← Autodidact Archive · Original Dissent · LlenLleawc
Thread ID: 15112 | Posts: 1 | Started: 2004-09-27
2004-09-27 00:23 | User Profile
[I]I thought this was interesting just because it seems to say that in effect there is no exit strategy in Iraq. First, we were in Iraq to counter imminant danger, then to better the lives of Iraqis; this author implies the second rationale is as phony as the first but still defends dragging this war out indefinitely. -Llen [/I]
STRATFOR INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
For release 9/22/04
[url]http://www.tmsfeatures.com/tmsfeatures/subcategory.jsp?file=20040922ctnib-a.txt&catid=1850&code=ctnib[/url]
Iraq STABILITY UNLIKELY, BUT THAT was NEVER U.S. MISSION
By George Friedman
Tribune Media Services
The United States has gotten a major dose of good news this week: A report, carefully leaked to everyone, shows that the CIA has become extremely pessimistic about Iraq. Since the good people in Langley, Va. - and there are indeed many good people there - have not gotten it right once about Iraq, this should come as cheering news.
It is interesting that some of the severest critics of the CIA have suddenly seized on this leaked report as if it were proof that the situation in Iraq is hopeless. They had best be careful, lest impending doom finds itself mixed in with missing weapons of mass destruction.
In a sense, the CIA report, or as much as has been officially leaked, makes a great deal of sense. The probability of stability in Iraq is indeed small. Saddam Hussein was not grafted onto Iraqi society by aliens. He represented the alternative to instability in Iraq: tyranny.
It is Iraq's tragedy that it cycles between these two poles, and certainly the United States cannot stop the cycle. The best Iraq and the U.S. can do is choose between which pole will dominate at any given time. Whether you prefer chaos to tyranny is, we suppose, a matter of taste, but it is no longer up to the Iraqi people, if it ever was.
The problem with the report is that it has confused the Administration's rhetoric with the strategic goals of the campaign. If stability in Iraq had ever been a goal, the U.S. would be in bad shape. But that was never the goal, and measuring the situation in Iraq by that standard inevitably translates into failure.
There were three basic reasons for invading Iraq, so far as the Administration was concerned. First, Iraq is the most strategic country in the region. From Iraq, the U.S. could reach out and touch critical countries in the region. Second, the United States wanted to pressure Saudi Arabia into moving against al-Qaida without overthrowing the House of Saud. Third, the United States wanted to demonstrate to a doubting Islamic world that the United States was prepared to undertake major military exertion.
In short, the U.S. wanted a strategic base in the region and it wanted to intimidate the Islamic world. Bringing stability to Iraq was never on anyone's agenda - let alone creating a democratic Iraq - until the United States discovered it was in a guerrilla war.
The Administration knew that instability was inevitable after Saddam's fall. What they didn't expect - and what the CIA didn't tell them - was that Saddam had planned a guerrilla campaign in the event that the U.S. invaded. There is a difference between chaos and a guerrilla campaign. Chaos is a "come as you are" party. Guerrilla war is a systematic attempt to undermine the American presence in Iraq.
Once the guerrilla war started, the rhetoric began to creep up. Winning the war on terror was replaced by bringing democracy to Iraq. The fact is that the United States cannot even bring a measure of stability to Iraq. There is no way that 130,000 soldiers, trained to fight and destroy enemy armies, can stabilize a country like Iraq. The rhetoric has outstripped the mission.
The mission remains doable, if the original mission is recalled. U.S. troops can remain indefinitely in Iraq, along the Saudi, Syrian and even Iranian borders, without being sucked into the endless and hopeless patrolling of the populated regions. Those regions will engage in a long cycle of violence now - or revert to a brutal dictatorship. Either way, reshaping the lives of the Iraqi people is beyond American power.
The original mission is not beyond American power. Iraq is now a base for the U.S.; Saudi Arabia has changed its policy toward al-Qaida and the U.S. has demonstrated its military capabilities. The problem is that the Administration that was so inarticulate and disingenuous in the first instance has now ratcheted up its position to total incoherence. It had a pretty clear goal, which has now become completely lost.
Ironically, the Administration's mission creep gives the CIA its best chance to be right in years. If the goal in Iraq is stability, it probably isn't going to happen. The problem is simply this: when did the goal in Iraq become stability? It was supposed to be a strategic stepping stone to a broader victory. Stabilizing Iraq was way beyond the plan.
George Friedman is chairman of Strategic Forecasting, Inc. Visit the company's Web site at [url]www.stratfor.com[/url]