Islamist Wave 2015 - News & Discussion

10 posts

Angocachi
The Method Behind the Islamic State's Madness


"At first glance, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) strikes observers as a fanatical religious group, bent on millenarian goals and fully committed to its position as the vanguard of a new caliphate. And that is exactly what ISIL wants you to think. The reality is more mundane. ISIL is a cool-headed organization with an impressive understanding of “image management” that feeds on state failure and sectarian tensions. ISIL is not trying to expand for expansion’s sake. Rather, it is trying to “dig in” and create a mini-empire in Sunni-majority areas in Iraq and Syria. These limited goals, however, make ISIL more dangerous, not less. Managing the ISIL crisis requires recognizing three dynamics. First, there is a method to ISIL’s madness, and a coalition of pragmatists — jihadists and secular Baathists — behind its strategy. Second, a realistic assessment of the strategic environment where ISIL operates suggests that the organization is much less “irrational” or “suicidal” than often thought. Third, ISIL’s approach to territorial control is pragmatic and flexible. Thus, strategic retreats or military setbacks, such as ISIL’s defeat in Kobane, do not hurt the organization as much as it is perceived in the West.


A Band of Pragmatists


Behind ISIL’s success lies an alliance between jihadists and Baathists who play a crucial role in strategic planning, running military and information operations, and building institutions . Baathists from Saddam’s defeated regime see ISIL as their only means for survival and the best vehicle for reestablishing dominance in Iraq. The existence of this alliance suggests that we are facing not fanatics whose eyes are fixated on other-worldly prizes, but pragmatic agents who are more than willing to combine an inflammable ideology with military and administrative know-how. Scrutinizing the evolution of jihadist ideology is necessary but not sufficient to understand ISIL’s strategy.


Once we move past the myth of ISIL as a homogeneous jihadist establishment, the “method” behind the madness that ISIL projects through its strategy of savagery becomes more visible. The military logic of barbarism is all too straightforward: ISIL uses “fear factor” as a force multiplier to compel and deter both its enemies and dissatisfied factions living in territory under its control. Two additional factors inform ISIL’s approach.


First, ISIL operates in a highly competitive market for global jihadists and is capitalizing on its unique brand as the baddest, meanest, “purest” jihadi organization in the world. ISIL’s acts of violence and territorial ambitions (and, so far, ability to get away with them) are best seen as daring commercials in a long and well-devised advertisement campaign to grab more of the market share. Second, ISIL’s acts are not merely attempts to cow the Westerners into passivity (or to provoke them into over-reaction) by aggressively promoting a death cult . Rather, ISIL is aiming to present itself to a specific target audience in the Muslim world, as the righteous underdog that fights against overwhelming odds not only in the name of God, but also for the sake of justice. Take the example of the recent video that shows the burning of a Jordanian pilot. For many in the West, this is an act of meaningless savagery or even desperation , but ISIL positions this as righteous justice. The group establishes a narrative around the “crime,” in this case the civilians killed alongside ISIL fighters by airstrikes. Then ISIL instantly and directly associates the pilot with these charges. Suggesting that people who died in the airstrikes were burnt alive or crushed by debris, ISIL burns the unfortunate pilot and then crushes the cage in which he was trapped. Thus, this seemingly savage and senseless act is intended for a local audience to whom it will have meaning.


Assessing the Strategic Environment


ISIL leaders believe they can afford to present an uncompromising and fanatical front because they don’t believe the United States and its Western allies will put boots on the ground in Syria and Iraq. Nor does ISIL appear overly concerned about regional actors. The Iraqi government has yet to recover the reputation it buried in Mosul. Furthermore, Baghdad’s heavy reliance on Shia militia and Iranian support that reached new heights during the battle over Tikrit in March 2015 inadvertently empowers ISIL by fueling the Sunni-Shia rift on which the organization feeds. Turkey may be more capable, but several factors inhibit Ankara from leading a ground assault against ISIL. First there are the obvious economic and human costs that would be associated with such an undertaking. Second, Turkey makes for a highly vulnerable target for ISIL-inspired or sponsored terrorist attacks. Third, having bet heavily on Assad’s rapid downfall , the Turkish government categorically refuses to be involved in any cross-border operation against ISIL unless the West promises Assad’s removal from power in return.


While the Syrian military has extensive experience battling the jihadist groups, motivating Assad to tackle ISIL would be difficult for two reasons. First, Assad’s weakened forces are tied up fighting the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and non-ISIL jihadist groups like Jabhat Al Nusra, al Qaeda’s Syrian branch. Second, Assad would be unwilling to concentrate his forces and attention on ISIL unless the West commits to a settlement where the regime remains intact and the FSA is liquated. Considering that Assad has been demonized in the West for years and countries such as Turkey adamantly oppose any reconciliation with the Syrian regime, this would be a very hard pill to swallow for the United States and its allies.


The Kurds appear to be a motivated and capable fighting force, especially in the wake of the successful defense of Kobane. However, not only are the existing Kurdish military experiences and capabilities best suited for territorial defense, the Kurds’ strategic priorities are to preserve what is deemed as Kurdish homeland, and to gain recognition as a capable and legitimate political entity. Even if the West can incentivize the Kurdish forces to go on the offensive against ISIL through promises of further recognition and support for an independent Kurdish state, Kurdish incursions into regions that are deemed outside of the Kurdish homeland will provoke ethnic tensions and elicit harsh responses from Turkey and Iran (who both have their own Kurdish minorities) as well as the Iraqi government.


This leaves Iran as a wild card. Even if Iran opts for a more direct involvement in the conflict and helps bring down ISIL, the resulting “victory” may set the stage for a post-ISIL sectarian firestorm that can drag the region into a multi-theater transnational conflict. Iran’s involvement in the Syrian civil war is a case in point. When the Iranian government sent — informally — its elite Quds forces to fight alongside Assad a couple of years ago, Tehran inadvertently empowered a narrative that portrayed the civil war as a Sunni-Shia conflict (despite the fact that the Assad regime has considerable Sunni support). In no uncertain terms, further Iranian involvement in Iraq and Syria can set the stage for the Middle East’s own Thirty Years’ War .


As things stand, none of the actors that ISIL defies has the will or capability to tackle ISIL head on. This allows the organization the opportunity and time it needs to build the kind of state it seeks.


Mapping Out the “State” in the Islamic State


There are two common assumptions about ISIL’s statehood. The first is that ISIL cannot sustain itself as a state-like institution in the long run because people under its rule will be too displeased with the quality of services, and eventually rise up. The second assumption is that since ISIL’s appeal comes from both the myth of invincibility it has created and its claims over territorial control , failure to capture new territory and territorial losses will break the halo surrounding the organization and will — almost automatically — pave the way for its demise. Both assumptions are misleading.


Just like most proto-states throughout history, ISIL is acting as a “ stationary bandit ,” raising revenue through extortion, kidnapping, and smuggling while at the same time controlling natural resources. In return, ISIL provides a modicum of security and “protection,” as well as public goods that range from subsidized bread to free education and health. ISIL also polices the streets and even manages traffic. It is true that the revenue ISIL raises from such activities (1 to 3 million dollars a day) is not all that much for a “state” ruling over six million people. The assumption that ISIL will eventually implode, however, misses one crucial dynamic: a stationary bandit needs to sustain a “standard” in its services only when it faces competition from other bandits. Simple market mechanisms are at work: unless other political actors in the region offer competitive services, ISIL can rule those lands on the cheap.


Although it resembles most proto-states in history, ISIL’s approach to territory fundamentally separates it from the nation-states that lie at the heart of the present-day international system. It is now common knowledge that ISIL declared its intention to eradicate the borders established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 (that the more accurate reference point about present-day borders is San Remo Conference of 1920 escapes not only ISIL but also many area specialists). What is often missed about this claim is that ISIL sees the very modern nation-state (with its hard borders and claims to territorial sovereignty) as a Western artifact that does not fit with the human terrain of much of the globe. By implication, ISIL is not seeking a seat at the UN and cannot care less about the dictums of international law. In short, ISIL’s challenge to the present-day territorial order is more fundamental than merely seeking to establish an Islamic state.


But what about ISIL’s claims to have re-established the Caliphate? If so, then it will be unlike most caliphates in history, which, while built around religious principles, were never only about religion. From a territorial perspective, most caliphates were transnational empires built on indirect rule that transcended boundaries. ISIL is in fact trying to build a mini-empire, in the same way land empires were conceived in the classical times from the Byzantium Empire to the Ottomans. Like those empires, it legitimizes its authority by invoking a borderless ideology, and aims to extend political control through break-neck pragmatism and institutional as well as territorial flexibility.


Upon closer inspection, it becomes evident that ISIL is following the key principles of imperial governance: pragmatism over standardization, multi-layered administration, and considerable delegation to locals. Similarly, ISIL does not strive to create “hard borders” or impose “uniformity in administration” to create “ homogenous spaces .” These principles not only have allowed ISIL to expand its “sphere of influence” rapidly, but can also explain why ISIL can afford to run a terrain of six million people on the cheap. The “territorial logic of ISIL” is also reflected in the organization’s power projection methods, which can be traced to the Islamic empires of the past, for example, the Ottoman Empire. In these Islamic empires, the disregard for hard borders and the embracing of “open frontiers” revealed itself best in the so-called Ghazi tradition. Ghazi, in its traditional interpretation, stood for the Islamic knight who served both for religious reasons as well as for the sake of bounty. Ghazis were used to expand frontiers by raiding enemy areas repeatedly, in order to soften the populations and break resistance. A cult of martyrdom was combined with a remarkably flexible and pragmatic approach not only to territorial expansion, but also strategic retreats and territorial contraction. ISIL operates under similar principles and its military performance to territorial expansion and retreat should be analyzed accordingly.


Understood through this lens, we can surmise that ISIL can absorb losses of specific pieces of land like Tikrit. First, ISIL’s ideology is not built on the notion of indivisible homeland, but rather on territorial flexibility. Second, ISIL’s reputation and appeal do not derive from a myth of invincibility as most Westerners would like to believe, but has more to do with the image of “relentless David” who fights against not only non-Muslims but also those it brands as “pretenders,” especially the Shia. As long as ISIL is able to commit its forces to fight till the bitter end and exact a considerable toll on the overwhelming forces it faces (the parity of forces was somewhere between 1:25 to 1:50 in Tikrit ) while at the same time provoking sectarian reprisals on the Sunni population, piecemeal territorial losses will not have decisive strategic impacts on the fight against ISIL. In fact, the siege of Tikrit suggests that religion has a very important place in the ISIL crisis, if defined in terms of sectarian tensions.


Reverse-Engineering ISIL?


So, what can be done to defeat ISIL’s strategy? In the near-term, we have to move beyond sensational interpretations of the organization that present ISIL as a band of irrational fanatics. Doing so points towards an immediate and time-sensitive opportunity: to break the jihadist-Baathist alliance, by either trying to co-opt or at least empower the Baathist wing. This would be a challenging task, one which intelligence agencies would be best-suited for. If successful, the benefits would be substantial.


In the long run, we must target the territorial logic of ISIL directly. From a military standpoint, this requires separating the Syrian and Iraqi theaters by making it extremely costly for ISIL to transfer resources and manpower across now defunct borders. Enforcing artificial lines of demarcation is not the cheapest option and most certainly does not create as much fanfare as the “liberation” of a town does. The West must recognize, however, that such operational successes do not automatically translate into strategic victory. We are facing a strategic actor that has achievable goals and operates in an environment that it understands very well.


Ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu held that what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy . Make no mistake. ISIL is playing the long game. Slowly but surely, the organization is setting up a “sectarian trap” to establish a mini-Empire in Sunni-majority lands in Iraq and Syria. Defeating ISIL requires a long-term strategy that can undermine the organization’s strategic planning, not quick operational victories that may further destabilize the region in the long run. The worst that the West can do would be to give in to the sensational interpretations of the organization and the myth of a quick, decisive, and “cheap” victory."


http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/the-method-behind-the-islamic-states-madness/3/


The second article is giving the lowest estimate possible for ISIS' population; 6 million. That's an impossibly low figure if you just add up some of ISIS' largest cities in the Mashriq, never mind the towns and countryside. The widely accepted figure is ~9 million, a bit more than Austria, Switzerland, New Jersey , or Virginia.


Anyhow, the above two articles are supreme and if you don't read anything else in this thread, read those.
Marcus
napoleonparttwo

Where does/did most the funding to MILF come from? Was it indigenous (i.e. levying taxes, crime, etc.) or was it foreign based? I also have read that the Moro people have retained a lot of their indigenous practices as well as a few customs adopted from Christianity, is this also true of the fighters who are in MILF, or are they more devout/Wahhabist in nature?

Angocachi

MILF is the Fatah of Bangsamoro. They attack until the government buys them off. Abu Sayyaf is the Salafist Jihadist group there and is far less compromising.

Marcus

There was a rumor that McVeigh's coconspirator Terry Nichols had connections with Salafists in the Philippines (his wife Marife is Filipina).

Angocachi
There's also the olive skinned man spotted by a witness(es) who many later suspected was Jose Padilla.
I don't know if McVeigh or Nichols had any connection to Jihadists or not, but I do notice that the ones most interested in such ideas of an Islamic connection are anti-Islamic types who like to inflate the danger of Islamic terrorism and downplay the history of non-Islamic domestic terrorism. Whenever such types bark about Islamic terrorism they're invariably confronted by Muslims and multiculturalists with muh'McVeigh. I suspect they form Muslims did OKC theories to pass that hurdle to forming a thoroughly Islamophobic terrorism narrative.
Terry Nichol's wife was a mail order bride and nominal Christian from Cebu. She wasn't a Muslim or a Moro, nor would she likely have known any.
Angocachi
Marcus Nelson Van Alden Fitz napoleonparttwo

This is a thorough and insightful history of IS in Iraq demolishing the Sunni insurgency and what these groups, Baathists and Salafis alike, have done to preserve themselves (or fail to preserve themselves) in the face of the juggernaut Caliphate project.
If IS duplicates their Iraqi experience in squashing other Sunni militants in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan then the Taliban, Libyan Dawn, Al Nusra-Jaish Al Fath, AQAP, etc need fear.


Rise Of The Islamic State And the Fading Away of the Rest of the Iraqi Insurgency Interview With Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi

From 2013-2014 it seemed like there was a broad rebirth of the Iraqi insurgency. The protest movement against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government revived a number of groups, which had gone dormant by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. The Islamic State (IS) and the Jaish Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshibandi (JRTN), two organizations, which never ceased operating were regrouping as well. A rough agreement was made between these different factions to work together during the summer of 2014 to seize territory from the government, which resulted in the fall of Mosul, Tikrit, and a large swath of Kirkuk province as well. The number of different groups who participated in the offensive last year gave rise to a narrative about revolutionaries and tribes, not just the Islamic State carrying out a revolt against Baghdad. Today, the story has changed as many of these smaller groups have either been swallowed up by IS or gone dormant. To help explain the changes that have taken place within the Iraqi insurgency is Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi a fellow at the Middle East Forum. He can be followed on Twitter at @ajaltamimi .

1. In 2013 and 2014 a number of Iraq’s older insurgent groups such as Ansar al-Sunna, Jamaat Ansar al-Islam, the Islamic Army, 1920 Revolution Brigades, Jaish al-Mujahadeen, and others reactivated as the Sunni protest movement started and violence began picking up once again in Iraq. In 2014, many of these groups came to an understanding with the Islamic State (IS) to take part in the summer offensive. What were these groups hoping to achieve by working with IS, and what has become of them now?

The groups in question had different agendas. On the more moderate side of the spectrum was the Islamic Army, which post-2011 U.S. withdrawal demobilized and set up the Sunni Popular Movement, in a bid to push for a Sunni federal region in Iraq. In contrast Jaish al-Mujahideen had always struck a nationalist, Salafi and anti-Shi’a rejectionist tone towards the post-2003 order. But as you note, most of these brands only really re-emerged with active advertisement of militant activity and evidence of a presence on the ground in 2013-2014, and the key early example of coordination with IS came in the fall of Fallujah at the beginning of 2014, which was often described inaccurately at the time as having come under IS control. Coordination also occurred in the summer offensive in the captures of cities in the north of the country including Mosul and Tikrit.

The main reason for coordination was undoubtedly hope on the part of these groups that they could carve out their own spheres of influence without being subjugated by IS. But quite predictably, the opposite of what they expected took place, over varying degrees of time. The other insurgent factions in Fallujah and the wider area held out for some time in the face of IS, which really became dominant in the city by May-June 2014, and defeated Jaish al-Mujahideen in a confrontation in al-Karma (al-Garma) to the east of Fallujah city in late August 2014, forcing it to withdraw from the town. As a result of these developments, IS created its own “Fallujah Province” in September 2014. In other areas of Iraq, such as Mosul, which fell in June 2014, it took much less time for IS to gain the upper hand, within a month or so, reflecting IS’ stronger position with its gains in Syria and its deep entrenchment in Mosul. More generally, a trend that very quickly emerged over the summer of 2014 was IS’ consolidation of the cities, while other factions left for the countryside.

Even so, things only continued to get worse for these groups, as members continued to give allegiance, were arrested or killed by IS, or simply fled and quit the field. The worst affected was Jamaat Ansar al-Islam, a jihadist group that had mainly been active in Ninawa and Kirkuk provinces and had set up a Syria branch in 2011. Jamaat Ansar al-Islam initially coordinated with IS in the offensives on Mosul and Tikrit but rapidly lost members to IS. Undoubtedly part of this trend was the result of the fact that Jamaat Ansar al-Islam has the same end goal of a Caliphate and since IS already declared itself to be the Caliphate, ideological incentive for defection exists.

Thus, it is estimated from remnants of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam who did not defect that around 90% of members gave allegiance to IS by the end of August 2014, which IS then exploited to have senior defectors issue a statement in the name of the whole group in Iraq declaring its dissolution. Though rejected by those who controlled Jamaat Ansar al-Islam’s official Twitter account, the remnant faction is too small to have any real influence on the ground. As a result, Jamaat Ansar al-Islam can be considered a de facto defunct group in Iraq as IS has continued to hunt down the remnants with impunity, while its offshoot branch in Syria still survives primarily in Idlib and Aleppo governorates.

The other factions continued to claim operations but directed against the government, of small scale and little significance, and these attacks have gradually declined to virtually nothing. For example, it should be noted that the “General Military Council for Iraq’s Revolutionaries,” a faction serving as a front for both the Jaish Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshibandia and the 1920s Revolution Brigades, continued to claim targeting of Taji military base to the north of Baghdad, and with the new government offensives in al-Karma, it even claimed some fallen fighters. But now the group’s official page is merely issuing occasional official statements and reporting on government abuses.

The Islamic Army occasionally claimed fighting in the countryside of Salah ad-Din province- such as in the Yathrib district- but that too has now vanished. By the group’s own admission, coordination had initially existed with IS but it eventually stopped as problems predictably arose (e.g. the Islamic Army once had a presence in Baiji city, but members gave allegiance to IS or left the city).

So in short, Iraq’s insurgent factions beyond IS have descended into irrelevance. From the little data left, it is possible some of them are operating in some countryside areas and in and around Baghdad city where one can still escape the clutches of IS, but this has no real impact on the overall security situation. The current crisis greatly differs from the Iraq War of the mid 2000s in that the insurgency was much more diverse back then, and members of non-al-Qaeda/Islamic State of Iraq groups played an important part in forming the Sahwa movement in 2007. One might have hoped that the same process could be repeated now, but that is not the case.


2. After IS, many believed that the Baathist Jaish Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshibandia (JRTN) was the second largest militant group in Iraq. The organization has been back in the news recently as it appears that its leader Izzat al-Duri was recently killed. Like the rest it too cut a deal with IS during the summer and participated in seizing several cities. Afterward there were reports of fighting between the two groups in places like the Hamrin Mountains and other areas. What happened with its alliance with IS, what is the state of the group today, what will be the impact of Duri’s death?

For many months and even now it has been widely supposed that JRTN is an “alliance of convenience” with IS. However such a notion is greatly mistaken. Non-IS jihadis would often draw attention to prior
coordination between JRTN and IS in a bid to show that IS is not a legitimate jihadist group at all but rather a Ba’athist group in jihadi guise, a notion that has also gained some currency in the media. Further I think the perceptions of an alliance between JRTN and IS were reinforced by claims originating from Atheel al-Nujaifi [governor of Ninewa] in the summer that IS was withdrawing from parts of Mosul and allowing JRTN to assume responsibility for management.

It is more accurate to characterize relations as one where JRTN, like the other insurgent factions, also hoped to have its own sphere of influence, but proved itself unable to withstand IS. This is true even in areas where many analysts expected JRTN to be particularly strong such as Tikrit and the surrounding area.

The true nature of the relationship between JRTN and IS is best determined by reading between the lines of its statements issued over the course of 2014 and into this year. Though JRTN did not denounce IS by name in its statements and sometimes absurdly blamed the government in Baghdad, it clearly distanced itself from IS’ genocidal targeting of the Yezidis, displacement of Christians from Mosul, as well as destruction of heritage sites in Mosul and elsewhere.

As 2014 came to a close, JRTN claimed Western attempts at outreach in a bid to form a Sunni force to fight IS as a sign of desperation at the strength of JRTN. JRTN was actually the one becoming increasingly desperate. Though strongly denying any involvement in discussions over participation in the proposed National Guard or other initiatives suggesting dialogue with the government, JRTN turned to regional Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. This was reflected in effusive praise for the latter, and a remarkable eulogy to the Jordanian pilot Muadh al-Kasasbeh who was burned alive [by IS]. JRTN went so far as to hail him as a “martyr” carrying out obligatory duties of defending the “holy sites of our Arab Islamic Ummah.” This JRTN alignment with regional Arab states including Saudi Arabia was also reflected in Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri’s last recorded speech that came out this month, which also marked a reversion to classic praise for Gamal Abdel Nasser as the hero of Arab nationalism with distancing from the “takfiri” thought of IS. Contrasting with JRTN’s alignments, the 1920s Revolution Brigades vociferously condemned Arab state participation in the coalition against IS on account of the airstrikes on Sunni areas of Iraq.

The present state of JRTN suggests that some members are still present in areas under IS control- such as Mosul- but have no influence and live underground, with some very minor safe havens also in the Kirkuk countryside. As such, JRTN cannot be seen as the force that can defeat IS. For the same reasons also I do not see Duri’s death as having a real impact on events in Iraq, even if confirmed (still no confirmation either way from JRTN, whose last statement was in praise of the Saudi-led coalition against Houthis in Yemen).


3. During the U.S. occupation years IS’s predecessor Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) considered itself not only as the vanguard of the resistance to the Americans, but eventually its leader. It had a long history of demanding allegiance from other groups, and going after those that refused. Can you give a little background to this history, and whether it repeated that same tactic after the fall of Mosul in 2014?

The current ideological basis for IS demands of allegiance from other groups is its presentation of itself as the Caliphate, which requires allegiance from the world’s Muslims and the dissolution of all other groups and other organizations. However, this does not mean that IS had not exhibited similar behavior in its prior manifestations. For example, IS’ predecessor organizations had a long standing dispute with Jamaat Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, sparking clashes on multiple occasions in Ninawa and Kirkuk governorates and mutual assassinations. The key here is that although both groups have the same ideology, Jamaat Ansar al-Islam only considers itself a mere group (jamaat), while IS’ predecessors in the forms of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham) and ISI (Islamic State of Iraq) already considered themselves a state in some form, and therefore demanded allegiance. The tensions were such that Jamaat Ansar al-Islam appealed to no avail in 2013 to Ayman al-Zawahiri to restrain ISI on the grounds that it was his affiliate in Iraq.

The main difference following the fall of Mosul was that what became IS was much stronger than its predecessor organizations, with contiguous territory spanning borders, claims to state governance that translated to reality on the ground and the assumption of Caliphate status. Hence, IS demands for allegiance could not be taken lightly, and what followed was the rapid demise of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam over the summer of 2014.


4. Many tribes were said to have risen up against the Iraqi government as well. IS was known to have appealed to some sheikhs to join it. Have these connections been maintained, and have any turned against IS like what happened before in Iraq with the Awakening and Sahwa movement?

Unfortunately, the present evidence does not suggest meaningful shifts in the tribal dynamics against IS. The initiatives that have arisen have mostly helped to prevent IS from seizing more territory rather than taking territory from IS. The most notable case is the Kata’ib al-Hamza in western Anbar, taking its name after the initiative that arose among Albu Mahal tribesmen in al-Qa’im in 2005 against AQI. Kata’ib al-Hamza draws on locals not only in Haditha but also dissidents from the Albu Mahal tribe in al-Qa’im and other far western towns in Anbar that are currently IS strongholds (Rawa, Anah and Rutba). The group initially claimed to have connections in these strongholds to undermine IS, but that has not so far been borne out on the ground. The Kata’ib al-Hamza’s main function has been to help prevent IS from taking Haditha. Even so, local resistance can be overwhelmed, as was the case when IS took the town of Hit in Anbar last year.

More generally, new tribal initiatives have been repeatedly announced in a bid to roll back IS in Anbar but these initiatives tend not to be anything groundbreaking but are rather the same tribesmen who have been working with the government all along since the fall of Fallujah in January 2014. The notion of a viable ‘third-way’ tribesmen who are both against the government and against IS is mistaken, and part of the problem is that IS has been able to divide members of some of the same tribes against each other, a tactic IS also employed in eastern Syria as it consolidated control.


5. IS is no longer seizing large tracts of territory and has lost ground in places like Babil, Ninewa, Kirkuk, and most recently Tikrit in Salahaddin. At the same time, it is still carrying out large offensives in many of those same provinces along with Anbar. There is an on going debate over whether the tide has turned against the group, and whether its decline has begun. What do you think the general state of the Islamic State is in Iraq?

I think for the sake of media stories there is a tendency to be hasty and proclaim “IS is winning/losing” according to the latest development. It is however fair to say that on aggregate IS has lost territory in Iraq since the summer of last year, having lost all major towns in Babil and Diyala provinces (though in the latter, IS activity persists despite claims the province has been completely cleared of IS), as well as the town of Tikrit. Meanwhile, the fighting fronts in Anbar and Salah ad-Din are at best proving to be only stalemates, and it is notable that very recently Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi issued a mobilization call in the Syrian provinces to reinforce these fronts. Despite these setbacks for IS in Iraq, the fact remains that in the strongholds they control like Mosul, Tel Afar and Fallujah, they face no meaningful local opposition that can undermine their rule, which would be the most effective way of rolling back the bulk of its holdings in Iraq.


6. Finally, what has the group been doing in Syria recently, and what does that say about whether the group has reached a tipping point or not in its defeat?

In Syria, IS has mainly been trying to expand in southern Damascus province and in eastern Hama province, having announced new “provinces” in these areas. Elsewhere, the frontlines remain largely static. For example, in north Aleppo countryside, there has been no meaningful shift in positions either way since August 2014 when IS seized some northern border towns and villages including Dabiq, which plays an important part in IS apocalyptic discourse. Indeed, that particular frontline (which I visited in December 2014) remains remarkably quiet, with only occasional exchange of gunfire and mortar rounds. Partly this has to do with the vast efforts IS put into trying to take the Kurdish city of Kobani but ultimately failed in the face of hundreds of coalition airstrikes and limited Peshmerga ground intervention. Ultimately I think these developments very much vindicate the cautionary words of Joel Rayburn who has repeatedly affirmed that we should not think of IS as an unstoppable juggernaut. The group does not have the resources to launch intense offensives on every front. But even so, the same point applies to the Syrian territories it rules as to its Iraq holdings: there is a problematic lack of meaningful local opposition to undermine its rule; and in Syria, IS has much more of a claim to the trappings of a state than it does in Iraq (e.g. in Raqqa IS is able to provide electricity as a public service, not so in Mosul). So if we are going to see the collapse of IS in Syria, I think this is still years off at best.


http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.be/2015/05/rise-of-islamic-state-and-fading-away.html?m=1
Angocachi
[​IMG]

The greatest testament to the social potency and spiritual validity of IS is not in the masses of recruits it draws. It's in the ever growing number of nominally conservative, militant, White Western men who are volunteering themselves to Marxist wog militias for the chance to indulge their ancestral crusader souls in battle against authentic Mujahideen.


"A former US Marine has set up a Gofundme page so he can travel to the Middle East and ‘hunt’ ISIS killers.

Philip Bonnie, who fought for the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Marines in Fallujah, Iraq, in 2007, is trying to raise £7,000 for plane tickets and equipment to join Kurd forces fighting against the terror group.

The 31-year-old, a University of Arizona graduate from Norfolk Virginia, posted a message on the page - titled 'ISIS Hunting Permit' - outlining why he wants to travel to one of the most dangerous places in the world.

Bonnie, who has also worked as a military contractor in Iraq, Afghanistan and Africa, said: "I believe that the innocent have a right to survive. I saw the tyrannical thumb dictating through fear while I was in the Marines.

"I believe that people from all races, all nationalities, have a right for freedom, a right to dictate their own lives, a right to live without fear, a right to not be subjugated to the iron rule of sharia if they choose not to.

"I believe in the humanity of mankind to fight against oppression and torture; both mentally and physically.

"I believe in the right to choose. With all my heart, I swear, I will make a difference.”

Speaking to Mirror Online, he admitted his family are scared but support his decision.

He said: "My parents will always worry but they understand my convictions and my desire to help those in need.

"They support my decision and did every time I went back to Iraq or Afghanistan."

Having seen the fate of other Westerners captured in Iraq, does he fear being taken by the terror group?

He said: "I know what will happen, but sometimes you have to be prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice in order to do the most good.

"It would have been the same if I was captured in Iraq or Afghanistan. The convictions I hold in my heart outweigh my fear of the possibility."

When he discovered Kurds, who are embroiled in a desperate battle with ISIS, were actively recruiting fighters from the West he contacted them and was accepted.

He has raised $426 of his $7,000 target so far. One donor, Tyler Deaton, said: "Give 'em hell."

On his LinkedIn page he claims his squad found the largest insurgent weapons stockpile ever recorded in Fallujah and destroyed it while taking heavy enemy fire from the surrounding buildings.

He intends to travel to the war-torn region on July 14.

Meanwhile U.S.-led forces targeted Islamic State militants in Syria with nine air strikes from Sunday morning through Monday morning and conducted another nine strikes against the group in Iraq, the U.S. military said on Wednesday.

Most of the Syrian strikes, six, hit targets near Al Hasakah, where they destroyed Islamic State fighting positions, vehicles, mortar positions, heavy machine guns and a supply point.

There were also air strikes near Ar Raqqah and Kobani, according to a military state.

In Iraq, forces struck targets near Bayji, Fallujah, Haditha, Mosul, Ramadi and Sinjar."

http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/isis-former-marine-sets-up-5686398
Angocachi

Erdogan underling tweets 'Caliph' in reference to Erdogan, has his account locked and does a backflip off his own words.
The context is this. Erdogan's party, the AKP, gets most of its votes by portraying itself as a moderately Islamist party. That's to say, they won't implement Shariah but they won't let the Kemalists dismantle Islam in Turkey any further than they have.
Turkey was host to the last caliphate before the establishment of the Islamic State centered in the Mashriq on Turkey's southern border. The global wave of popular Islamism following 9/11 and certainly following the Arab Spring has raised the standard of what is an Islamist. Democratic Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and its Turkish cousin the AKP can't pass themselves off to Islamist voters as genuinely Islamist anymore. That's prompted Islamist politicians to talk the talk of Shariah and Caliphate, if only to tickle the imagination of religious voters. However, Turkey is still under a blanket of secularism, in Istanbul and in the military, in media and academia, and in NATO. It quickly stamps on any assertive Islamism. Referring to Erdogan as a Caliph to get public support (rather than to mock him as has been the norm for leftists) is a step too far for the Kemalists and metropolitans still ruling Turkey, and so this fool has to eat his words and betray to the people who the real boss is.
All the while the real Islamic State is just across the border finding new ways to put more Islam in their Islam so they can Islam harder.

"With no end to Recep Tayyip Erdogan's tenure in sight, the Turkish president (formerly prime minister) is often been accused of mimicking the authoritarian style of veteran Russian leader Vladimir Putin. But an official from his own party made a more historical comparison this week, when he suggested that Erdogan's rise wasn't over yet — and that his critics should get ready for a new "caliph."

Fuat Ozgur Calapkulu, the leader of Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the eastern province of Siirt, made the comment in a tweet Tuesday. His Twitter account has since been locked, but screen shots of the tweet are widely available.

The controversial tweet was apparently written in jest: Responding to criticism of Erdogan's plan to become the head of government under a new presidential system, Calapkulu said people had underestimated the Turkish leader before, pointing out that at first they said the "tall man" (slang for Erdogan) couldn't even be a local administrator, then that he couldn't be prime minister or president.

“Now they are saying he cannot be president" under the new system, Calapkulu tweeted, according to a translation from Hurriyet Daily News . "The caliph is coming, get ready.”

Whatever the intention, Calapkulu's remarks sparked a backlash. On Friday, he released a statement saying he did not mean "caliph" literally. “I use this word to refer to a leader who has command of all the problems, institutions and administration of his country," he wrote, "a leader who is the independent and powerful voice of the world’s downtrodden; the protector of the oppressed; a good, successful, pioneering and visionary leader.”

It's understandable, perhaps, that not everyone would see it that way. The idea of an Islamic caliphate is deeply intertwined with Turkish history: The Ottoman Empire claimed the caliphate from the 14th century to the early 20th century. As the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the first president of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, undertook reforms and abolished the caliphate, effectively leaving the political lineage of the prophet Muhammad unclaimed. Since that point, secularism has long been an important, though divisive, feature of Turkish political life.

However, after nearly 13 years under AKP and Erdogan, many wonder whether the secularism embedded into Turkey by Ataturk is fading. Erdogan is a devout Muslim, and the party he leads has long been accused of having Islamist leanings. The Turkish president certainly has no problem linking himself with Turkey's pre-Ataturk past. This year, he took to greeting important visitors in his lavish, 1,000-room palace surrounded by guards wearing costumes from Turkish and Ottoman history . He's even tried to revive an Ottoman-era language.

To complicate matters further, last year the extremist Sunni group known as the Islamic State declared its own caliphate across Syria and Iraq and deemed the group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph. Turkey's government has found its opposition to the Islamic State complicated by its relationship with its minority Kurdish population and accusations of tolerance for Islamist extremists within Turkey. Last month, Turkish troops entered Syria to move the tomb of Suleyman Shah, considered the founding father of the Ottoman Empire.

Calapkulu isn't the first person to think of Erdogan as a caliph. Last year, Today's Zaman — a newspaper run by supporters of the Gulen movement, which opposes Erdogan — wrote that a number of followers of the Turkish leader had compared him to an Islamic ruler in the past, though Erdogan himself had never demonstrated any ambition toward establishing a caliphate.

In his note, Calapkulu implied that as his views were "peacefully expressed," they should be tolerated. Critics of Erdogan aren't always given that benefit: Over the past year, scores of Turkish journalists and many others have been investigated on accusations that they insulted public officials, usually the Turkish president. Among those who could face charges include a former Miss Turkey and a 16-year-old schoolboy ."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs...-ready-pro-erdogan-turkish-politician-tweets/

Angocachi
How have Islamists Eclipsed Nationalists, Marxists, and other Secularists in Muslim Insurgencies Around the World?

In the 20th century insurgencies in the Muslim world were irreligious. The Wars of Independence, such as in Algeria, Morocco, Malaysia, Indonesia, were waged by Secularist Muslims and were a kin to the Left-Nationalist anti-colonial insurgencies of Indochina, Latin America, and Christian Africa that characterized the wider Cold War. Muslim revolts against Russian and Chinese rule were also nationalist. Even in conflicts that had obvious and immediate religious characteristics, like Palestine-Israel, the Muslim insurgents were Marxists, Nationalists, included Christians in their ranks and had no Islamist character until groups like Hamas formed in 1987. The Moro Insurgency against the Philippines was similarly irreligious, despite being a clear cut conflict of Muslims against Christians, until Abu Sayyaf started up in 1991. The Afghan-Soviet War, despite drawing Arab Jihadists as drops in a bucket, was waged virtually entirely by irreligious warlords. Shariah didn't come to Afghanistan until the Taliban was established in 1994. The First Chechen War of the 90's was a nationalist cause, as were the Muslim rebellions in Ethiopia. In the case of civil wars between Muslims, as in Somalia in the 1990's, neither side was Islamist.

How is it that Islamist insurgency, which was so asleep during the 20th Century despite the multitude of Islamic Conflicts, has suddenly dominated every ongoing conflict in the Muslim world. How is it that Jihadists who were a supplemental force pushed to the side after the fighting, as in the Balkan Wars for example, have come to seize large swathes of well populated territory and administer them. How is it that in some theaters old guard secularists like MILF and Fatah are struggling to survive in the face of growing Islamist groups, and in other theaters groups that were recently the definition of Jihadism, like Hamas, the Taliban and Al Qaeda, have to compete for the right to call themselves Mujahideen in comparison to an international Caliphate literally warring with nearly the whole world?

I'd always thought of it rather simply as representative of the growing Islamism in the people of the Muslim world. Islamism itself has become more prevalent. If there are Shariah-minded guerrillas now where there were once nationalist separatists, it's because the locals have swung back to Islam.

That brushes over too many details.

By the numbers... how Islamists have rolled over irreligious rebels in the Muslim world.