← Autodidact Archive · Original Dissent · BjarniTyrdal

Thread 9540

Thread ID: 9540 | Posts: 3 | Started: 2003-09-05

Wayback Archive


BjarniTyrdal [OP]

2003-09-05 04:53 | User Profile

III THE FOUR SHAPES OF THE STATE

I am the state! Louis XIV. (1638-1715)

How do I recognise the best state? In the same way as you recognise the best woman. – Namely, my friend, by not talking about either of them. Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805)

The modern state is a sub-human being with a huge body and a tiny head, with an insatiable hunger for money and power and very little reason, very little conscience, very little character. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1937)

Numerous theoreticians considered the state as defined by a "rule" which can compel obedience from all its subordinated individuals and associations. They viewed the state as an "association which is caused by the organisation of a rule". Depending on the kind and on how this rule came into existence a distinction can then be made between "rule-affirmative" and "rule-tolerating" associations (nations).

Others considered the system of laws as constitutive for the state. In that sense, for H. Kelsen the state is "the unit of a system of norms that regulate the conditions in which a particular pressure should be executed on humans".1 Accordingly, the state is "a nation which has been build into a unit through its law" (J. Binder). Or even more precisely: "the system of laws creates the state" (A. Finger).

The organologists wanted the state to be seen as "a desiring and acting unit" not only in juridical terms, but "also in terms of sociology and the natural sciences". For them the state was an organism comparable to animals and plants: "a being of higher, spiritual-ethical order." Leopold von Ranke wrote: " In power itself there seems to be a mental being, an original genius that has its own life, that fulfils more or less characteristic conditions and that builds itself a sphere of activity." The phenomenon of power also forms the centre of assessment for other thinkers. The theory of power within political science defines: "The state is power". " Power is the prime and connotatively necessary purpose of the state."2 Bismarck thought along the same lines when he explained: "The only healthy basis of a big state is state egoism and not romanticism." From that, however, there derives "the fundamental question as to in the services of which purposes the authority of the state should use its power".3 Hegel went even so far as to raise the extension of power and war-politics to the level of the "immediate and required purpose of the state." He demanded war when the times of peace lasted all too long and there the population has sunk "into egoism and greed for acquisition"4.

Others, in turn, saw in the state an instrument for the suppression of the subjugated. Franz Oppenheimer wrote that the state was "a social institution which was forced upon a defeated group of people by a victorious group of people with the sole purpose of regulating the rule of the latter over the former and to protect it from internal and external attacks."5 Karl Marx formulated this even more precisely: "The modern authority of the state is only a committee which administrates all the common affairs of the whole bourgeois class."6

Terminologically there exist different opinions whether an unsettled and travelling herd can already be considered a state or whether a fixed territory of state is one of the criteria of the "state". Depending on size a distinction is made between: herd, association of herds, tribe, tribal relationships, state, confederation of states. Apart from the "nation of the state" and the "national territory", other important characteristics of the state are the "authority of the state" and the "national constitution". According to the "purpose of the state" the violent state serves the interests of an individual or of a group. There, the citizens partly become "part and means of the state". The other extreme is the security state. Here the state is merely a "useful means for present individual purposes". As Prince Smith said, it then is a "producer of security". Lassalle, who mocked this kind of state, thought that in such a state he would only be a "watchman in the world of business". The modern state under the rule of law stresses: order, freedom, a flourishing economy, ennoblement of culture, social justice, national unity. The freedom of the individual is reduced in many ways for "reasons of state". In the welfare state this influence goes even further.

Depending on the "building of norms for the activities of the highest organ of the state" one speaks of "absolute" and "constitutional" states. If those norms – those rules for behaviour – are limited to the utmost, then one speaks of "liberal" states, if they are far-reaching and strict one speaks of "authoritarian" states. Depending on the kind of government the following distinctions are made: monarchies, aristocracies, democracies. Depending on the influence of individual groups on political life there derive further distinctions: in the "theocracies" the priesthood, rules in "plutocracies" capital, in "bureaucracies" civil servants, in "feudal states" land owners, in "ergocracies" unions of professions (this, for instance, was the case with the guilds), in the "party-state" one party rules, in "polycracies" different, equally strong social groups compete with each other. With all these different ways of looking at the subject, one thing was hardly ever put into question, namely whether what we subsume under the term "state" should even be subsumed in that way.7 2 As was shown to the reader, the energon theory subsumes phenomena which formerly were considered as completely different into the same terminological categories.

With others – and at such a phenomenon we have now arrived – exactly the opposite is the case. Here, this theory leads to the fragmentation of a term which so far has been considered as a justified, even self-evident unity. According to the energon theory the phenomenon "state" appears as a mixture of four different basic structures. In the following I will depict them as purely theoretical models: the state as a common organ, as a professional entity, as an business organisation and as an organ of acquisition. The order is irrelevant: it does not concern the actual historical appearances of these phenomena. None of these models ever appeared in completely "pure" form. Most of the types of states, on the one hand, can be assigned to one or the other, yet, on the other hand, in most cases also elements of the three others can be found. Consequently, always all four standards have to be considered in an assessment. This sounds more complicated than it actually is.

3

First model: the state as a common organ. The premises for this model have already been discussed. Energons created by humans are to a large degree built up by "artificial organs" and their power depends on "functional units that have not coalesced". The protection of these units – as with the total protection of the areas of acquisition – can be achieved effectively only through correspondingly strong common organs (army, police, courts, etc.). Such common organs, therefore, were the prerequisite for that development (Part Two, chapter I, paragraph 2, Fig. 15).

Similarly, division of labour and acquisition through exchange can only take place in organised communities. If chaos breaks out, a farmer may still survive but an insurance agent or producer of rocking horses for children, on the contrary, loses his basis of acquisition. Similarly, the order of all relationships of exchange and transfers of rights necessitates a higher, legalising, deciding and protecting authority. This was the prerequisite for the first manifestation of the "state". In our first model the state is a big common organ of protection absolutely needed by all acquisition structures. The fact that this organ can be millions of times bigger than the energon which it serves should not bother us. The car is an artificial organ of locomotion and is also bigger than we are. If we use it we are surrounded by it completely. Even bigger is a train or a plane. A functional unit is not defined by its size but by its productivity. In the end it may encompass the whole world – like for instance the postal organisations – but nevertheless it is an organ of the individual human being.

With each functional unit it is crucial that it produces its work as cheaply, precisely and fast as possible. Its necessary "appearance" – thus the appropriate spatial-temporal structure – derives from the function that has to be fulfilled. Therefore, let us consider what this first type of the "state" – which is nothing other than a common functional unit of protection – necessarily or ideally has to look like.

A functional distinction has to be made between protection within the territory of the state (total acquisition area) and that of the whole state vis-à-vis the outside. We start with internal protection.

This internal protection is directed against all energon "colleagues". For the legalisation of property, transfer of rights, etc. rules of behaviour are necessary – namely, behavioural patterns. In their totality they are called a "system of laws". Such a system has to correspond to the general will: thus, an organ is necessary which this system of laws has to fabricate according to the wish of the general public or which it supplies in some other way. Such a system is the organised unit we call the representative body of the people, parliament, the executive body. The people – namely, all matured germ cells which we call "adults" – elects representatives of their interests and these design the necessary recipes. If it turns out that changes are necessary, then this functional unit is also responsible for that8.

Thereupon further units are necessary in order to see that these patterns are obeyed and to avoid prevent them being disobeyed. This unit we call the "police", the executive.

Thirdly, an organ is necessary in order to punish violations and also, if necessary, to enforce private rights. Otherwise these patterns have no power and no effect. Principally, also the executive could take on this task – and occasionally this has already happened9. According to the function, however, a separation is useful. The judicial office requires – in order to be carried out properly – a high degree of specialisation. The police needs physical strength, the judicial office requires mental power. Thus – seen only from the viewpoint of the energon principle – the judicature (the judicial authority) becomes the third necessary organ. Then judicial execution, prisons, organs of distraint and so on can be linked to either the judicature or the executive.

All these units also have to be supplied with energy (money), their commitment and co-ordination has to be secured, appropriate matchings between these units are necessary and controls have to be carried out. From these requirements arises the necessity for a further organ. We call it "administration". With that a central place for decisions is useful – however, in our model, it can only act according to the guidelines of the people's representatives.

These, then, are further patterns which do not really order the relationships between citizens, but which determine the rights and duties inside the common organ "state". These patterns we call the "constitution". They, too, are elaborated by the representatives of the people.

The raising of the necessary amount of energy "money" and its correct distribution constitutes a particular problem within the administrative function. The common organ "state" is paid for by the citizens – thus proportional contributions have to be levied. This total activity requires specialisation – it presents itself to us with the functional unit "Ministry of Finance".

As far as the protection vis-à-vis the outside is concerned, the units mentioned do not suffice. Associations of enemies do not care about the constitution of the people's representatives and cannot be put off by judicial authority and prisons. An additional, particularly powerful and expensive organ is necessary: the national defence. It presents itself in the shape of fortifications, weapons, soldiers, moreover in units for the investigation of the enemy (espionage) and internal defence against enemies (counter-espionage).

This unit is independent and requires – as a vitally important backbone – its own body of co-ordination. The co-ordinated units of the administration are not suited for that. On the other hand, the assigning of the necessary energy (money) can be carried out by the financial office which attends to internal protection. The centre of the co-ordination of the defence has to be equipped with special authorities. Often, the repelling of the enemy requires fast decisions – it cannot be that first the people's representatives have to be called in. This head of co-ordination must therefore be granted more freedom of action.

Finally, apart from the internal and external protection, the community also needs representatives in other countries. This task the head of the administration can take on additionally, yet, for this also any other person elected by the people's representatives is suitable. Thus, what also belongs to this first – and cheapest – model is a representative head of the state. In addition to that, an organ for the maintenance of relationships with the environment, except in the case of war, can exist: a "Ministry of Foreign Affairs". Already in this first model which only consists of what is absolutely necessary, we have most of the familiar basic units which build up "the state". The bigger a state is, the bigger and the more hierarchically graded are the single functional units. The smaller it is, the more frequently it happens that one and the same unit is in charge of several functions.

The state as a common organ is totally and completely beneficial to the public. No superfluous tool, no superfluous department, no superfluous function should exist, no superfluous expenditure of energy should occur. As with such a huge shape natural selection can hardly have an effect, a corresponding inner selection, an organ which is aligned to control and rationalisation is also important. According to its function it belongs to the financing unit – in close co-operation with the people's representatives.

The picture which I have drawn here corresponds most closely to the type of state characterised by extreme liberalism. It creates security but otherwise does not intervene with the individual functional units. It creates "order" – however, only to the degree needed for internal and external security. Additionally it also provides the representation which is also absolutely necessary.

4

Second model: the state as a professional entity.

This type of state may historically be the oldest one; it was the predominant one for long periods of human history and was only supplanted by others during the last two hundred years. Here and there it still exists today. For the understanding of the phenomenon "state" it is highly important.

The term "profession" seems to be far off the mark in this respect. Yet it is fully legitimate and should not be avoided. The energon theory subdivides the human entities of acquisition into professional entities and business organisations. Acquisition structures built by humans are called professional entities if they function as the extensions of the single individual. The second model clearly belongs to this category.

One of the first "professions" of humans was hunting and robbery. If such a hunter or robber surrounded himself with assistants to whom he gave orders and whom he rewarded with part of the booty,10 then his professional entity was extended correspondingly. His henchmen and companions served him as willing functional units. The prey went to him. Parts of it he distributed.

We can also call him – if we want to– the first entrepreneur. A small step led to the unsettled, autocratically led herd, to the war alliance. The chieftain, general, tribal prince –whatever we call him – forms the centre. The unit organised around him is his extended body. In whatever direction this body moves, he carries his space of power and his acquisition area with him. The robbery, the profit, the prey principally belong to this top performer. From them he nourishes and finances his subordinated functional units.

Thus, while in the first model the state in its totality is an organ, or a functional unit for that matter, in the second model it is a real energon. It is a professional entity, which – as will be shown immediately – extended and inflated itself much more than any other. No other kind of profession produced a bigger power structure. a) The state as a common organ. This state is a big, protecting common organ (S) for every citizen, professional entity and business (B). Its costs are paid proportionally (through taxes); it has two important main functions: protection against the outside (against enemies) and protection inside the state's territory (property, security, etc.).

  1. B) The state as a professional entity. This state is an extreme extension of a single human being, of the ruler, the king, the emperor (K). One of these forms the steering centre all citizens and institutions of the country are functional units in its professional entity. It is a real energon, comparable to a classical entrepreneurial business.

c) The state as an organisation of acquisition. This state, too, is a real energon, however, one of a higher order of integration. It is an supra-individual structure where all citizens, professional entities and business organisations are functional units. The interest of the state dictates the respective activities and payments for them (supply).

d) The state as organ of acquisition. An exploiter (E) uses the state as a "milch-cow", as an aid for his/her acquisition. This exploiter can be another state, a ruler, a ruling clique or a party, This "state" is a functional unit which has to serve the interests of the exploiter: it is structured accordingly. These four basic types are hardly ever realised in pure form; almost any state consists of elements of all four types. Further details in the text. This unit which used to travel settles down. The land is farmed and cattle are bred. Now the acquisition area is precisely determined and stabilised. The legal situation remains the same. The whole acquisition area basically is the property of the prince, he pays reliable employees with parts of it, to the others it is leased profitably.

This line of development then leads – without basic change – to really huge formations of states. The prince or king here is nothing else than an entrepreneur. It is his country, his structure of power. He tries – following his human impulses – to pass it on to his children but this is not necessary for that structure. He or his inheritors might be murdered – and somebody else "usurps" this profitable position. It does not change the professional entity at all. Numerous times in history have ruling dynasties been superseded by others – and the basic legal structure could still remain untouched11.

Now, what does this kind of profession look like, what requests does it make and which functional units are necessary?

For the herd, easy to view, this was clearer than for an already vast, autocratically ruled empire. Here, the maintenance of command and the keeping of the functional units under one's own dominion is of primary and decisive importance. According to the energon theory here the problem of bonding is in the foreground. The functional units have to be kept from running away and making themselves independent; their willingness to function has to be maintained. How can this be achieved?

The answer which suggests itself is: through power. If one contemplates this more carefully, then it is a rather amazing achievement to counter each functional unit by another one. Thus, the matter is not that simple after all. The main weapon to achieve this subordination is a different one. For the subordinates – at least for the most important ones – there has to be more profit from employment than from independent work. This is the key for the comprehension of such creations. In the beginning – and also long after – the individual human being only had the possibility to build his own professional entity within such associations. Alone, they were at the mercy of wild animals and other humans without protection.

Thus, the individual human being was willing to join such a power structure – if he had the impression that this would offer concrete advantages. This was the starting point. This made it easier for human beings with the qualification of leaders to attract others and to make them parts of their professional entities. Here an exchange of achievements took place. The subordinate accomplished his service – the prince protected him and offered him a safe livelihood. The necessary achievement in this particular job "prince" or "king", thus consisted in the ability to build bonds – partly through contracts of exchange, partly through violence. And then he also had to ensure that these bondings and this willingness to function remained intact.

For that, functional units of control and punishment were necessary. Such organs he could build by making corresponding payments. In other respects, all main functions could remain concentrated in his own person. He was his own "Minister of Finance": the prey came to him and he distributed it. He was his own General: he commanded military actions. He was his own lawyer: he dispensed justice. Innate reactions of humans made the execution of this job easier. Our social instincts are – just as with higher mammals which form packs – designed in a way so that also subordination to somebody with more power provides feelings of satisfaction. Persons who want to lead under all conditions are more the exception. Incidentally – and everybody knows this from the own experience – humans readily subordinate themselves to somebody whom they consider as having a higher qualification. To work for somebody like that, to be praised and rewarded by him bestows considerable feelings of happiness. Persons with outstanding intelligence, strength and leadership qualifications were able to trigger off this innate following-reaction in humans. In economic terms this means a saving of otherwise necessary control and force. Also luxury and the unfolding of power caused corresponding intimidation in the subjugated. Ceremonies, celebrations and similar fuss stimulate feelings of reverence in subordinates. No wonder that the rulers used such means – and even use them today. Another form of "outside energy" which was put to use here was structures of the human imagination: especially the religions12. Nothing protected the ruler better than when he made himself the god or one of the relatives of the god-family. This was also one of the few measures of power which effectively protected the line of succession. Another, no less important means of power was moulding and habit. The symbol of the ruler was imprinted onto the adolescent person in his sensitive period, and all ethical and aesthetic values were related to this ruler and his family as positively as possible. The result was that people became so strongly accustomed and intimidated that most of them did not even think of the possibility of changing the state any more.

This type of state, therefore, derives from principally different roots than the model described first. It is not a common organ but a professional entity, a real, independent energon. The means that hold this unit together are thoroughly different ones. It is a fundamentally different phenomenon – however, it leads to a highly similar structure.

The association becomes settled, the monarch is in charge of the country and enlarges it: a powerful reign is created. Inevitably, there arises the necessity to build rather similar common organs as with the first model.

If the community is to flourish – and only then can appropriately high taxes can be levied that go to the king – there has to be internal peace. In this case this peace is not created by the people's representatives but by the king – however, in order to be effective it has to appear similar to the first model in many respects. Police are necessary, legislation is necessary, prisons are necessary. An army for the protection against the outside is necessary. All these units have to be co-ordinated, they have to be supplied with enough energy, they have to be controlled and attended to. The overall leadership and representation, of course, is the task of the ruler – but here, too, we have a "Ministry of the Interior", a "Ministry of Finance", a "Ministry of Defence" and later a "Ministry of Trade". Concerning its external appearance, therefore, a quite similar shape is created. One difference lies in the fact that there are no people's representatives who draw up laws and the constitution. The behavioural patterns are dictated by the king, orally or in written form. A second difference lies in the fact that the police have to be more aligned to avoid insubordination and revolution. A third difference is the higher taxes – they have to cover not only the actual expenses of the state but are partly the king's "proceeds".

If the king is wise, he will keep these proceeds within reasonable limits. If he is unwise, and the feeling of power goes to his head, then he will squeeze out of his acquisition area whatever is possible in any way. In this case he forcefully suppresses the grumblers. The end – sooner or later – is revolution. What is very remarkable indeed is how model two, as fast as lightning, can change into model one or model one into model two.

5 Let us take the first case: a revolution.

What has to be created is representation of the people. Certain one-sided laws which serve the ruler have to be repealed and a constitution which secures the common interest has to be built up. Otherwise, many things can remain the same. Military power is necessary, police and judicial authority are also required. A certain number of persons have to be replaced by others but the actual functional units can remain. The only change is that slightly modified behavioural patterns force them to pursue slightly different activities .

A second and opposite case: a state which functioned as a common organ (model 1) is usurped by a dictator or by a "tyrant". In this case, too, the latter can practically take over the complete apparatus: only minor changes are necessary: the people's representatives are removed, the authority of the police is made stronger, the laws, insofar as they do not suit the usurper, are changed, the taxes partially go to the usurper. These changes can be carried out relatively quickly, the basic structure can remain the same. Reliable people who are paid correspondingly are exchanged with the former holders of the posts. With a certain degree of cunning this transformation can be achieved in only a few days. Two things become apparent from this. First: model one offers an excellent possibility and a big attraction for the usurpation of its apparatus of acquisition. Secondly: in order to prevent this, further measures of security are necessary in model one.

The possibility to seize such a gigantic business organisation has been exploited frequently. Somebody who manages to eliminate the people's representatives and to place himself/herself at the co-ordinating centre of a democratic state gains an incredibly huge professional entity overnight. Everything is, as it were, ready for him/her; only a few changes have to be made.

What is then created has so far – due to the structural resemblances – also been called a "state", just like that from which it derived. According to the energon theory, however, they are two fundamentally different structures. In order to prevent the danger of such a transformation, therefore, appropriate precautions have to be built into model one. No external power can threaten this type of like the danger from inside. For a cunning person, as it were, this is an immensely profitable body of acquisition that lies ready to hand.

And not only the body of acquisition – but also the body of power. This is an important point. With the innate instincts of human beings, power often provides far greater satisfaction and pleasure than a very successful body of acquisition. The military leadership is predestined for this way of taking over power. For the already mentioned reasons it has to be equipped with appropriate authority. It has the strongest means of power under its control. Thus, it is hardly surprising that most often it was military leaders who could be found among the usurpers.

6 Third model: the state as an business organisation. Galbraith calls those American concerns which have cast off the management of the enterprise and have become organically, self-managing acquisitional structures "matured businesses". Analogously, the third model can be called the "matured state".13 It is not a common organ anymore, nor a hugely blown up professional entity. It is an organisms of a higher level of integration – similar to the big businesses.

These states are characteristic for our modern world. Due to the fact that the free spaces have already been conquered and distributed, these states are primarily economic and social organisations. By increasing their total ability of acquisition they increase – in the ideal case of model three – also the individual acquisition of the entities of acquisition by which they are build up. Here, too, both internal and external protection is necessary: practically the whole apparatus of model one. In addition to that, however, much more is needed: economic and nutritional politics, support of the traffic and the information system, of education and research, the upkeeping of the culture, social welfare, protection and attending of employees and much more.

This means, many more common organs are added – the partial costs increase correspondingly. Yet, these are costs which serve the general interest – or which are supposed to do so. The ideal structure of this type of state can probably be determined with the help of the energon theory very exactly. These states are real organisms and as such directly comparable to plants and animals. With the state as professional entity the human impulses of the ruler play a crucial role. Such states only to some degree behave according to the statistics, some of them quite idiosyncratically and individually. Nowhere else does the human independence of mind and striving for luxury unfold better than there. The matured state, on the contrary, can be determined statistically. Here the innate, unpredictable tendencies of the germ cell "human being" count less and less. The total usefulness pushes itself through. It is identical with the basic structure of competitiveness14.

7 Fourth model: the state as an organ of acquisition. Let us suppose that the state conquers another one and makes the latter pay tribute. From the viewpoint of the energon theory in this case an energon makes another one its slave, servant, a functional unit. It makes it into an additional organ – namely an organ of acquisition. Seen from the point of view of the victorious energon the unit that was gained has exclusively the function of acquisition. It has to create acquisition and to hand it over. An independent energon has become a milch-cow.

Again, most of the institutions that already exist there are still necessary. If the milch-cow is to supply enough milk, then order has to prevail in that structure, it has to be shielded from external disturbances and threats. It needs co-ordination and attention just like any other organ. What changes are the behavioural patterns. The people's representatives may remain, however, under the supervisory control of the winner. The essential behavioural patterns are now dictated by the winner. While so far – in the case of a liberal state – it was largely up to the individual how much he wanted to earn, now only one function is required: acquisition and handing over. The golden freedom has gone – and the subordinated citizens can only to a limited extent use their own judgement and enjoy the fruits of their work. A target is imposed on them. In order to meet this target, correspondingly more severe control, stronger authority of the police and tightened centralisation are necessary. The organs required for that can largely be built up by local "strengths". If appropriate advantages are offered (money, power, privileges), one or the other citizen becomes a "traitor", a "collaborator". He unties the old bond and builds a new one – thus, helps in the suppression and exploitation of his former colleges.

Therefore we see that model four also corresponds with the others as regards many of its structural elements. And yet, in essential aspects it is fundamentally different. It is not an energon – it is an organ, like model one. Accordingly, just as with model one – in the ideal case – where everything has to be aligned to the function of security, here – in the ideal case – everything has to be aligned to the acquisition. Inside the functional unit the whole structure is always dictated by the effect that has to be achieved: everything else would be a waste. It is the same here. Inside the acquisition organ not even the smallest body of luxury is appropriate. Every functionless unit in this organ is a burden and has to be removed or to be forced to work. Every unit needs an adequate supply of energy, the necessary care in order to remain able to function, however, there should be no surpluses – this creates a sad situation in this model for the people affected by it.

Also with model one – the state as a common organ – the functional units are aligned to achievement and accordingly nothing in this structure should serve individual luxury. Yet here we have bonds that have been build voluntarily – for appropriate payment. Thus these units "affirm the reign". In model four – the state as an organ of acquisition – the bondings and duties are based on force. Here the units are "tolerating the reign". This results in the necessity – inevitably –of an additional structure of effect for the maintenance and control of the bondings and achievements.

The state that was accused by Marx of being nothing but an "administrator of bourgeois interests", also belongs to this model. A group of people can also make a state into an organ of acquisition. To the outside, again everything appears very similar: many major functional units (army, police, Ministry of Finance, courts etc.) are more or less identical with the ones of the other models. Additionally, however, here there exists the structure of effect which is necessary for the maintenance of force. Here it appears less openly than in the tribute-state, however, functionally it is equally important. In the tribute-state there is not much point in hiding force (although this can be tried in certain ways), in the interest-administrating state (as I will call it, following Marx), on the contrary, this is highly useful. The better the actually existing force is hidden, the more economies can be made concerning the otherwise necessary measures of control and compulsion. This is the "hypocrisy" against which Marx declared war, the "mask" which the Marxists wanted to snatch from the faces of the exploiters. Model four is – beyond good and evil – an energetic structure where human emotions are merely elements which also have to be taken into consideration. For this model hypocrisy is an important factor. It is a possible means for rationalising an organ of acquisition and its effectiveness15.

Finally, a third complex of phenomena belongs to this fourth model: all "corruption", all individual enrichments at the expense of the state. As with model one the totality of the "state" is a common organ which serves everybody – the big structure of the "state" can also for many at the same time become an organ of acquisition. Like parasites hundreds of acquisition structures can suck at this structure and branch off the stream of energy into private channels.

Here one does not speak of a normal, "honest" business of exchange. The state is, in any case, the biggest client and the richest source of acquisition inside the whole territory of acquisition. It requires numerous achievements in every model and acquires them – through exchange – with money.

The state only becomes an organ of acquisition when an exploiter changes parts of the state's structure according to his interests, when he brings parts of this body into his power and then sees to it that the state's expenditure does not serve the state itself anymore – but primarily himself.

This, for instance, is the case when the state is made to acquire equipment, apparatus and weapons which are either too expensive or which are not even needed or which are in worse condition than what can be acquired for the same price.

C. N. Parkinson pointed out another important form of exploitation16. The state organs show a tendency to expand themselves more than is necessary. From the point of view of the single acquisitive individual this is understandable: enlargement means a growing of power and profit. If, in the state, departments become superfluous (for instance after a war is over), then often they try hard to not be removed: they simulate a non-existent importance, create problems where there are none, and by that fight for their rights to exist with cunning and imagination. Such and similar tendencies threaten the state apparatus everywhere. This is which is meant by "human inadequacy" which is often discussed in political science.

According to the energon theory it is simply a matter of conflicts of interest between energons. The huge structure of the "state" can be made into an organ of acquisition by another energon – likewise, also groups inside the state itself can be turned into organs of acquisition by entities of acquisition which influence parts of it, or by state organs which blow themselves up within the total structure beyond what is functionally necessary and at the expense of the state expand their individual entities of acquisition.

It goes without saying that in the latter case of the "corruption-state" (as it can be called) the veiling of the means and hypocrisy are even more important weapons than in the "interest-administrating state". Any such tendency has the normal control-organs of the state as its enemy. This system of exploitation is perfected, if precisely these control-organs can be incorporated into the net of the secret exploiters.

8 From these four models, which are hardly ever realised "purely", all types of states – I would claim – are built up. They are, as it were constructed according to four different building plans of which every single one is a closed system of relations functionally dictated and which can even – at least in principle – be determined arithmetically.

Between each of these models and the rest there exist all conceivable transitions and all conceivable combinations.

The transition from model two (professional entity) to model three (business organisation) took place visibly from the absolute via the constitutional kingdom to the republic. The controlling power of the ruler is reduced bit by bit and the power of the people's representatives and of the common interests grows. In the end the king maintains himself as a magnificent representative (which is also a function) or is totally "relieved from the service of the state".

The transition from model one (common organ) to model three (business organisation) is marked, for instance, by the ideas of W. Eucken17. Extreme liberalism (laissez faire, laissez passer) was supposed to grant the individual the greatest freedom. However, as a matter of fact, it led to the building of monopolies which robbed many acquisitive structures of the possibility of free development. From that derived the idea of the state as exercising influence on the economy, hence the idea of economic policy: that is, the limitation of the economic freedom by the state – in order to secure the freedom of the economy. In this case the state intervenes more and more into matters concerning the individual and is not merely an organ of protection any more. It becomes an energon itself with the highest state interests. The extreme is achieved with the communist state which itself becomes the central business, the common economic enterprise and makes all its parts into functional units.

The transition from model two (professional entity) to model four (organ of acquisition) shows a bad, egoistic ruler following a good one. When Frederick the Great said: "The king is the first servant of his state", he spoke in the sense of model two. This statement is not merely – according to our conventional assessment – a "beautiful and moral" one, but economic for this model – energetically correct – and in this sense "wise". Every energon, if it wants to survive, has not only to be lord, but also servant of its organs and functional units. Somebody who overextends their heart, eventually is harmed, people who do not take care of their legs and break them later walk with a limp. The same is the case with the professional entity of the "state". A good ruler has to reign well but also has to serve. Only then does that body of acquisition endure. Then it works with the smallest amount of "inner friction".

If a good king is succeeded by another one who only considers his kingdom as an acquisition organ, then maybe for some time everything remains the same. However, only too soon dissatisfaction arises. It has to be dealt with – in order to maintain the organ of acquisition. And thus it happens that the one model – necessarily – changes into the other one: an additional inner structure of control and the practice of force has to be implemented. Gradually, the parts that approved the reign become a society that merely tolerates the reign – which is dangerous for the ruler.

What is interesting inside "democracy" (model three but also model one) is the party system. It is a functional substitute for natural selection which has only little effect with states (due to their small number and long lives). Here another mechanism of improvement is necessary – especially considering the constant danger of the influences of model four, namely the spreading of parasitic phenomena. The opposition (additionally fuelled by highly personal interests) exerts an appropriate controlling function and elections replace the expensive processes of revolutions. Admittedly, this solution, too, has its functional weaknesses. The party system also opens up a range of possibilities for model four, thus for corruption. Or a party uses its power for the elimination of others and makes its interests (which can also be of an "idealistic" kind) the main thing, and expands by force – and therefore here too the pendulum swings in the direction of model four.

Inside the "states" many different human entities of acquisition develop, as in a tropical flower garden. Which are the most successful ones? What is their maximum profit?

Comments: 1 "Allgemeine Staatslehre", Berlin 1925. 2 L. Duguit, "Traité de droit constitutionnell", Vol. 1, Paris 1921, p. 398. 3 R. Thoma, "Staat", in: "Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften", Jena 1926, p. 755. 4 Collected works, Vol. 7, Stuttgart 1938. 5 "Die Geburtsstunde des souveränen Staates", 1954, p. 427. 6 Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1848. 7 H. Kelsen also had such doubts. He thought, "that already with a superficial examination of scientific, linguistic usage, more than a dozen highly differing meanings of the word ‘state' can be found". ("Allgemeine Staatslehre", p. 3.) 8 Here and in the following somebody who works within the administration. may find it particularly difficult to follow the arguments of the energon theory The habit of viewing human beings as units and their functions as properties of those units is deeply rooted. Accordingly, for instance, a minister or head of a department has rather different tasks. However, according to the energon theory it is always the effects, the functions which are in the foreground – they and not their vehicles are the actual reality. Today with most effects there are always different departments co-operating with each other – and today most departments have several functions. Therefore, if somebody who is rooted in the conventional way of thinking assesses the energon theory with the standard that is self-evident to him or herself, then he or she will be provoked by contradictions everywhere. Here I can only recommend: trying things the other way round. Certainly, in this case what seems simple becomes incredibly complicated. Yet, if we search for the actual units that build up the structure of effects, then we have to take into account that in some cases – as for instance here – it will turn out as a highly diffuse shape. Double functions, extensions of functions and joinings of functions within the state's administration – as well as in that of businesses – have led to an extremely complicated network of effects. 9 An example: a sheriff, as he frequently appears in westerns, who both arrests and passes judgements. 10 The family and kin were the first such groups. 11 In Serbia the Obrenovic and Karadjordjevic were hostile ruling dynasties which repeatedly superseded each other. With the professional entity into which they in turns slipped, of which they in turn seized control – with the "state" and its system of laws – nothing changed. 12 The religious reader may here disregard his/her own religion and only think of the others. That at least some of them were figments of the imagination may hardly be doubted. 13 H Krüger calls it the "modern state". ("Allgemeine Staatslehre", Stuttgart 1964.) G. Jellinek called it the "completed/perfected state". ("Allgemeine Staatslehre", Berlin 1914.) 14 H. Krüger says of the "modern state" (which he sees as the state per se), that it was "a structure which belongs to history", it was "a historical answer to a timeless question". And he continues: "Because such a group has always to be built and held together, it constantly needs order and leadership, and, on all sides, it is in confrontation with the environment." ("Allgemeine Staatslehre", p. 1.) Almost the same formulation can be applied to all energons. Their essential characteristic is: they are answers. That is, answers to a historically changing environmental situation and to problems which every kind of interaction of units raises. 15 W. Eucken also considered "ideologies" as such tools. According to him they are "weapons that have been built according to specific plans used in the economic battle". They are supposed either to "veil the true motives of the demands of interests or give them greater force". He writes: "The whole human history of ideas is determined by attempts to secure claims for power ideologically or to support it when it is attacked." ("Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie", Berlin 1959, p. 12.) The judgement passed on "ideologies" here is without doubt a bit too one-sided. Yet, doubtless they were – and still are – perfect tools for building a professional entity or an business organisation, for strengthening it and rationalising it. 16 "Parkinsons Gesetz und andere Untersuchungen über die Verwaltung", Düsseldorf-Stuttgart 1957. 17 "Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik", Hamburg 1959.


BjarniTyrdal

2003-09-05 21:05 | User Profile

I thought this piece was rather good and covered a lot of ground about the nature of the state. If everyone had already read it I see why no one commented on it and I am sorry to have posted it.


Hilaire Belloc

2003-09-06 16:14 | User Profile

*Originally posted by BjarniTyrdal@Sep 5 2003, 15:05 * ** I thought this piece was rather good and covered a lot of ground about the nature of the state. If everyone had already read it I see why no one commented on it and I am sorry to have posted it. **

Yes it's a nice work and I did read it. Just don't expect people to always reply to your posts. I've posted some real good articles and such and nobody has replied to any of it in the past. So this is something that you'll have to get used to, since I see your still a newbie.