Islamist Wave 2015 - News & Discussion

In short, IS left this guy ...

Abu Ayman al Iraqi, a former colonel and air defense intelligence agent under Saddam Hussein, in charge of defending Tikrit. He spent 2007-2010 in American custody at Camp Bucca where he hooked up with Al Qaeda in Iraq. During the Syrian Civil War he went to Idlib, Aleppo, and Lattakia as a senior IS commander, where he assassinated FSA men among other activities.
In his heart he harbors vestigial loyalties to Saddam Hussein and his defense of Tikrit is personal. The war with Iran and the Shia is his primary reason for joining and leading IS, and his immense military skills are the reason IS is overjoyed to have him.

So far he has prevented the Iranian-backed Shia militia conquest of Tikrit. Shia casualties had mounted so high that there were the beginnings of a popular Shia street mobilization against the Baghdad government and participating militias for launching the foolhardy and costly operation in Tikrit. As a result the assault was halted and there were calls to ask for US airstrikes against IS in Tikrit. The US denied, DC not wishing to aid Iran too directly in the face of AIPAC and the GCC. This has created a split among Shia Iraqi leaders, one militia leader calling those who'd rely on the US 'weaklings' and insisting he'd capture Tikrit with Iran's help only.

That IS has aligned the Shia with Iran's overt and heavy direction against it, that IS has so far defended Tikrit, that IS has split the Shia on the matter of a Shiite-American alliance, and that it hasn't been so overwhelmed by all that it couldn't continue its expansive work elsewhere... is spectacular in the eyes of the Sunni public. Even secular Sunnis, reformist Sunnis, anti-Salafi Sunnis, and pro-Western Sunnis are finding themselves supportive of IS on the single all important question, "Who else is going to effectively fight the Shia, Assad, and Iran?" As if to drive the answer to that question home, IS launched a massive attack on Shia mosques in Yemen in the wake of the Houthi takeover that has so alarmed Sunnis and left them dismayed by the lack of Saudi counter-action. While America and the Arab Monarchs sit on their hands in the face of Shia advances, IS is killing Shia in droves and on several fronts.

It's ironic that Zawahiri who so sought to win Arab popular opinion is now clawing for it, and IS, which intentionally disregarded public relations and its image... has more image than it can handle.


Iraq’s Tikrit offensive drags on as Islamic State advances elsewhere

The Iraqi army’s assault on the city of Tikrit began with upbeat promises that it wouldn’t take long to overrun the Islamic State (IS) paramilitaries which had taken control of the city. Once Tikrit was back in government hands, the way would be clear to start moving north towards Iraq’s second city of Mosul.

There were even confident predictions from both the military and government that Mosul itself would be subject to intense assault in April or May and that retaking it would deal a huge blow to IS. After all, it was the capture of Mosul in June 2014 that finally alerted Baghdad, the US and an array of regional and Western states to the seriousness of the IS threat.

Within two weeks, the Iraqi prime minister, Haider al Abadi, said that victory was near and would be achieved “ totally by Iraqi hands ” –- but barely a week later, things look very different.

The assault on Tikrit has clearly stalled . Although many of the villages around the city have been retaken, the forces attacking the city itself have withdrawn to regroup, as much more information comes to light about the nature of the fighting.

Government forces have been facing intense opposition, losing up to 60 men a day , with many of them being taken to the Shia holy city of Najaf for burial. The forces attacking Tikrit have been overwhelmingly Shia militias – and not Iraqi Army units – comprising 23,000 militia paramilitaries and just 3,000 Iraqi troops, heavily backed up by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps specialists.

IS’s defenders, meanwhile, number between 400 and 1,000 , a tiny clutch of determined fighters holding off a force more than 20 times its size.

It is still likely that Tikrit will be retaken at some stage – but not necessarily because of Iraq’s might or skill.

On all fronts
The usual pattern of IS’s paramilitary operations is to fight as long as is practical and then withdraw to fight elsewhere – and this is already happening at this particular flashpoint.

In a little-noticed operation, IS fighters recently overran the strategically important headquarters of the Iraqi army’s Brigade 26 at Thar Thar near Baghdad, killing 30 Iraqi Army personnel and wounding 40 . That this was done even as intense fighting surrounded Tikrit shows IS is not putting all its resources into maintaining control of the city.

Indeed, in the long term, what is now happening may even aid the movement. There is mounting evidence that the government-linked Shia militias that are so important to the whole campaign are frequently taking revenge on Sunni communities wherever they gain control.

There was evidence of this in a Human Rights Watch Report on a government attack on the town of Amerli as long ago as summer 2014, when thousands of houses were torched in 30 neighbouring villages.

Similar actions are now being reported around Tikrit – and these, combined with all the Shia militia actions of recent months, herald an increase in support for IS from Sunni clans right across northern and north-west Iraq.

From the perspective of the IS leadership in Raqqa, Syria, there are other positive signs outside the immediate zone of conflict.

Expanding the map
Tunisia has long been one of the main sources of foreign recruits to IS cause, but there were worries that as Tunisia’s tourist industry recovered, helping the overall economy and reducing the anger and frustration among unemployed youths, the country as a source of recruits would diminish as a threat.

But the Bardo Museum massacre, timed to coincide with a cruise ship visit, could both seriously damage the tourist industry and spark a severe government crackdown on extreme elements. Both of these moves would fuel anger on the margins – and thereby supply yet more IS recruits.

Similarly, an IS affiliate’s attack on the Shia mosques in Yemen’s capital Sana’a , which killed well over 100 people on March 20, had a specific purpose: to remind Saudis sympathetic to IS that its supporters are active in Yemen, where the Houthi ascendancy is of considerable concern to Riyadh given the rebels' Iranian links .

Saudis already fear a “Shia crescent” stretching from Lebanon and Syria through Shia-dominated Iraq and on to Iran and the Arabian Sea – so Iran’s strengthening influence in Yemen is dire news for them indeed.

IS’s influence in chaotic Libya is also on the rise. And the government of Afghanistan has now stated what many people expected: that there are factions in the country now pledging allegiance to IS .

The icing on the cake was Binyamin Netanyahu’s recent victory in the Israeli elections .

Much as Ian Paisley was once described as the Provisional IRA’s best recruiting sergeant in Northern Ireland, so Netanyahu is similarly regarded in Raqqa – even more so if he makes good on his promises to allow more settlements, stand tough on Gaza and confront Tehran.

Take all this together and it is hard to dispute that, far from being on the defensive, IS’s leaders are surely confident that their reign is far from over. After all, they clearly see this as a conflict set to stretch over not months or years, but decades.

http://theconversation.com/iraqs-tikrit-offensive-drags-on-as-islamic-state-advances-elsewhere-39198

An excellent brief biography of the Islamic State's Caliph.

-is from Samarra
-has 6 children to 2 wives
-was the Imam of a Sunni Mosque in a Baghdad suburb
-has a masters degree in Islamic studies from the Iraqi University of Baghdad
-became a Qutbi Ikhwani while at the university, gave up Ikhwan because of its all talk, no action reputation
-was arrested for visiting an Al Qaeda friend, though he was not himself Al Qaeda
-went to Camp Bucca prison with a great number of other Al Qaeda and Baathist men, entered their organization
-was chosen to lead Al Qaeda in Iraq against Osama Bin Laden's objections

“Before anything I want to understand why he became like this, why an academic would make such a choice and how he feels toward the thousands of people he has killed around the Middle East. Then I’ll make sure he gets punished,” Maj. Bakr (a pseudonym), a member of the elite Iraqi counterterrorist unit the Falcon Brigade, said.

Iraqi forces had him in their crosshairs on Nov. 8, 2014, but an airstrike came too late and a wounded Baghdadi, 44, managed to slip across the Syrian border. The self-styled caliph now travels secretly and has avoided the public eye, apart from his infamous Friday sermons at a mosque in Mosul. While seclusion has only raised his profile, Baghdadi’s origins remain wreathed in more mystery than his movements.

Uncovering the man behind the demagogue was no easy task, so to find an answer I interviewed people who met him, saw him or lived with him in the past. I visited the neighborhood where he lived in Baghdad and the mosque he led the prayer services as an imam; I saw pictures of his family members, including his sons, daughters, brothers and wife. Based on all this, I will try to depict the man before he became the elusive Baghdadi, when his name was Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, or Sheikh Ibrahim, of Samarra and he led a fairly normal life.

How did Sheikh Ibrahim become Caliph Baghdadi?

This was the main question to answer. The first place to visit was the neighborhood of Tobji, nestled in northwest Baghdad, where he lived and was the imam of the Sunni mosque of Haji Zeidan, built in 1958.

I headed directly to the mosque’s wooden door, knocked twice before a policeman opened and expressed surprise when I asked if this was the place where the IS leader used to lead the congregational prayer as an imam. “I don’t know anything about this,” the policeman said, before calling Khaled, the man who introduced himself to me as the son of the mosque’s imam. “People here are afraid of discussing this issue openly,” Khaled said. “My father has been arrested several times because of Baghdadi. The last time he was detained for almost two months. The intelligence wanted to talk to him once more. I’m not sure you’ll find someone to tell you anything here.”

I then approached two men, one of whom seemed old enough to know all those who lived in the area in the last 40 years. When I asked if he knew Baghdadi, the man’s face changed, and he said with fear in his eyes while looking at his friend, “We don’t know him, he was one of few young students who lived here 15 years ago. Nobody knows him well. This is an old story that we prefer not to discuss."

The last group of men I met were more forthcoming. A man in his late 70s told me he used to see him in the area but never spoke to him, while another man roughly the same age said, “He wasn’t the mosque’s imam, he was a tailor and he was a student too.” A third man, about 35 years old, said Baghdadi lived there while he was studying at the Iraqi University before the US invasion of Iraq. “He wasn’t alone, he had a family with him. The guy seemed very normal, and yes I do remember him very well,” the man told me.

The younger man waited until I left a group I had been standing with and then approached me, revealing that he knew Baghdadi very well. After introducing himself as Amjad, he said, “Sheikh Ibrahim [Baghdadi] was someone very normal, someone like you. He didn’t have any complexities in his life, and we used to play football here,” as he pointed to an empty piece of land next to the mosque. “He was obsessed with scoring goals; he would become nervous if he didn’t.” Amjad added, “When the US invaded Iraq he decided to take up arms and fight — he changed a lot after that.”

As Amjad finished speaking, one of the gentlemen I met earlier said, “Are you still asking about the same guy? We told you we don’t know anything about him. This is an old story and we have no intention to answer your questions.” It was obvious that my trip to Tobji was over, but my search wasn’t.

According to official documents, Baghdadi is married to two women who gave birth to his six children. His first wife, Asma Fawzi Mohammed al-Kubeisi, his first cousin, is the mother of Huzaifa, Omaima, Yaman, Hasan and Fatima. Israa Rajab Mahal al-Qaisi is his second wife and the mother of his youngest son, Ali. It is unknown whether Asma or Israa live with him, yet Abu Ahmad, who claims he has known Baghdadi since the 1990s and studied with him at the same university and was part of his close circle, suggested they reside within the territories that he controls. Abu Ahmad agreed to talk to me on two conditions: that he cover his face and we conduct the interview in my hotel room.

According to Abu Ahmad, the IS leader has three brothers: Shamsi, Jomaa and Ahmad. “There are serious differences between Sheikh Ibrahim and his brother Shamsi. On several occasions Shamsi objected openly to his brother’s choices, but this didn’t stop him from being detained by US and Iraqi forces many times,” Abu Ahmad said. “Jomaa was a Salafist from the beginning. He was an extremist even when Baghdadi was not yet part of that circle, causing many problems between them. But things are different now. Jomaa is one of his brother’s bodyguards and one of the closest aides to him. His third brother Ahmad caused Baghdadi some problems, and his reputation isn’t that good in regard to financial issues,” he added.

Shamsi is detained at one of the Iraqi intelligence detention facilities to the north of Baghdad and suffers from serious health problems. An official Iraqi security source ruled out the possibility of conducting an interview with him.

In regard to Baghdadi’s time at university, Abu Ahmad said, “Sheikh Ibrahim was a calm person. He used to take part in social activities, but started changing after he was introduced to Dr. Ismail al-Badri, who directed him toward a special path with the Muslim Brotherhood. He became a member of the jihadist Ikhwan [Brotherhood] and a sincere follower of Sayyid Qutb. He quit in 2000 after reaching the conclusion that they [Brotherhood] were people of words and not action.”

Hisham al-Hashimi, the author of “Inside Daesh” and an adviser to the Iraqi government on extremist groups, said Baghdadi became a Salafist in 2003. “He was influenced by Abu Mohammed al-Mufti al-Aali, the man who was seen at that time as the main ideologue of the jihadist groups in Iraq. Baghdadi along with other followers of Abu Mohammed — what was known as the Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a movement — had people in Baghdad and Samarra,” Hashimi said.

Then somewhere near Baghdad I met Abu Omar, a former IS member who was held three years at the Camp Bucca detention center that was managed by the US occupation forces in Iraq near the city of Umm Qasr. The camp was named after Ronald Bucca, an American firefighter who was killed during the 9/11 attacks in New York. “Camp Bucca was a great favor the United States did to the mujahedeen,” Abu Omar, who served his time at Camp Bucca for being a member of al-Qaeda, said. “They provided us with a secure atmosphere, a bed and food, and also allowed books giving us a great opportunity to feed our knowledge with the ideas of Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi and the jihadist ideology. This was under the watchful eye of the American soldiers. New recruits were prepared so that when they were freed they were ticking time bombs.”

At Camp Bucca, Abu Omar met Baghdadi, who was then using the alias Abu Duaa. “He used to lead the prayers and on many occasions gave Friday sermons. He wasn’t someone important there when compared to the high-profile inmates such as Abu Mutaz, Abu Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi and current IS spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani. They were the big names and they had their fingerprints on the world of jihad,” Abu Omar said.

Baghdadi was arrested in 2004 while visiting an al-Qaeda-affiliated friend. At that point, the future IS leader wasn’t a member of the organization. He had just graduated with a master’s degree in Islamic studies from the Iraqi University in Baghdad, now known as the Islamic University of Iraq, and was preparing to start his doctoral degree. Hashimi said, “At Camp Bucca, Baghdadi absorbed the jihadist ideology and established himself among the big names. He met Haji Bakr, back then known as Samir al-Khlifawi, Abu Muhannad al-Suedawi, Abu Ahmed al-Alwani. These were officers in Saddam [Hussein]’s army, and despite their Baath origins they impressed him with their military knowledge. He also influenced them with his religious background — mainly his expertise in Quranic studies.”

Abu Omar, Baghdadi’s friend at Camp Bucca, filled in other details of Baghdadi’s daily life there: “I saw him playing football with other prisoners. I was amazed by his skills, and I understood later that he was given the name Maradona. This is the only thing I saw in him. I heard his speeches but he was nothing compared to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. His words lacked power,” he said.

During his years at Camp Bucca, Baghdadi built his contacts and established good ties inside Iraq’s al-Qaeda. As soon as he was released he became a member of the group, taking the name Abu Duaa as his alias. Baghdadi sought to continue his studies and acquired a doctoral degree in Sharia from the Islamic University in Baghdad. Outside prison, Baghdadi met Sheikh Fawzi al-Jobouri, one of the influential intellectuals within the ranks of Iraq’s al-Qaeda. Jobouri introduced him to the organization’s Minister of Information Muharib Abdul Latif al-Jubouri, who used his authority to help Baghdadi go to Syria and concentrate on his writings on condition that he would help in media issues whenever they needed him.

“Sheikh Ibrahim’s field of study was phonetics of the Quran, a rare field that only few chose in their doctoral studies.” Abu Ahmad said. “He was influenced by his father who used to teach the Quran at the Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal Mosque in Samarra.” The future leader of IS acquired his doctoral degree in June 2006, the same month that the al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian, was killed by US and Iraqi forces.

There was no obvious candidate within al-Qaeda in Iraq to succeed Zarqawi. He had possessed an unchallenged reputation and charisma within the organization’s ranks, and he had in fact posed as great a threat to the authority of Osama bin Laden as US President George W. Bush.

Zarqawi’s ideology differed from bin Laden and he resented pledging allegiance to bin Laden. Zarqawi’s priorities were different; he believed in focusing on the enemy nearby, not the one afar. This meant killing Muslim enemies, Shiites for instance, came before killing US soldiers. Because of the similarity of IS' philosophy to Zarqawi’s beliefs, jihadists widely believe that Zarqawi is the real founding father of IS.

After Zarqawi’s death the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq, then affiliated with al-Qaeda, was also announced. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was chosen as its first emir, while Abu Hamza al-Mohajer (known also as Abu Ayyub al-Masri) was his deputy and minister of war.

When he finished his studies, Baghdadi went back to Syria to take on more serious roles within al-Qaeda. He became the assistant of Abu Ghadiya, who was responsible for moving fighters through Syria to Iraq.

“Abu Ghadiya was said to have been killed by the US forces in a strike on the border between Syria and Iraq,” Hashimi said. “The truth is that he survived and was detained by the Americans. He was later handed over to the Iraqi authorities, but he succeeded in fleeing along with others on July 21, 2013, from Abu Ghraib prison.”

After the attack on Abu Ghadiya, Baghdadi returned to Baghdad, where he was introduced by Haji Samir, whom he met in prison, to the Islamic State of Iraq’s second-in-command, Abu Hamza al-Mohajer. Mohajer was impressed by Baghdadi and introduced him to the group’s emir, Abu Omar. It was clear that Baghdadi had sponsors inside the Islamic State of Iraq who helped him to quickly climb the ranks. “His relation with Abu Omar wasn’t direct at the beginning, yet Mohajer recommended him for several roles,” Hashimi said. “He was later appointed as member of the powerful Shura Council.”

Iraqi intelligence believes that Baghdadi was later promoted to be a member of the coordination committee. “Members of al-Qaeda call it the blessed coordination committee. It’s responsible for coordinating between the emir of the organization and governors of the states,” Maj. Bakr, the intelligence officer, said “He was one of three men and became the most prominent and trusted one among them. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi gave this committee high authority.”

During this period, Baghdadi began to be noticed. The higher he climbed up the al-Qaeda organizational ladder, the higher he was ranked on Iraq’s most-wanted list. It was not until April 18, 2010, that he became a priority to be captured.

On that date, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri were both killed in a US-Iraqi joint operation. Al-Qaeda in Iraq had lost its leader and his deputy, and there was a dire need to choose a successor. Al-Monitor found that Haji Bakr backed Sheikh Ibrahim to be the next emir of al-Qaeda in Iraq. But bin Laden wanted a different man — Haji Iman — to be the successor. This made Haji Bakr’s task difficult; he had to convince the key players that the man he supported was the best choice. Eventually, he succeeded, and nine members of the Shura Council agreed to vote for Sheikh Ibrahim.

Former IS member Abu Omar said one of the main reasons for Baghdadi’s selection was that he was descended from the Quraysh, the same tribe of the Prophet Muhammad, one of the conditions for being selected as caliph. “This was very important to those planning the future strategy of the group, those who wanted to fulfill Zarqawi's dreams in subsequently announcing the caliphate,” Abu Omar said. “There was a great challenge to face after the Sharia Council abstained from accepting him. He [Baghdadi] wasn’t up to it, I heard many of his speeches, he lacked the charisma, he’s not to be compared with Zarqawi.”

Sheikh Ibrahim then chose the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as an alias — an odd choice for someone hailing from Samarra. “It’s like saying that Baghdad will always be their target,” Abu Omar said. “The final battle will be in Baghdad. Baghdadi wants to revive the glory of the Abbasid Caliphate, so this is also a message to the enemy that Baghdad is ours.”

Baghdadi’s main mandate was to revive the Islamic State of Iraq. He started by gathering members he thought were capable of helping him achieve his goal. Within a few months, the Arab Spring ignited and the revolution in Syria began. It was the best opportunity for the group to spread in a fertile environment.

Months later, developments further cleared the field for Baghdadi. Bin Laden was killed and the less charismatic Ayman al-Zawahri succeeded him. Taking advantage of the leadership vacuum, Baghdadi sent two of his aides to Syria to expand his state. These aides, Abu Mohammad al-Golani and Mullah Fawzi al-Dulaimi, formed Jabhat al-Nusra.

The new group started gaining ground within months and Baghdadi decided it was time to declare a state under his rule in both countries under the name of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Golani, however, refused to go along with Baghdadi’s decision, as did Zawahri. These were hard times for Baghdadi’s organization as it stood on the verge of its first serious defection.

“Abu Mohammad al-Golani was one of Baghdadi’s soldiers,” Abdel Bari Atwan, a veteran Arab journalist who met bin Laden and wrote a book on ISIS, said. “He was sent to establish a branch for the Islamic State in Syria. Baghdadi wanted to expand through Golani, but the latter decided to instead look to their leader [Zawahri]. He [Golani] wanted to be a branch for the main al-Qaeda, he wanted to be an emir in the same way as Baghdadi. He also wanted it to represent the Syrians only.”

Golani’s decision intimidated Baghdadi, who decided to take revenge by going himself to Syria. “Golani’s move was a punch in the face to Baghdadi; it was a stab in the back,” Abu Omar said. “Baghdadi gave him everything; men, money and contacts. Yet, Golani saw himself as a possible leader with direct links to Khorasan [al-Qaeda's central command]. He thought it was time to make a great leap.” A serious crack appeared within al-Qaeda in Syria: Baghdadi and Golani were at war with each other. Soon ISIS began taking control of areas that were held by Jabhat al-Nusra, and Raqqa was the first Syrian province to fall completely into the hands of ISIS. It was obvious Baghdadi’s men had the upper hand in the fight, and in June 2014, ISIS entered Mosul in Iraq and delivered the decisive blow in the battle for supremacy, starting a new era.

Baghdadi declared the caliphate and pronounced himself as the new caliph. “Four men declared him caliph — Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, Abu Ibrahim al-Masry, Turki al-Binali and Abu Suleiman al-Otaibi — before his defection,” Hashimi said. “They convinced him to take this step fearing that Zawahri might precede them; such a declaration attracts new recruits and donations.” The move put to rest the competition.

The journey was complete, and Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai — the local imam, academic, US-held prisoner and al-Qaeda officer — had become Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ori...aliph-many-names-al-qaeda.html##ixzz3Va9q90gw

Latest issue of IS' brilliant magazine Dabiq https://ia601503.us.archive.org/10/items/Dabiq8/Dabiq_8.pdf

Damn archive.org deleted it? They are usually very liberal as far as allowing controversial content.

Over at the LongWarJournal there's a frequent poster, "Tom", who's made some curious points on Novorossiya, Assad, Obama, PKK, FSA, IS, etc. He's blatantly pro-IS and is clearly following developments closer than I am.

Here's his response to the latest video from IS of their campaign in Hama Governorate.

• The Tank shows the USAF and USN as usual are overstating their kills, and that the Air Campaign is largely ineffective, as usual.
  
  Artillery is and will remain the king of the battlefield. Unless directly hit, a tank will shrug off a bomb going off nearby it, though the crew will be fatally vacuumed out if the hatch was open. 30mm rounds bounce off even the top armor of Tanks, not enough angle of attack.
  
  We are also seeing that IS attritional strategy is working like the NVA’s and Novorussians. Grab the few critical spots, then a string of outliers you can afford to lose and let them serve to soak up enemy counter-attacks and resources while you counter-punch elsewhere and close the gap.
  
  Note this is not the best map and is not meant to be definitive, it lacks roads and what not, so overlay it with Wikimapia.
  
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Module:Syrian_and_Iraqi_insurgency_detailed_map/doc
  
  Starting at Jarabulus, IS must holds are Jarabulus, Manbij, Sarrin, Tishrin Dam, Tabqa Dam, Ar-Raqqah (most important as it was a historical Caliphate Capital), and Tall Abyad. With these, they pretty much control entrance to their territories they claim and can raise forces in sufficient quantities to negate their losses and grow their Army larger.
  
  Everything else they can give up at need and indeed in early 2014 they were fighting for their life in Raqqah and abandoned all of Lataika and Idlib province, half of Aleppo, and 2/3rds of Deir Ezzour. After securing Raqqah they then expanded into Iraq and today they still hold 70% of what they took.
  
  Key differences between IS and Novorussia forces:
  
  IS is shoestringing its conquests together and most of its heavy equipment is taken as spoils of war or cottage built.
  
  Novorussia is being given top rate Russian military equipment with Russian Military license plates still on them.
  
  IS is self-funded
  
  Novorussia is blatantly paid directly by Moscow
  
  IS has no real defence against fixed-wing aircraft, so long pilots don’t stupidly fly low like the Jordanian pilot, they’ll be fine. Helicopters are another matter.
  
  Novorussia has effectively shot down the entire Ukrainian Airforce
  
  Other key IS strengths:
  
  They have an operationally organized military. Tactical units are expendable so long as the overall operational goals are met, but if they conclude an operational goal can’t be met, they’ll pull back and reassess. IS is seeking to win the war, not battles, and so long as they have an army, they have a state.
  
  They constantly spend the majority of their budget (98%) on social programs and reconstruction which in turn means more refugees settle in their areas because there is stable if harsh order and social services.
  
  YPG can’t accomplish that, so despite holding Kobane, the majority of their budget goes to its military, most of the Canton’s residents have fled and are not returning because their homes are destroyed and YPG can’t reconstruct them as IS destroyed or looted all their construction equipment. YPG lost 4,000 killed despite their propaganda which most people uncritically accept at face value, and FSA is spearheading their stalled counter-offensive which IS is now counter-attacking into. Unlike YPG, IS knows that if people don’t have homes or somewhat functioning services their military is ultimately doomed as they can’t recruit enough soldiers and more importantly the supporting troops that keep their heavy equipment working. And outside of the Assad regime, IS supplies the most power for civilian use.
  
  YPG could in theory provide the power its people need, but haven’t allocated the resources and wastes money antagonizing Turkey with PKK militancy. In addition YPG has squandered much of its military in human wave assaults, backstabbing everyone, getting slapped back, and then crying for help later. Nor is YPG able to make good its losses without recruiting children by force. IS by contrast is mostly volunteers and kids can’t fight unless their mothers say its okay, which is not much better, but it is what it is.
  
  As for FSA:
  
  What FSA? Whoever isn’t wholly owned by JAN and IF have fled the country.
  
  Like IS, JAN is fighting for a Caliphate as well, just less dickish about it

• “Sigh”
  
  We are degrading ISIS Obama says. Ironically before the US got involved by bombing the IS, FSA, JAN, YPG/PKK, and IF were planning a joint strike on Tishrin Dam followed by a march on Raqqah.
  
  http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/archive/8/88/20140912043639!Syrian_civil_war.png
  
  http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/archive/8/88/20141004202144!Syrian_civil_war.png
  
  As you can see, FSA, JAN, and IF were besieging Tishrin to relieve the pressure off of YPG and force IS to defend Raqqah.
  
  The airstrikes on JAN killed the plan because it also killed IF leaders and led JAN to decide SRF was a liability and strike them first while IF pulled out of the Tishrin front.
  
  End result was the total collapse of the FSA pockets along the Euphrates. Obama scored an Own Goal for IS and JAN. Oops!
  
  Looking at the updates:
  
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cities_and_towns_during_the_Syrian_Civil_War
  
  IS is resuming its Kobane offensive now that the ground is firming back up for Trucks and new recruits trained over the winter are now ready for combat.
  
  They already retaken the Mitras Grain Silos, Hamadun, and Cilik (Jayl). They are ow moving to surround Mitras, thus securing Sarrin and using it to rsume the fight for Kobane. YPG simply doesn’t have the troops or equipment to resist them and IS operational capabilities negate its opponents advantages.
  
  Scoot over to Hasakah, IS is pushing into Tall Tamer now, and further over it has repushed across the Khabur river between Tall Brak and Tall Hamis. IS goal is quite clear here, take the upper Khabur River Valley and the remaining Syrian Wheat Fields or at least deny them to YPG, further harming their economic resources just as they did to the Kobane Canton which lost its entire fall drug crop and the income from cigarette smuggling.
  
  In this IS is following the operational strategy of the Rashidun Caliphate which lost more battles than it won, but still won the wars because they carried out an integrated approach that fought their enemies economy, manpower, and logistics and was flexible enough to call off operations when the army became imperiled.
  
  YPG which follows French Doctrine constantly wastes its forces and as the front is now spread out, IS mobile forces are able to encircle and destroy them while negating US Air Power. Also as previously mentioned elsewhere, YPG has lost the Civilian base it recruits from and Turkey has closed the border to all but select Kurds who it knows won’t join YPG which is a subsidiary of PKK and considered worse than IS by Turkey.
  
  As for Assad:
  
  1. He can no longer win this war alone with the resources he has.
  
  2. Hezbollah doesn’t have enough numbers to replace losses and unless LAF intervenes in Syria in Assad’s favor, Hezbollah can’t deploy its full might.
  
  3. Iran is trying to reach him, but first they have to clean up Iraq and that is not likely this year as the Militias and Kurds have made it clear to Sunni Arabs that they are all considered to be IS and thus more Sunnis are joining IS because its that or be killed. They have no where else to go.
  
  4. Assad’s best forces, Tiger Brigade and Druze Division are stretched too thin or tied down in Deir Ezzour Pocket respectively.
  
  5. IS and JAN are growing stronger and amassing more equipment despite airstrikes which are more annoyance than actually useful and have even perversely helped IS and JAN.
  
  So Assad basically has to hold his capital, Homs, Deir Ezzour, Hasakah, and Qamishli if he wants to keep his job and head. He loses either of those spots, he is dead figuratively and literally and Iran won’t be able to link up with him in time with their militias.