Islamist Wave 2015 - News & Discussion

10 posts

Marcus

partition Syria and Lebanon into Shia-Christian and Sunni states

Angocachi
I believe that, despite appearances, Iran is going to grow frustrated with it's Shia Crescent Project and through MOIS make a pact with Ikhwani factions against the Arab Monarchs & Juntas. To do that they'll need to put the breaks on all of the Sunni-Shia Conflicts; Yemen, Iraq, Syria. They'll make a nonaggression pact with Sunni Jihadists in each theater and cut the administration of each country according to on the ground sectarian demographics at the time of agreement.
The cooler more calculating heads in Iran's intelligence community, it's clerics, and military don't want Iran to be the head of Shia against Sunni... because it unites all of their enemies against them and makes more enemies out of their natural allies. Rather, Iran wants the Sunnis battling each other while it backs the inevitable winner from the start.
The best indication of the future Iran-Ikhwan alliance is how Morsi opened the Suez Canal to Iranian warships such that they could float off the Israeli coast, dock in Syria and Lebanon, and stick their tongues out at NATO. If Morsi had remained he would have, with Erdogan and Iran, settled the Syrian conflict with an Ikhwani-Assad power sharing deal, and then Iran and Erdogan would have fallen over each other to back Ikhwani revolutions across the Arab World (Assad was most pleased with Morsi's removal because he feared competing with him for Iran's favor and didn't want to be pressed into such a deal when he was certain he could win). That's what Iran needs to get back to. I believe if Damascus and Aleppo fall, if the Houthis fail to hold Sunni Yemen, and if the Shia out of Baghdad can't hold Sunni Iraq... then we'll see Iran on that previous track once more.
Niccolo and Donkey
Angocachi

And the Tooth Fairy is real. Gimme a fucking break. This is as dumb as the Americans who were screaming "On 9/11 America was minding its own business....."
Angocachi
If they can't fund themselves after capturing 9 million people and a territory larger than many countries then that would be absurd.
SixtusVIth

I believe they captured several hundred million dollars when they conquered Mosul, it was reported at the time.

I want to know where they stand on the Laffer Curve and capital gains tax cuts :mises:

Welund

They also produce oil.

Angocachi

The Saudi station, al Arabiya, has this gorgeous Russian woman commenting on ISIS & Russia.

Antonius Blockhead Nelson Van Alden Fitz President Camacho Broseph Marcus

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http://english.alarabiya.net/en/vie...SIS-takes-its-fight-to-Russia-s-backyard.html

ISIS takes its fight to Russia’s backyard

More and more terrorist groups swear allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the international attempts to bring down ISIS seem in vain.

The strongest extremist organization gains the terrain, both on the ground of Syria and Iraq and in the minds of people far from the Syrian and Iraqi borders. ISIS challenges the Security Services all over the world, as the way it spreads is extremely difficult to be cut and controlled.

ISIS spreads primarily through the Internet, using it as a sophisticated instrument of propaganda, recruiting and expanding, along with personal contacts of its recruiters. Spreading over the net, they create cells as metastases, far from the Syrian and Iraqi borders – in Nigeria, in Libya, in Yemen, in Afghanistan, in Algeria, in Tunisia and others. The list is already long and is becoming longer.

ISIS is not al Qaeda. Its force and unity does not depend on authority and cult of one leader

The alarming message has come from a Russian senior security official after a session of the SCO’s regional anti-terror body, saying that some warlords of the prohibited Emirate of Caucasus have pledged their allegiance to ISIS. This trend challenges not only Russia, over 1700 citizens of which have joined ISIS, and who fight in Syria and Iraq (this figure is an estimate, the real numbers could be higher still), but for the whole Caucasus region and the neighboring countries.

Non-proclaimed war
Georgia is already fighting, or about to fight, a non-proclaimed war against ISIS. The Pankiski Gorge, the valley region of Georgia, birders with Russia’s Chechnya and is populated mostly by the Chechens.

The Gorge, feebly controlled by the Georgian authorities and security services due to its specificity and complexity of geographical location, poses a great security problem for the countries in the region, it being practically a free portal for local young radicals and militants of to go to the ISIS stronghold and return.

Now the Gorge is infiltrated by ISIS “so called” emissaries who brainwash the youngsters, recruit them and send to Iraq and Syria, using this well prepared and organized route functioning in an ideal way, used by the extremists willing to join ISIS worldwide.

The Gorge is a matter of great concern for Russia too. The Russian Caucasus Republics seem relatively stable, however there are regular anti-terror operations there. The stability is kept by the enormous efforts of the security forces and strongmen of the region.

“Liberate” the Caucasus
But who knows how long they will be able to keep the current relevant stability, as long as ISIS is getting stronger. The consequences of the destabilization in the region would be extremely dramatic. ISIS and its Chechen squadrons have already declared the war to Russia and promised to “liberate” the Caucasus.

ISIS has recently menaced the U.S., promising to “burn America” also, putting the two best rivals on the same side of a chessboard.

The scale of the ISIS menace to Asia is also dramatically rising. Many citizens of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have joined ISIS. According to data provided by the General Sergey Smirnov, deputy director of Russia’s Federal Security Service, over 4 000 people from the post-Soviet Central Asian republics fight for ISIS.

ISIS infiltrates the already existing terrorist groups so uniting them into one powerful and strong force. It’s quite obvious that ISIS will target - and targets already - all Muslim communities all over the world.

Assaulting stability
The tactical measures taken on the local level are shortsighted and inefficient in terms of the already global ISIS influence. The attempts of countries to take measures on the local levels and even in cooperation with their neighbors are also inefficient as they are about to elaborate the system of measures to counter the threat posed by ISIS.

Meanwhile ISIS has already created a complete system of assaulting the stability on the inside of countries in all levels and dimensions. They are one step forward already, that make the attempts to counter their threat much harder and less efficient. ISIS appeared to be much more ready for the use of the modern technologies in pursuing their goals, than the countries that have created these technologies.

The West’s focus on the illusory Russian threat that is more a matter of dreams than reality, wastes resources and forces on the countering of Russian propaganda. And it misses the time to counter a true and very concrete global theat.

The international community should realize the need of complex measures uniting all countries of the world to counter the ISIS threat. All sides should be united not under the aegis of a country, but of the U.N., for a stronger legitimacy and efficiency, as it prevents from turning the common affair into a business of a single country or a group of countries to serve their proper interests.

The ISIS cancer
ISIS is not al Qaeda. Its force and unity does not depend on authority and cult of one leader, but on the idea, lying in the core of this far-reaching project. It exists not only on the ground that can be bombed, but in virtual space, that needs much more sophisticated approaches.

Furthermore there is no way to stop the recruiters through dotty measures and to track down all of them. ISIS gets weapons and money, they trade in oil. To stop ISIS there is a need of a detailed investigation of the chains of its financial flows to cut them once and for all.

But it would be a tough challenge, as there are many of those who are eager to make a fortune on this devilish business. But if not to work on it now, the ISIS cancer will enter its final stage, where all the measures will be definitely vain and there won’t be nothing left but to watch the civilizations dying in the hellish barbarism.

-------------------------------------------
Maria Dubovikova is a President of IMESClub and CEO of MEPFoundation. Alumni of MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations [University] of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia), now she is a PhD Candidate there. Her research fields are in Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, Euro-Arab dialogue, policy in France and the U.S. towards the Mediterranean, France-Russia bilateral relations, humanitarian cooperation and open diplomacy. She can be followed on Twitter: @politblogme

Angocachi
The Competition between IS and AQ

The Islamic State’s lightning offensive through Iraq and Syria last year has dominated the headlines, but the jihadist group that has won the most territory in the Arab world over the past six months is Al Qaeda. On balance, the Islamic State has lost territory during this period—though it still controls more overall than Al Qaeda—most prominently, Tikrit and the southern half of the Salah al-Din province.

What we are likely to see now is a titanic war of ideology and tactics between two vicious, radical groups that together probably command more prestige among Arab peoples than the weak, often delegitimized governments they have outsmarted and outfought. Perhaps the ultimate irony is that, in an era when the threat of terrorist violence is arguably worse than it was on the eve of 9/11, it is Al Qaeda—a decade ago, the scourge of Sunni governments—that may come to be seen as the more acceptable of the two by these same governments.

Here is a snapshot of the two groups’ current territorial holdings, though these are changing all the time. In the past year, all of the Islamic State’s geographic gains have been minor, such as the town of Baghdadi in Iraq’s Anbar province and the Yarmouk refugee camp near Damascus, and they have also been contested, with control of these areas fluctuating between the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL) and its enemies. In contrast, Al Qaeda’s affiliated organizations have made striking gains, in particular in Syria and Yemen.

Why have these gains fallen somewhat under the media radar? In part because the Islamic State’s media capabilities dwarf those of Al Qaeda, which for years has employed a strategy that emphasizes a quiet presence and deliberate movement and has only occasionally tried to hold and govern territory. Frequently, its affiliates’ connections to the Al Qaeda network have gone unannounced, and the group has even worked to hide these ties. This strategy was effective against Western states as well as regional governments that Al Qaeda sought to topple, as Al Qaeda placed itself during the Arab Spring uprisings in a position where it could gain influence and destabilize recognized governments in multiple theaters, eventually allowing itself to erect its own governments from its enemies’ ashes.

When ISIL loudly burst onto the scene with its superior skills at public communication, it managed to change many of Al Qaeda’s strategic strengths into weaknesses. Essentially, ISIL transformed Al Qaeda’s deceptions and clandestine actions from an asset for fighting the West into a liability when it came to competing with the Islamic State for affiliated organizations and recruits. Because Al Qaeda was quiet in comparison to the Islamic State, it seemed not only to Westerners but even to some jihadist movement insiders that the Islamic State was quickly becoming the only game in town.

Al Qaeda’s recent gains show, however, that the competition between these two groups is far from over. The Islamic State's challenge to Al Qaeda’s holdings and supremacy over the jihadist movement will certainly cause Al Qaeda to adapt. The question is whether Al Qaeda will replicate ISIL by becoming louder and more overt—a rival would-be caliphate, in effect—or if its adaptation will be more unconventional, a kind of fundamentalist jiujitsu that waits for the Islamic State to overreach and be destroyed thanks to its baleful prominence in the fight against the West.

Either way, Al Qaeda is on the move, and we need to do a better job of understanding the latest iteration of this threat. Al Qaeda’s Syria affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, was at the forefront of a rebel military offensive that captured the city of Idlib, the capital of Syria’s northwest province of the same name, on March 28. Idlib’s fall represents one of the most significant rebel territorial gains against Bashar Assad’s government in two years. Consistent with Al Qaeda’s more quiet strategy, Nusra attempted to assuage its allies’ fears that it would seek to dominate Idlib, as the group’s emir Abu Muhammad al-Jolani stated that the city would be ruled by sharia (Islamic law) but also called for “unity among the groups that won Idlib" and said that they should set up an Islamic court to settle disputes.

Following the fall of Idlib, Nusra led the capture on April 1 of Syria’s Nasib border crossing with Jordan, a crucial route used to move commercial goods from Damascus to the Gulf. Nusra and allied rebel factions also have experienced success in Syria’s southwestern province of Dara’a, about 70 miles south of Damascus, including capturing key towns like Nawa (population 60,000), Sheikh Miskin (population 24,000) and Bosra al-Sham. In addition to its territorial gains, Nusra destroyed the Hazzm rebel movement, which received U.S. support, over the course of a single weekend.

Meanwhile, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the jihadist group’s Yemeni affiliate, has capitalized on the ongoing civil conflict in Yemen between Iranian-backed Houthi Shias, Sunni tribes and forces loyal to president-in-exile Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. AQAP recently managed to gain control over Yemen’s fifth-largest city, al-Mukalla, in the Hadramawt coastal region. As part of the offensive, AQAP militants freed some 300 prisoners on April 2, while also seizing a presidential palace and al-Mukalla’s security headquarters and raiding the central bank.

About two weeks earlier, AQAP also overran the southern city of al-Houta, the capital of Lahj province. The militants were able to seize the main security barracks, the governor’s office and the intelligence headquarters where Al Qaeda detainees were held. Though AQAP withdrew from the city the same evening, the fact that it overran al-Houta demonstrates the group’s capabilities. Indeed, AQAP has employed these hit-and-run tactics in other areas. It temporarily seized an army base in the town of Bayhan on February 15, capturing several soldiers and heavy weaponry before leaving the area.

This method of overrunning territory in Yemen without trying to hold it is designed to destabilize the areas, creating multiple chaotic environments that AQAP’s opponents will be unable to defend and thus allowing AQAP to ultimately erect governing structures after its opponents are exhausted. Additionally, AQAP has secured a base of public support in these areas from which it can recruit and receive backing, particularly given the Houthis’ penchant to make local enemies through their heavy-handedness. All of this prompted U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter to say of AQAP that it can be seen “making direct gains on the ground there as they try to take territory, seize territory in these battle lines.”

Al Qaeda’s gains have surprised many analysts. After all, the group’s strategy is based around having an unassuming presence and conducting some of its expansion through non-Al Qaeda brands. For example, Jabhat al-Nusra had long been affiliated with Al Qaeda prior to its public pledge of allegiance to Al Qaeda’s emir, Ayman al-Zawahri, in April 2013. Rather than making a noisy entrance into Syria, Al Qaeda first quietly entrenched itself with Syrian rebel groups. This has put Nusra in a very strong position, as it is now thoroughly enmeshed in the broader Syrian opposition, making rebel groups willing to work with it despite Nusra’s connection to Al Qaeda, and also making Nusra difficult for Western powers to attack so long as they still want to support the Syrian opposition against Assad.

Al Qaeda has disguised its presence in other areas, too. Many analysts did not recognize Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi in Tunisia or the Caucasus Emirate as affiliates of Al Qaeda until these groups publicly described themselves as parts of Al Qaeda in recent months. Similarly, the Tunisian government has presented evidence about Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia that, if accurate, means the group has been functioning as an unacknowledged Al Qaeda affiliate for some time.

The jihadist commentator Abdallah bin Muhammad recently wrote an article defending this approach. He quoted Osama bin Laden’s view that declaring an Islamic state was “political suicide,” since the West would muster its military resources to crush that state. He described Al Qaeda’s approach of cooperating with other Islamist groups, and even covertly participating in political processes, as “political guerrilla warfare.” (Bin Muhammad singled out Libya as a place where this covert political participation was occurring.)


Though Al Qaeda has controlled territory in the past (including northern Mali in 2012-13, parts of southern Yemen in 2011-12, and most of southern Somalia until al-Shabab was pushed back in 2011-12), it has never been so bold as to declare a caliphate. Indeed, the group has even shied away from declaring emirates. This is because Al Qaeda has never assessed itself to be in a position to hold significant territory for extended periods. Al Qaeda has instead focused on quietly building an organizational structure across multiple countries, destabilizing those countries and preparing to erect its governing structures amidst the chaos that it planned to unleash.

Al Qaeda’s strategy is effective in what we might call a two-player game (Al Qaeda vs. non-Muslim powers). But with ISIL’s emergence, Al Qaeda now faces a challenge from its own side that understands its ploys—a noisier adversary intent on turning the group’s tendency to stay below the radar into a weapon against it. Al Qaeda’s approach is more poorly suited to such a competitor because the Islamic State’s emergence was not accounted for when Al Qaeda forged its strategy for North Africa and the Levant. This makes it possible for ISIL to throw a monkey wrench into the plans Al Qaeda had prepared over the course of years.

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The Islamic State’s approach to global jihadism has been largely the opposite of Al Qaeda’s: ISIL is a boisterous organization that constantly seeks the media spotlight and touts its victories (real or imagined) at every opportunity. It is adept at communications, particularly its use of social media, and emerged at a time when the U.S. and other Western states were war-weary after 14 years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.

These dynamics allowed the Islamic State to gain a great deal of attention during its rise. ISIL was so hungry to foster the perception that it had momentum that the group even convinced prominent outlets like CNN and The Associated Press that it had taken control of the northern Libyan city of Derna when it was, in fact, only one of a number of armed players there. The Islamic State's subsequent military push into the Libyan city of Sirte appeared calculated to further create the impression of momentum and impress the Nigeria-based jihadist group Boko Haram, which agreed to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State and thus join its network. Essentially, much of the Islamic State's strategy for expansion into Africa had been a long con designed to falsely inflate the group’s significance on the continent. In the case of Boko Haram, a major jihadist group was persuaded by this con game.

Also, the Islamic State immediately claimed responsibility for the notorious Bardo museum attack in Tunis, which killed 24 people—mainly foreign tourists—on March 18. However, Tunisian authorities believe the attack’s primary architect was not the Islamic State but, rather, Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi, which is aligned with Al Qaeda. If ISIL exaggerated its role in the attack, its immediate claim represents the Islamic State again outflanking Al Qaeda because it understands the group’s methods. The Islamic State knew from past experience that Al Qaeda generally doesn’t claim credit for attacks while its operatives are still at large, particularly when they are trained operatives who are intended to survive. ISIL thus may have realized that it could issue a claim of responsibility before Al Qaeda was prepared to do so.

Further, the Islamic State recognized that it has the media operations of Al Qaeda—a group that has been pursuing an often covert strategy—outgunned. Given the way media cycles work—and ISIL is very attuned to the media cycle—its false or exaggerated claim of responsibility would dominate the news before anybody could disprove it, at a time when Bardo remained a top headline. Al Qaeda’s greater role wouldn’t become known until the attack was no longer a hot news item, and, given its disadvantage in media operations, Al Qaeda would have trouble swinging the perception of momentum back to it.

The Islamic State’s louder strategy has allowed it to snatch up a couple of important Al Qaeda affiliates, Boko Haram and Egypt’s Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. ISIL's strategy for convincing Al Qaeda affiliates to align with it has a number of components. One is to tout its own successes, sometimes embellishing them while providing enough granular information to make the Islamic State's exaggerations seem believable, while never admitting failure. The group’s loud claims of success have often been echoed by the news media even when they proved to be inaccurate, as was the case for ISIL's claims to have conquered Derna.

The Islamic State has also employed an “out with the old, in with the new” narrative about its competition with Al Qaeda. In several issues of the group’s English-language magazine, Dabiq, the ISIL refers to its ability to do three crucial things: gain territory, maintain momentum and consolidate its gains. The group often juxtaposes its criticisms of Al Qaeda with references to its slogan, baqiya wa tatamaddad , or remaining and expanding.

Part of the Islamic State's criticism of Al Qaeda centers on the latter’s inability to create a caliphate over its decades-long existence. In the first issue of Dabiq, titled “The Return of Khilafah,” the Islamic State presented a chart (right) illustrating the five phases necessary to achieve the caliphate. It explained that while the Islamic State had reached the fifth and final stage, that of establishing the caliphate, Al Qaeda had “become frozen” in the very first phase, that of hijra (emigration). In the same issue, the Islamic State highlighted a high-level defection from Jabhat al-Nusra to the Islamic State. In later issues of Dabiq, the Islamic State would continue to trumpet its ability to inspire defections from Al Qaeda, both from individuals and entire groups. In return for the loyalty of its new supporters, the Islamic State “guarantees … constant victory and consolidation” despite being surrounded by enemies.

The Islamic State has made several references to Al Qaeda’s strategy in Yemen, criticizing the organization’s unwillingness to emphasize sectarian attacks against the Houthis and stating that it would resolve Al Qaeda’s “mistakes in creed and methodology” with its expansion into the country. Similar to the group’s loud expansion into other theaters, ISIL’s March 20 suicide bombings targeting Houthi mosques in Sanaa, which killed 137 people, were designed to show off its presence.


The Islamic State's model has been highly disruptive for Al Qaeda, as it has poached two major affiliates and threatens to either capture still others or at least inspire defections from their ranks. But ISIL's model is also a flawed one. Not only does its declaration of a caliphate make the group’s legitimacy hinge on the caliphate’s continued viability, but the Islamic State has done nothing but make enemies since its advance into Iraq. Further, the group’s emphasis on consolidation and momentum means that a failure to maintain the momentum that it trumpets jeopardizes ISIL. Indeed, despite the group's boisterous advance into Africa, the recent military setbacks it has experienced in Iraq at the hands of the coalition aligned against it pose a significant challenge.

The most obvious way for Al Qaeda to respond to the Islamic State's rise is to become more overt than it has been. In an effort to show that it hasn’t become obsolete, Al Qaeda could ask its affiliates to more explicitly adopt the Al Qaeda brand and could conduct the kind of shows of force that have made the Islamic State so prominent.

But Al Qaeda could move in an unexpected direction that, as in the past, exploits its adversaries’ willingness to view it as a spent force. Rather than becoming more overt, Al Qaeda could instead further de-emphasize its brand, pushing affiliates that lack a known Al Qaeda affiliation to the fore and getting others to shed the Al Qaeda label in order to rekindle a robust relationship with Sunni states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait.

And then it can wait for Islamic State to destroy itself by drawing all the fire. ISIL has moved what political theorists call the Overton window—a range of ideas the public will embrace—with respect to what is “acceptable” behavior for Islamist groups, thus making Al Qaeda appear to be a lesser evil to some Sunni states (as well as to some Western commentators). In addition, the region’s growing Sunni-Shia competition might further open the door to Al Qaeda’s rehabilitation—and thus to state sponsorship as it operates under new names.

Such a strategy would be risky for Al Qaeda, as creating a front organization for its Iraqi affiliate helped produce the Islamic State’s ultimate break from the mother organization. But at the same time, this strategy would be based on the same premises trumpeted by top U.S. officials such as Vice President Joe Biden: that the coalition’s recent string of successes has significantly weakened ISIL. In other words, Al Qaeda may assess that the challenge posed by ISIL will recede sooner rather than later. If the Islamic State loses the city of Mosul, many jihadists may begin to question whether it had ever succeeded in establishing a caliphate in the first place. Despite the risks, such a gambit by Al Qaeda could pay off. After all, this move would bank on its adversaries failing to understand Al Qaeda’s subtle and complex strategy—and many analysts charged with understanding the group have displayed an overarching eagerness to declare its incapacity.

So whose strategy is more likely to succeed? The competition between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State will be fierce, and many unexpected developments could occur. They could be vying for supremacy over the global jihadist movement for years. However, Al Qaeda is better positioned for the long term, while it’s not clear that the Islamic State is prepared for a metaphorical rainy day. Al Qaeda has survived an onslaught by the world’s sole superpower that has lasted a decade and a half, and it isn’t clear that the Islamic State poses the mortal challenge that some commentators believe. However, the Islamic State's rise poses a challenge to Al Qaeda that, if correctly exploited, could severely weaken the organization that Osama bin Laden unleashed.

This is why it is so essential that we understand what the shape of the Al Qaeda network is, instead of analyzing the group based on what we would like it to be. The United States has a great deal of opportunity to exploit the cleavages between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, but if we fail to understand the two organizations’ strengths, weaknesses and strategic and tactical postures, the jihadist movement may emerge from this period of competition stronger than before.

http://www.politico.com/magazine/st...g-the-islamic-state-116954.html#ixzz3XMJFCuL2
Marcus

AQ and Daesh stand to gain the most from Saudi intervention in Yemen.

Angocachi

This maps the shift in Salafi Jihadist power between the IS axis and the AQ axis over a year.

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Geopoliticus: The FPRI Blog
One year later, ISIS overtakes al Qaeda: What’s next?
People:
Clint Watts
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A year ago, the Islamic State (IS or ISIS) was on the rise but few expected them to travel such a rapid trajectory to the top of the global jihadi community. The fighting ( fitna ) to kick off 2014 between Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s arm in Syria, and ISIS seemed, at first, to be undermining the greatest jihadi foreign fighter mobilization in history. But in June 2014, ISIS swept into northern Iraq simultaneously seizing Mosul and the minds of jihadi supporters worldwide by doing what al-Qaeda always discussed but never delivered--an Islamic State. Through audacity, violence against Assad, Shia, the West, and slick social media packaging, ISIS now dominates the global jihadi scene. Foreign fighters have flocked to ISIS ranks and when unable to travel, have sworn allegiance to ISIS ( bayat ) in groups across North Africa to Southeast Asia.

The Good News for al-Qaeda

  • Jabhat al-Nusra is rebounding in Syria : Pressure on ISIS from the international coalition combined with the failings of Western backed militias to seize the initiative in Syria have allowed the still well-funded and cohesive al-Qaeda arm Jabhat al-Nusra to resurge in Syria taking Idlib in the last couple of weeks. To survive, al Qaeda needs its place in the Syrian jihad – Nusra remains its greatest hope.
  • Yemen’s Turmoil Creates Operational Space for AQAP : Just when an emerging younger ISIS affiliate may have started to challenge AQAP in Yemen, the Houthi coup and ensuing Saudi response has ignited a sectarian war where AQAP has already regained ground once lost to the Yemeni government. AQAP, since bin Laden’s death, has become al-Qaeda Central and with time, space and maybe the death or resignation of Zawahiri in Pakistan, they may be able charge forward and challenge ISIS.
The Bad News for al-Qaeda

  • Jihadis don’t care about al-Qaeda: More than any other factor, global jihadi members and supporters don’t talk much about al-Qaeda. ISIS has coopted al-Qaeda’s most notable characters showcasing bin Laden, Zarqawi and even Anwar al-Awlaki in their propaganda and rhetoric. Even the youngest ISIS supporters are openly challenging Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda needs their own success to rally the troops. They haven’t really had that in years and should even a big attack occur it’s doubtful it would eclipse ISIS's success.
  • Jabhat al-Nusra might want to quit al-Qaeda : Nusra’s connections with al-Qaeda and loyalty to Zawahiri have hurt the group more than helped it. Al-Qaeda’s Khorasan Group embedded in Nusra has brought U.S. airstrikes. Al-Qaeda’s global focus distracts from Nusra’s local focus and doesn't offer a viable alternative to the ISIS state which provides the only form of governance in parts of Sunni Iraq and Syria. Why would Nusra stick with al-Qaeda at this point?
  • Al-Qaeda’s resources are limited: Compared to ISIS, al-Qaeda relies heavily on donations, which allowed it to survive while being hunted over the past decade. Today, donor reliance is a liability for al-Qaeda. ISIS coffers are full from oil money, licit and illicit schemes, and their successes have allowed them to push into al-Qaeda’s donor stream. Al-Qaeda provides little incentive for donors to cough up their cash, and has no population to prey on for resources.
  • Al-Qaeda has lost membership across all affiliates: Zawahiri’s creation of al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-Continent signals his vulnerability to the Taliban’s shifting allegiance to ISIS. He feels threatened and all al-Qaeda affiliates globally are either shifting their allegiance or are finding splinters that support ISIS form in their ranks.
The Good News for ISIS

  • Everyone wants to be ISIS : The pace of pledges coming into ISIS is unprecedented and unexpected. When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the Islamic State and named himself as the new caliph, one might have expected more backlash for his arrogance. Instead, jihadis have seen ISIS's success and generally gone with his pronouncements and fallen in line. ISIS ranks have swollen in Iraq and Syria over the past year with the pace of foreign fighter recruitment likely peaking in the late summer and fall of 2014 before the push of the international coalition. ISIS, until the loss of Tikrit, is winning, and jihadis love them for it.
  • Affiliates (Emirates) are popping up all over : Just as pressure mounts on ISIS in Iraq and Syria and they begin to lose ground, other new affiliates continue to pop up in safe havens of promise. Libya and Yemen provide two new genuine opportunities for ISIS to anchor and homes for foreign fighters to nest in as they are pushed from the Levant. ISIS affiliated attacks in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen show the potential of this new global jihadi network.
  • Resources still in tact : Despite a sustained aerial campaign, ISIS remains able to sustain itself logistically.
The Bad News for ISIS

  • Everyone wants to be ISIS : A letter from Zawahiri to bin Laden, found amidst the Abbottabad documents , described al- Qaeda’s concerns about the growing number of inspired members claiming to be al-Qaeda that had no actual connection to the group. ISIS's rapid growth faces a similar challenge. How might the misplaced violence of inspired supporters hurt the group’s global appeal? Baghdadi has affirmed the pledge of some affiliates but also ignored the pledge of other upstart groups signaling he may not even know of these emerging groups, or he doesn’t trust that they are committed and in-line with ISIS goals. ISIS's rapid rise and growth while being under pressure from an international coalition suggests that there will be emerging command and control problems as young boys execute their violence with limited or no guidance.
  • Taking losses in Iraq and Syria: As opposed to al-Qaeda, which has existed as a stateless, cellular network, ISIS's unity of command and cohesiveness depends on the centralization provided in their pursuit of a state. They are now taking losses and fractures appear to be emerging as defections increase and ISIS has allegedly killed off doubters in their own ranks. Pressure on ISIS continues to mount, on-the-ground, in-the-air and online, Baghdadi and his inner circle face a substantial challenge in 2015.
  • Declining foreign fighter flow: Thousands of fighters have been killed in recent months and these losses will be difficult to regenerate as it becomes more difficult for fighters to get to the battlefields in Syria and Iraq.
http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2015/04/one-year-later-isis-overtakes-al-qaeda-whats-next

Marcus