← Autodidact Archive · Original Dissent · triskelion
Thread ID: 7730 | Posts: 10 | Started: 2003-06-30
2003-06-30 21:39 | User Profile
Someone expressed an interest in examining the question of why Hitler invaded the USSR mentioning the June ââ¬Ë85 issue of Journal of the Royal Institute for Defense Studies. Basically, the reason for Hitler launching an invasion of the USSR was that Stalin had a massed an incredibly impressive invasion force, with plenty of American and British help, intended to begin the conquest of all of Europa in June of ââ¬Ë41. The Axis having attempted and failed to engage the U.K. in peace negotiations during the course of the last year was now facing an invasion that could only stopped via a massive pre-emptive strike. Obviously, doing so would commit the Axis to fighting a vastly superior foe on a very wide front leaving such an attack the least disastrous option available to the Axis.
I am not too interested in examining the matter as my limited time must be focused upon matters pertinent to the current state of the struggle so I will not be debating the matter. However, those that are interested in finding out how Hitler prevented Western Europe from meeting the same fate as befell the East I suggest the following reading materials:
Antony C. Sutton's study, National Suicide, Arlington House, 1973 Robert Goralski's World War II Almanac ,1982 Soviet tanks by Igor P. Shmelev, published in 1993 Major General M. K. Kudryavtsev's offensive plans detailed in his memoirs General Staff member, General Zhukov memoirs Prof. R. Stolfi, a professor of Modern European History at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. See his book "Hitler's Panzers East" Jacob Tordahl's "The Aborted Soviet Invasion of Western Europe 1941" (published only in German and Norwegian at present but attempting to secure an English language edition) Viktor Suvorov's trilogy on the topic "Icebreaker", "Dni M", "The Last Republic" Journal of the Royal Institute for Defense Studies June ââ¬Ë85
America's efforts to provoke a war with Hitler and encourage a Soviet invasion of Western Europe including material support for the invasion of Western Europe and encouraging Stalin to do so as well as American offensive operations against the Axis prior to December ââ¬Ë41 :
See Mr. Roosevelt's Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942 by Patrick Abbazia [Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975 John T. Flynn's "Roosevelt Myth" Robert Nisbet, Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship 1989 W.H. Chamberlain's Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace
I am sure a good deal more material supporting the contention I raised exists but at the moment all I can recall of the cuff is found above.
2003-07-01 15:54 | User Profile
Originally posted by triskelion@Jun 30 2003, 21:39 * *Someone expressed an interest in examining the question of why Hitler invaded the USSR mentioning the June ââ¬Ë85 issue of Journal of the Royal Institute for Defense Studies. Basically, the reason for Hitler launching an invasion of the USSR was that Stalin had a massed an incredibly impressive invasion force, with plenty of American and British help, intended to begin the conquest of all of Europa in June of ââ¬Ë41. **
At least on the surface, this theory of a Third Reich fear of a massive Russian invasion force seems to contradict all the accepted analyses and reports of mainstream historians.
According to the mainstream historical account, Hitler thought the Soviet Union would be an easy victory after its debacle in the 39-40 Russo-Finnish conflict. Because of this the Hitler did not make adequate preparations for the war effort which of course contributed to the eventual defeat. Also your theory seems to contradict Stalin's reported reluctance to acknowledge and deal with the growing reports of an invasion threat.
As I note, this theory sounds like a revisionist account squarely against mainstream theories. As such, I wonder if it dovetails with any thing recognized or published by the IHR, which is generally cognizant of the various revisionist theories and schools of thought.
**The Axis having attempted and failed to engage the U.K. in peace negotiations during the course of the last year was now facing an invasion that could only stopped via a massive pre-emptive strike. Obviously, doing so would commit the Axis to fighting a vastly superior foe on a very wide front leaving such an attack the least disastrous option available to the Axis. **
While the immediate Soviet threat may be debatable, the growing tensions between Germany and both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and the likelihood of an eventual war seem generally acknowledged by historians. Toward this ends their criticism of the German war effort center less on the "why" and more on the "how".
2003-07-01 17:41 | User Profile
The proposition that Barbarossa was a matter of 'pre-emptive attack as defense' doesn't square with the long touted policy of lebensraum, and the related German desire to free itself from resource dependance by invading eastwards. How does the 'defensive' case account for this?
2003-07-01 18:23 | User Profile
Originally posted by triskelion@Jun 30 2003, 21:39 * *See Mr. Roosevelt's Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942 by Patrick Abbazia [Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975 John T. Flynn's "Roosevelt Myth" Robert Nisbet, Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship 1989 W.H. Chamberlain's Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace
I am sure a good deal more material supporting the contention I raised exists but at the moment all I can recall of the cuff is found above.**
Just by chance, I found another interesting thread on a book that supports your thesis.
[url=http://www.libertyforum.org/showprofile.php?Cat=&User=Magician&Number=725493&Board=news_history&what=showflat&page=&view=&sb=&o=&part=1&vc=1]Stalin's War of Extermination - (Liberty Forum)[/url]
Historians have debated the cause of WWII and of Barborossa ever since WWII. It is a complicated picture, but perhaps this recent scholarship is casting a new light on things.
I did mention that a look at the Russo-Finnish war as enlightening as to the cause of the conflict, as small conflicts had a way of presaging larger conflicts. In this regards, I think a look at the Russo-Finnish war is quite enlightening, as it marked one of the first areas of conflict between the Reich and Stalin after the Ribbontrop-Molotov pact.
Finland was in the Soviet sphere of influence, but Germany grew increasingly alarmed at Stalin's continual attempt to harass Finland after the 39-40 war, eventually warning the Soviets that a continuation of the aggression against Finland could have "unforeseen consequences".
This drew Finland under the German umbrella, but in a way that clearly was incompatible with the Ribbontrop-Molotov Eastern Europe partition. Clearly it was a sign to both sides that the Nazi-Soviet peace was not working and would eventually break down. It also is one pretty naked example of Stalin's aggression and imperialism.
2003-07-01 22:06 | User Profile
That is absurd, Stalin caused most of the Russian Armies initial disaster because he was so sure that Hitler would not attack him. Stalin was as anti-semitic as Hitler was and thought Hitler realized that fact. Stalin was poisoned, in all likelihood, by Jews who feared that he was about to launch an attack on the West that would use nuclear weapons.
Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in self defense?
Bah!
2003-07-01 23:44 | User Profile
Stalin was informed by the American, British and many other governments that Germany was going to attack. Sorge, his man in Tokyo, affirmed this. Even Schulenberg, the German ambassador to Moscow, warned Stalin. Schulenberg stated he was of the Bismarck school that placed good relations with Russia above all else.
I guess that Stalin placed ultimate faith in his weapons and his hordes. He chose to forget that his butchery of the Red Army High Command negated his accounting style of management. He was the McNamara of his day. Poor leadership doomed the Red Army.
After the war the Gestapo attache at the Tokyo Embassy remarked that up until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Germans were not sure Japan would be their ally.
2003-07-01 23:50 | User Profile
Stalin caused most of the Russian Armies initial disaster because he was so sure that Hitler would not attack him.
The common belief that Stalin thought Hitler was his pal, that Hitler would never attack him, smacks of propaganda at best, and naive self-deception. Stalin was a cynical tyrant, he had no illusions about Hitler, he knew the Red road to European dominion ran straight through Germany.
Stalin was as anti-semitic as Hitler was and thought Hitler realized that fact.
Stalin was surrounded by Jews, and married one. He did purge many Jews after WW2, but he replaced them with more Jews.
Stalin was poisoned, in all likelihood, by Jews who feared that he was about to launch an attack on the West that would use nuclear weapons.
If Jews poisoned him, you can bet your sweet a$$ they didn't do so to protect the west.
Thank you for the sources Triskelion. :th:
2003-07-02 01:24 | User Profile
Originally posted by Leland Gaunt@Jul 1 2003, 20:03 * (cantankerous ranting snipped)*
The question was directed at the non-keyboard-nazis on the forum.
2003-07-02 02:36 | User Profile
Originally posted by Leveller+Jul 2 2003, 01:24 -->
QUOTE (Leveller @ Jul 2 2003, 01:24 ) <!--QuoteBegin-Leland Gaunt@Jul 1 2003, 20:03 * (cantankerous ranting snipped)* The question was directed at the non-keyboard-nazis on the forum. **
You mean both of us? :D
Sisyfos
2003-07-02 04:28 | User Profile
Leveller: The proposition that Barbarossa was a matter of 'pre-emptive attack as defense' doesn't square with the long touted policy of lebensraum, and the related German desire to free itself from resource dependance by invading eastwards. How does the 'defensive' case account for this?
In my estimation, it doesnââ¬â¢t. Once more, Barbarossa was not ââ¬ÅCopenhagen,ââ¬Â or pre-emptive defensive attack, but a war of conquest aimed at eliminating the last remaining significant power in Europe and an ideological mortal enemy, which, incidentally, also entertained thoughts of expansion some day soon. But in terms of timing, I find suspect the claim that USSR was weeks away from lunching its own campaign. It simply was not ready. The Red Army was in the process undergoing a vast but hastily conceived reorganization (to take in the lessons of tactics in France) and these were months if not years from being finalized. Also, the officer core had yet to recover from Stalinââ¬â¢s purges, thus the requisite brain trust needed for the colossal undertaking was not in place. Though there is no question that Bolshevik ideology and Stalinââ¬â¢s fancies made reverse Barbarossa a matter of time, but it seems that this did not factor into Hitlerââ¬â¢s decision. Recall that he would have attacked sooner if only he were not ââ¬Ådistractedââ¬Â by the situation in the Balkans. The planning, whether to go straight for Moscow or whether to do so in a more indirect manner, shows ample concern for Soviet defensive responses and none for their initiative, and, of course, the high command appeared perpetually baffled by the sheer amount of captured war material, the kind of thinking not usually found if one has some inkling of the oppositionââ¬â¢s imminent intentions.
Concerning Western deployment: where else would the Soviets field the overwhelming bulk of their war machine? The Japanese were recently spanked and the USSR had left sufficient arms to deal with Tojo's boys if need be, and she had no other enemies of notable strength. I think that Stalin hoped extract full value from the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which entailed waiting a while before bringing the "revolution to aid the European proletariats."
The European theatre did not become a two front war until 1943. Little Britain had no means of invading the continent by itself and had to settle for mass bombings. Initially, and following the Sea-lion faint, she was considered not much more than a nuisance and Germany opted for employing U-boats as cheap means of finishing her. During the time under consideration there were some 50 divisions of varying quality in Western Europe, stretching from Norway to Libya, but I think that with some notable exceptions it would be more accurate to describe these as ââ¬Åpeacekeeping forces,ââ¬Â more akin to todayââ¬â¢s Anglo-American occupying imperialists, than second front participants, though their presence was of course good deterrence.
As for Lebensraum, or Germanyââ¬â¢s attempt to imitate the US and the ââ¬Åwinning of the West,ââ¬Â the resources devoted to population transfers--many a Wehrmacht commander lamented the loss of trains and other materials earmarked for civilian transfers when soldiers could have profited from their availability--makes it unlikely that following a successful Barbarossa (i.e., the shooting of communists and resettlement of undesirables) the German army would pack up and leave. Simply put, she aimed for natural resources up to the Urals and would have settled for small-scale but perpetual wars with the Asiatic hordes beyond. We need not go into what the specific plans were for the inhabitants of the annexed (or governed from Berlin) territories because opinions were numerous and wide-ranging.