Islamist Wave 2015 - News & Discussion

People held hostage by Al Qaeda in Iraq have related how they were put through mock executions... so it is probable that many in these videos were unsure if it waa really the moment or not.
On the otherhand IS executes people right upon capture as well. Sometimes they struggle and sometimes they don't.
Most people are calm

While the Taliban is launching a massive assault to seize the 1/3 Pashtun northern border province of Kunduz and now hold 2/3's of it, the Islamic State has set up a camp in Logar province near the Pakistani border in the heart of Pashtunistan.

Note they are flying the white Taliban flag alongside the black Islamic State flag. This is to say that they are still Taliban and it is as Taliban that they have become an Emirate of the Caliphate.


They named their camp after Ustad Yasir,

He was a Taliban commander killed in 2012 by the Pakistani ISI and/or rival Taliban.

Three photographs of the “Ustad Yasir” camp were obtained by journalist Saleem Mehsud and published on his Twitter account on April 18. The images were emailed to the Pakistani reporter, Mehsud told The Long War Journal .

Fourteen Islamic State fighters are shown in formation in two of the photos. The other image shows a pickup truck with a heavy machine gun mounted on the back moving through a creek.

The Ustad Yasir camp is run by the Sa’ad bin Abi Waqas Front and it is located in Logar province in eastern Afghanistan. The group was named after Sa’ad bin Abi Waqas, an al Qaeda emir in Kunar province who was killed by the US military in an airstrike on April 14, 2011. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda’s commander for Kunar, several operatives killed in airstrike .]

The Sa’ad bin Abi Waqas Front is led by Sa’ad Emarati, a former commander in the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan who defected to the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province last year along with other disaffected Taliban commanders from Afghanistan and Iraq. [See LWJ reports, Pakistani Taliban splinter group again pledges allegiance to Islamic State , Islamic State appoints leaders of ‘Khorasan province,’ issues veiled threat to Afghan Taliban , and Mapping the emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan .]

The name of the camp provides further evidence that the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province, which is situated in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is comprised of Taliban and other jihadist groups who have been marginalized by or are unhappy with the existing leaders of the Taliban on both sides of the border.

Ustad Yasir was one of 26 senior and mid-level Taliban leaders who were killed in a Taliban purge in 2012. Prior to being gunned down, he had served as the head of the Taliban’s Recruitment Council and was a key ideologue for the jihadist group. [See LWJ report, Afghan intel confirms death of senior Afghan Taliban leader, possibly 25 others .]

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archi...otes-training-camp-in-eastern-afghanistan.php

Recently,
IS has beheaded 15 Houthi soldiers on video in Yemen.
The Saudi government has arrested 90 some suspects after IS killed 2 Saudi policemen and injured two others in Riyadh and planned an attack on the US embassy.
IS is in heavy fighting with FSA along the Lebanese and Golan border, and in Damascus.
Over 3,000 European Jihadists have joined IS in Syria & Iraq in the last 6 months according to the US military.
The Jordani government claims to have stopped hundreds from joining IS, and is arresting people for waving the black flag of IS.
IS has killed Jordani border guards.
The Israeli military has voiced concern that IS is gaining support in Southern Jordan.
Non-IS rebels in Syria keep capturing more and more towns, border posts, bases, etc from Assad.

Israeli media is alarmed that IS has set up on the Israeli-Syrian border and their mortar fire has hit Jewish territory.

"After foreign sources reported on Wednesday that the IDF began to increase its forces in the Golan Heights near the Syrian border, fears were rising on Thursday that Islamic State-linked fighters are nearing the area.

According to the reports, the reinforcements include Merkava tanks and armored personnel carriers. The defense establishment is following reports that one of the anti-Assad rebel groups has sworn allegiance to Islamic State and the same group is behind the "spillover" of mortar fire from the Syrian Golan into Israel in recent days.

The organization in question is Saraya al-Jihad (Jihad Brigades), who not only swore allegiance to Islamic State, but also succeeded in conquering the village of Qahtaniya near the border.

Pictures were published Thursday of Saraya al-Jihad fighters in the Syrian Golan Heights.

According to reports from Syria, the Sunni jihadist group has succeeded in establishing a base close to the border, just three kilometers from Kibbutz Ein Zivan in the Israeli Golan Heights. The possibility that light weapons fire that hit Israel on Wednesday came from the group's fighters is being investigated.

Israel is tracking the events beyond the border, but senior IDF officials claim that they have no intention of interfering in fighting between the various rebel groups and Assad's army. The belief is that no Syrian group or army is currently interested in acting against Israel, however in the defense establishment preparations have been made for the possibility that one of these groups openly turns their military efforts against Israel.

The IDF knows that the point recently conquered by Saraya al-Jihad was formerly in the hands of the al-Qaida-linked Nusra Front, whose operatives did not attempt to challenge the IDF. The estimate is that the mortar shells that landed in Israel on Tuesday were part of the Free Syrian Army and Nusra Front's efforts to reconquer the area.

The IDF's official response to reports that it was adding reinforcements to the area was that the army "does not respond to foreign reports," however the farmers and workers of Ein Zivan's fields, where the mortar shells landed in recent days, were instructed by the army to be alert. The order was given after a number of shells from light firearms crossed into Israel as a result of fighting between Syrian rebels and the army. Nobody was injured in the incident. After several minutes of fire from the Syrian Golan, the farmers were instructed to abandon their work and leave the fields until the fighting ceased.

However, a defense source downplayed the danger in the area, saying that the Golan enjoys "a pastoral life, a prosperous tourism industry and fruitful agriculture. With the exception of a few small events that Israel has control over, the situation is considered very stable," he said."
http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-C...al-to-ISIS-seen-near-the-Golan-Heights-400720

"LAW AND ORDER


Within the siyasa sharʿiyya system, ISIS has been able to create rules and regulations to govern civilians, discipline its own fighters, and control territory. Such regulations often deal with matters that were not directly addressed by the revelatory texts (for example, fines for traffic violations). But they are ultimately anchored in an Islamic legal order nonetheless. For evidence, look to four of the most important areas of regulation—citizenship, land, trade, and war.


The ISIS legal system purports to establish a relationship between government and the people that is based on accountability and Islamic justice, according to which the caliph himself can be removed by the Shura council if he fails to fulfill his obligations.The theory of the caliphate implies a law-based social contract with reciprocal obligations and rights between the caliph and the people, whom ISIS calls “subjects” ( riʿaya , or simply “the Muslims”). The group issues a variety of rules and regulations designed to enforce those subjects’ compliance with their obligations. It also guarantees a limited number of legally enforceable rights—for example, the right to file complaints or charges against ISIS combatants or officials. As one propaganda brochure from Raqqa states , “The Islamic State is just and there is no distinction between a soldier and a Muslim [civilian]. In the shariacourts, all are held accountable and no one has immunity.” Additionally, ISIS claims that its subjects have the right to equal treatment before the law of God: “The people are as equal as the teeth of a comb. There is no difference the rich and the poor and the strong and the weak. The holder of a right has redress, and the grievance of an injured party will be answered.”


Different legal obligations apply to Muslims and non-Muslims. Christians and Jews are allowed to live and work in the caliphate in exchange for paying an annual tax , which in Iraq was recently set at a rate of four gold dinars for the wealthy, two dinars for middle-income, and one dinar for the poor. At the same time, ISIS has also developed legal justifications for the extermination of certain classes of non-Muslim minorities within the caliphate’s territory. Prior to the capture of Sinjar in Iraq, ISIS claims , its religious scholars conducted research on the Yazidis to determine whether they should legally be considered an unbelieving group “by origin” ( asli ) or one that was originally Muslim and only later apostatized. Ultimately, ISIS determined that the Yazidis were a polytheist group by origin and therefore concludes , “Unlike the Jews and Christians, there was no room for jizyah payment … and [the Yazidis] can only be given an ultimatum to repent or face the sword.”


Of course, all residents of the caliphate, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, are prohibited from engaging in criminal activity or other forms of misconduct. ISIS publishes specific guidelines for the punishment of crimes that are specifically defined in the Koran (known as “ hadd crimes”), but it also metes out discretionary punishments (“ taʿzir ”) for ones that are not. Based on data collected on ISIS courts and policing activities, we have identified three main categories of punishable crimes and misconduct: crimes threatening the state and public order, including espionage , treason , collaborating with foreign interests , embezzlement of public funds ; crimes against religion or public morality, including adultery , sodomy , blasphemy , apostasy , pornography , selling or consuming drugs and alcohol , and witchcraft ; and crimes or torts against particular individuals, which include theft , burglary , home invasion , rape , armed robbery , and murder .


In addition to rules regulating subjects’ behavior, ISIS issues rules designed to expand the population and socialize children with Islamic values. Such regulations include mandatory education through the ninth grade (girls and boys are educated in different schools) and prohibitions on the use of birth control . These rules are generally oriented toward increasing the population of the caliphate and producing obedient subjects who can be easily governed and conscripted as fighters.


In terms of land laws, establishing a legal basis for territorial conquest is important to ISIS for both ideological and practical reasons. First, on an ideological level, ISIS purports to be reclaiming lands that were unlawfully expropriated from Muslims by Crusaders and colonial powers. It needs a legal foundation to justify those claims.


Second, on a practical level, ISIS is attempting to establish territorial control under conditions of war in which land rights are at best uncertain and at worst a subject of violent conflict. It is impossible to govern such contested territory without a legitimate claim to sovereignty and rules for property ownership and land use.


Accordingly, ISIS has articulated elaborate rules for property and land. For example, it has laws for the seizure of war booty , stating that jihadists should take only what is necessary to advance the objectives of jihad. ISIS has also issued a fatwa justifying the expropriation of agricultural businesses that previously belonged to apostates before the group captured them, and additional regulations for the distribution of such confiscated property as charity for the poor and to recruits. One propaganda magazine illustrates the importance of property as an incentive for recruitment: “Do not worry about money or accommodations for yourself and your family. There are plenty of homes and resources to cover you and your family.” Meanwhile, ISIS has also attempted to regulate agriculture and environmental protection. For example, a recent announcement from Deir ez-Zor in Syria prohibits fishermen from using electrical current, poison, or dynamite to kill fish, out of concern that such methods cause congenital defects in minnows and are also detrimental to the health of human consumers.


In terms of trade law,ISIS makes clear that the preferred vocation for subjects is jihad and that it frowns on peaceful alternatives such as farming. Propaganda advises Muslims to earn a living “by performing jihād and then taking from the agriculture of his kāfir enemies, not by dedicating his life to agriculture like his enemies do.” However, in recognition of the reality that the caliphate’s economy will rely on other forms of productive work, the group has developed rules to regulate labor and commerce. It requires fighters who “abandon jihad and work to improve their wealth and land” to pay taxes that will further the fight. Taxation is thus a justification for otherwise impermissible forms of commerce, and it also serves to reinforce the concept of a social contract in which residents of the caliphate perform obligations in exchange for assurances of accountable government and legally enforceable rights. In some places, the group taxes at a rate of 2.5 percent on real estate , clothing , food , vehicles , and more. In addition, ISIS sets prices for housing rents , medications sold at pharmacies, and childbirth operations performed in its hospitals, and has even issued a fatwa requiring that the price of counterfeit goods be lower than the price of the authentic product.


Finally, there are the rules related to war. Here, ISIS claims to follow Islamic laws of armed conflict. And, according to ISIS propaganda, the caliph is personally obligated to ensure combatants’ compliance with them: “The leader is required to ensure that he and his soldiers are held responsible for the rights that Allah has made obligatory and the limits that He has set.” ISIS has published guidelines, either as official fatwas or legal opinions authored by ISIS-affiliated clerics, specifying the conditions under which enemy combatants may be targeted, tortured, mutilated , or killed as well as rules governing the ransom of non-Muslim hostages. So ISIS can claim that its combatants are acting lawfully according to the group’s own rules, even though the United Nations has reported that “ISIS is violating binding international humanitarian law.” ISIS also has laws for the provision of security guarantees , called “ aman documents,” for journalists and humanitarian workers seeking access to ISIS-controlled areas. Rules for the treatment of prisoners and slaves do include certain limitations, such as a prohibition on separating a mother from her young children, but they also permit sexual slavery as a legally permissible alternative to adultery. ISIS also regulates and censors fighters’ communication through, for example, a decree that prohibits combatants from publishing photographs of enemies killed in battle and a ban on using Apple products and other GPS-enabled devices that, ISIS leaders worry, the U.S.-led coalition could use to help target airstrikes."

continued on next post...

COURT ORDER


ISIS enforces its rules and regulations through its internal security sector and two separate police units. One of the police forces, called the “Islamic police,” is responsible for ordinary law enforcement and public safety. Its responsibilities include conducting inspections at checkpoints and issuing tickets for traffic violations. According to ISIS propaganda, this force contains legal specialists who report to a senior jurist, who in turn serves as a direct link to judges in the courts. When dealing with interpersonal disputes, such jurists will first attempt to resolve the conflict through informal mediation. But if mediation fails, the jurist can refer the dispute to an ISIS court.


The second police force is a religious morals unit called the “ hisba. ” The mandate of this body is to “promote virtue and prevent vice to dry up sources of evil, prevent the manifestation of disobedience, and urge Muslims toward well-being.” Activities include enforcing the prohibition on commercial activity during prayer time, responding to reports of drug or alcohol use, and destroying banned materials (including musical instruments, cigarettes, or polytheistic idols). The religious police are also responsible for investigating alleged violations of sharia and may refer more serious crimes to courts.


ISIS has established official courts in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and proto-courts are reportedly operating in the recently annexed Sinai province as well as border areas of Lebanon . Although ISIS claims to control territory in parts of Algeria and Nigeria through its annexation of other jihadist groups (Jund al-Khilafah and Boko Haram) that have pledged allegiance, courts have not been established in these areas—yet. But as ISIS begins to communicate instructions and guidance to its distant franchises, these groups may come under pressure to establish the kinds of legal and judicial institutions that characterize ISIS governance in Syria and Iraq.


In general, the ISIS judiciary is organized into three main branches: a division for complaints ( mazalim ), including grievances against ISIS public officials and combatants; Islamic courts, including the Supreme Islamic Court located in Mosul, which deals with violations of ISIS laws and government matters; and the Diwan al-Hisba , which adjudicates crimes or misconduct referred by the morality police.


ISIS regulates its judiciary through a top-down bureaucratic chain that starts with the Sharia Council, which is headed by Baghdadi himself. Under the authority of the Sharia Council, each wali (the governor of a regional administrative division called a wilay a) oversees a shariadeputy who in turn supervises the wilaya -level shariacommission. The shariacommissions ( hayʾat al-shari‘a ) are responsible for overseeing courts and the work of judges. ISIS disciplines and even executes its own judges when they refuse to support the caliphate’s official position on legal questions. For example, one judge was removed from his post and is expected to face trial for voicing opposition to the legal ruling justifying the immolation of a Jordanian pilot. Another ISIS judge was “disappeared” in Deir ez-Zor after he objected to the torture of prisoners in ISIS jails. Still others have been executed on charges of treason and collaborating with foreign governments.


In addition to punishing its own judges, ISIS has executed independent jurists when they issue unauthorized fatwas that are deemed too radical. For example, in one case, ISIS executed one such jurist after convicting him of spreading fitna (strife or discord) by advocating excessive “takfīr” of other Muslim jihadists ( takfir , in Islamic law, is the practice of declaring someone to be an apostate and therefore a legitimate target for killing).


ISIS operates numerous prisons in connection with its court system. Although precise statistics are not available, Amnesty International reported in December 2013 that ISIS was operating at least seven detention facilities in Raqqa and Aleppo provinces alone. One of the functions of these prisons is to rehabilitate criminals for eventual reintegration into society; ISIS employs clerics in prisons to visit with and educate the inmates. Although the organization claims to guarantee certain rights for detainees, including a pretrial detention limit of seven days before the accused person is entitled to a court hearing, reports of arbitrary arrests and torture in prisons are widespread, and in some ISIS-controlled areas, civilians have staged protests to demand the release of detainees.


LAWFARE


It is too early to tell how long the caliphate will last, but its radicalism—the group’s effort to base its authority on what it thinks is the “prophetic method”—seems more easy to sustain in times of war and emergency. In peacetime, ISIS would have only two paths: first (and more likely), it could move toward the increasingly arbitrary corrupt rule of warlords governing an impoverished and enclosed territory; and second, it could become an increasingly “normal” state, in which the simplicity of rules and institutions plucked out of early Islamic history gives way to bureaucratic administration and positive law.


For now, ISIS’ ideas have filled a hole both in governance in Iraq and Syria and in the global Salafi-jihadist political imagination. In the long run, the ISIS legacy will be not only its gruesome record of sadistic violence but also its profound challenge to existing Islamist thinking. It is a rebuttal to the long-standing Islamist view that modern, centralized states can be “Islamized” within their existing institutions merely by substituting codified positive laws with codified “Islamic” laws. It also contravenes the al Qaeda–style strategy of spectacular violence directed at Western and Muslim targets without long-term governance of territory in which Muslims are the majority. It would not be surprising if ISIS’ legal strategy enhances its own global prestige at the expense of al Qaeda and gives inspiration to groups seeking to govern immediately over whatever territories they manage to seize by establishing shariacourts, hisba patrols, and military and administrative courts. Authority in these territories can be ratified after the fact as “delegated” from the caliph in Mosul. In the end, victory in the jihadist imagination will look less and less like the glorious toppling of dictators in national capitals such as Amman, Cairo, and Rabat, and more and more like the declaration of liberated wilayat until those isolated patches are woven into a single mantle covering the entire ummah ."


https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-04-15/caliphate-law