Islamist Wave 2015 - News & Discussion

10 posts

Angocachi
The Islamic State Splits the Caucasus Emirate

Defection to IS


In November 2014, a small DV cell or “jamaat” from Aukhovskii village took the bayat to IS’ Baghdadi. The DV’s Shariah Court judge and its Mountain Sector emir, Abu Usman al-Gimravii, condemned the Aukhovskii jamaat for risking dissension (fitna) and division within the CE and noted that the CE takes no side in the IS-Al Qaeda dispute. However, he implicitly criticized Baghdadi’s declaration of the caliphate and himself caliph by asking how CE mujahedeen could commit such treachery and destruction in regard to the CE by declaring allegiance to an “unknown entity,” which “ has not been recognized by scholars, hides out of sight, lacks the strength to defend Muslims, and does not see or know Muslims.”


On December 19, a more damaging defection occurred when the DV’s top emir, Abu Muhammad al-Kadarskii, and the leader of a key DV sector covering Dagestan’s capital declared the bayat to Baghdadi. This likely resulted in them “taking” several hundred mujahedeen, though it remains unclear whether they plan to go to the Levant. Only days later, the emir of one of only two fronts in the CE’s Chechnya network, the Nokchicho Vilayat (NV), followed suit, perhaps taking half the NV mujahedeen with him. These defections were a severe blow to the CE, which has seen its capacity diminish since 2011, especially following the surge in emigration to Syria since 2013.


The first response to these major splits came from Gimravii, who referred to Asildarov as the DV’s “former emir” and condemned his action as “treachery” and a “violation of the bayat” to CE Emir Dagistani. Fearing many DV emirs and mujahedeen would follow Asildarov, he warned that violating the oath is a “serious offense” that carries with it “grave consequences” for everyone committing it. On December 28, CE Emir Dagistani displayed an equally harsh stance and announced the appointment of a new DV leader.


The DV and NV (IS-CE) emirs could take with them more than half of the CE’s forces. If the now IS-loyal CE emirs and their mujahedeen depart for the Levant, the CE’s capacity would be devastated. In that case, Umarov’s gamble of sending mujahedeen to Syria so that they could network and gain experience with the global jihad in the Levant and later to strengthen the CE will have failed miserably. If, on the other hand, the IS-CE remains in the Caucasus and draws back some of the CE mujahedeen in the Levant, then a strong resurgence of jihad in Russia is almost certain.

excerpt http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2015/01/30/how-split-caucasus-emirate

Shock Waves From Insurgency Commanders' Defection To IS Felt Beyond North Caucasus

The decision late last year by several prominent North Caucasus insurgency commanders to retract their oath of allegiance to Caucasus Emirate leader Aliaskhab Kebekov (Sheikh Ali Abu-Mukhammad) and (IS) leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi has apparently engendered confusion and discord not only across the North Caucasus but within the Chechen diaspora community.


That at least is the message conveyed by Akhmad Umarov (nom de guerre Abu Khamza), the brother of Caucasus Emirate (IK) founder and leader Doku Umarov and the IK's official representative abroad, in a address posted last week on Checheninfo.com, the website of the Chechen wing of the North Caucasus insurgency.


In that video footage, Umarov requests a statement of moral support from Kebekov and Emir Khamzat (Aslan Byutukayev), the commander of the Chechen insurgency wing, in response to what he terms the "groundless accusations" dreamed up against him by the pro-IS faction and the latter's "childish" attempts to justify their actions.


He says it is "unacceptable" that those who do not obey Shari'a law "are trying to obstruct us in our work and spread discord," and insists that those persons who do so, whether unwittingly, or at the behest of "enemies of Islam," or in the hope of securing a comfortable post within the IS leadership, should be held responsible under Shari'a law, and will answer for their actions on Judgment Day.


Umarov appeals to Kebekov and Khamzat to explain why Chechen commanders are violating their oath of loyalty to Kebekov and their theological arguments for doing so. He says failure to clarify their arguments will only deepen the split between the two factions.


Umarov then presents his superiors with a choice: either to issue a statement of support for the stance adopted by the IK representation abroad with regard to the defections to IS that would make clear to all fighters from Chechnya and Daghestan that they should "abide by all demands that do not contradict the Koran and Sunna," meaning remain loyal to Kebekov. Or, "if you have doubts about what we are saying and our sincerity, then we ask you to appoint new people to replace us and dismiss us from our posts. If you have faith and confidence in us, then we ask you to grant us additional powers to restore order and establish a strict and functional system in accordance with Shari'a law to address urgent questions which it is imperative to resolve -- questions concerning religion, politics, and social, financial, and informational issues."


Umarov then addresses Chechen fighters both in the Caucasus and beyond "who are trying to help the cause and to defend our religion and honor," urging them to take a clear stance against the renegade faction. He says he can provide an explanation for what that faction "is saying behind our backs," but does not say what those criticisms are.


With regard to Syria (he does not use the toponym "Sham" favored by the Chechens fighting there), Umarov affirms unequivocally that "any fighter who travels to Syria to take part in jihad there should understand that he will have to answer for that on Judgment Day. We appeal to you, especially to the young people of the Vilayat Nokhchiicho [Chechnya], to stay where you are. Your holy duty today is jihad in the Caucasus...to defend our land, the territory of the Caucasus Emirate," from the "primary foe" in the person of the Kremlin regime and its apostate collaborators, meaning the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership.


Given that Umarov speaks in very general terms, it is impossible to assess the extent of support among IK fighters for IS and the magnitude of the threat that faction poses to the cohesion of the insurgency ranks. But his request for "additional powers" suggests he faces a serious challenge.


Since the statements of support for Baghdadi by six Chechen and Daghestani commanders last month, several insurgency commanders from Chechnya and Ingushetia who for reasons they do not specify are no longer in the Caucasus have to Kebekov. So too has (Zalim Shebzukhov), commander of the Kabardino-Balkar-Karachai insurgency wing.

http://www.bignewsnetwork.com/index.php/sid/229706307


New jihadist leader in Dagestan denounces Islamic State defectors

The Islamic Caucasus Emirate’s (ICE) leader in Dagestan, Said Arakanskiy, denounced the jihadists who defected to the Islamic State in a newly-released video. Arakanskiy’s short speech, totaling two minutes and 30 seconds, was released via the Vilayat Dagestan’s official web site and on its Twitter feed on Feb. 14.


A screen shot from the video, showing Arakanskiy, can be seen above.


The Vilayat Dagestan is one of ICE’s official “provinces.” Its former leader and some of his allies broke their allegiance to ICE emir Ali Abu Mukhammad al Dagestani late last year. This provoked a swift backlash from Dagestani, who quickly appointed Arakanskiy as ICE’s new leader in Dagestan. [See LWJ report, Dagestani jihadist swears allegiance to Islamic State, invoking backlash .]


In the new video, Arakanskiy makes it clear that he is an ICE loyalist who will not be following the defectors.


“I, emir of Vilayat Dagestan of the Caucasus Emirate, pledge allegiance to our emir Sheikh Abu Mukhammad [al Dagestani], may God protect him, [and I swear] that I will obey him and follow him in trouble and joy whether I like it or not, as long as he follows Koran and the Sunnah [the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed],” Arakanskiy says, according to a translation obtained by The Long War Journal .


Arakanskiy continues by addressing the “mujahideen brothers who have renounced their allegiance to” Ali Abu Mukhammad al Dagestani and “sworn allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi,” the leader of the Islamic State. He argues that these defectors “should not split the ranks of mujahideen because it makes non-believers happy and weakens jihad.” Not only do they no longer follow Dagestani, they have abandoned the “scholars of jihad,” Arakanskiy says.


The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has created an interesting dynamic in the jihadists’ world. Baghdadi’s henchmen have tried to peel off some of the jihadists allied with al Qaeda’s international network. They have had some success in this regard, as demonstrated by Vilayat Dagestan’s leadership crisis.


By the same token, however, the Islamic State’s rivalry with al Qaeda has also further exposed the degree to which al Qaeda commands the loyalty of jihadists who have not been publicly recognized as being a part of Ayman al Zawahiri’s organization.


Al Qaeda is known to hide its hand in some groups. For instance, the Al Nusrah Front in Syria was a part of al Qaeda’s network well before its formal allegiance to al Qaeda was exposed in April 2013. Zawahiri had prohibited any official recognition of al Qaeda’s presence in Syria. While careful observers could detect al Qaeda’s influence in Al Nusrah from the get-go, it was not until after the dispute between the emirs of the Al Nusrah Front and the Islamic State became public that Al Nusrah’s close ties to al Qaeda’s senior leadership were widely recognized.


Similarly, ICE’s loyalty to al Qaeda has become more clear as a result of the Islamic State’s challenge.


The “scholars of jihad” Arakanskiy references are likely the same al Qaeda ideologues who have denounced the Islamic State and endorsed Ali Abu Mukhammad al Dagestani as ICE’s emir. In January, top sharia officials from both the Al Nusrah Front and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) issued a joint statement saying the ICE defectors were mistaken and that Dagestani was a well-qualified leader for the group. One of the statement’s signatories was Harith al Nadhari, a senior AQAP sharia official who was a staunch critic of the Islamic State.


In early February, the Vilayat Dagestan openly mourned Nadhari after AQAP issued a statement saying he had been killed in a US drone strike. The Vilayat Dagestan’s web site continues to feature Nadhari’s commentaries, as well as messages and videos featuring other pro-al Qaeda, anti-Islamic State thinkers, such as Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi.


ICE emir: Zawahiri “our leader”


Ali Abu Muhammad al Dagestani, who succeeded Doku Umarov as the emir of ICE in March 2014 , has steadfastly supported al Qaeda and the Taliban throughout the controversy over the Islamic State’s rise. He has continued to do so even as some Chechen jihadists, including Abu Omar al Shishani, have risen to prominent positions within Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s organization.


In 2013, Abu Omar al Shishani helped found Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar, or the Army of the Emigrants and Helpers, before officially joining the Islamic State.


Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar, which is led by Chechens but includes other fighters as well, remains loyal to Dagestani. The group has tried to remain neutral in the conflict between the Islamic State and its jihadist rivals in Syria. However, like Vilayat Dagestan, Jaish al-Muhajireen awl Ansar and its allies in Ansar al Din, a coalition of several Syrian rebel groups, mourned the loss of Nadhari earlier this month.


In late June 2014, Dagestani released a video in which he discussed the efficacy of suicide bombings and the necessity of avoiding civilian casualties. Dagestani referred to Ayman al Zawahiri as “our leader” in the video and noted that Zawahiri has “urged rebels to avoid places where civilians gather.”


The ICE emir was likely referencing the jihadist guidelines issued by al Qaeda under Zawahiri’s direction. Al Qaeda is attempting to limit the jihadists’ civilian casualties in the Muslim majority world as it tries to build a broader base of popular support.


In September 2014, Dagestani released another video addressing Zawahiri and other leading jihadist ideologues as the “scholars of the ummah,” or international community of Muslims. All of the other scholars addressed by the ICE head in the video back al Qaeda in its rivalry with the Islamic State. The other scholars included: Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, Hani al Sibai, Tariq Abd al Halim, and Abu Qatada al Filistini, all of whom have criticized Baghdadi.


Dagestani referred to the “scholars” collectively as “our valued brothers, the loved ones, the delights of our eye.” It is likely that he addressed them in these glowing terms as a reply, of sorts, to the Islamic State and its supporters, who have been accused of slandering the veteran jihadist ideologues for not supporting the Islamic State.


“We rely on you in our jihad and follow you as our paragon,” Dagestani said, addressing the jihadist leaders. “Therefore, do not forget us in your provision of advice and guidance whenever this is feasible and possible for you.”


In late September and early October of last year, Dagestani played a leading role in promoting a jihadist truce initiative in Syria. He joined some of the same ideologues he had praised in publishing “An Initiative and Call for a Ceasefire Between Factions in Syria.” The proposed truce aimed to take advantage of the America-led bombing campaign in Syria to promote a ceasefire between the Islamic State and its foes. The Islamic State did not formally agree to such a deal.


When denouncing the defectors who have sided with the Islamic State, both Dagestani and Abu Usman, ICE’s top sharia judge in Dagestan, have referred to the jihadists’ scholarly consensus concerning the Islamic State’s “caliphate.” They argue that the defectors have ignored the opinions of leading jihadist thinkers in swearing bayat (oath of allegiance) to Baghdadi.


Said Arakanskiy’s new video echoes this argument.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/02/jihadist_leader_in_d.php


@Fitz Antonius Blockhead
Longface
How do you know this?

They are in favour of Shariah not ISIS. Most Arabs don't want ISIS.
Korth

“How does the world respond to [Libya being a clusterfuck]? The U.N. gets a mandate, goes there, and finds out there’s no one to work with—the ministries are Potemkin. The I.M.F. goes in, says what’s wrong, and doesn’t do much about it. The World Bank hardly does anything. Vast numbers of people came to Libya to look for contracts, but nobody got any money, so they went away.NATO tried to design a national-defense system, but the Libyans failed to engage with them. The French were going to train three thousand police. Instead, they trained thirty. Then some cadets were sent to Jordan for training, but the Jordanians kicked them out after they burned down a sports facility, because they were angry about a flight delay.” In November, the official noted, three hundred Libyan soldiers being trained in the U.K. were expelled after half a dozen of them ran amok in an English village, sexually assaulting several women and raping a man. “The Libyans defeated everyone,” he said. “It didn’t matter whether you were Gandhi or Stalin. It didn’t matter how hard we tried, they defeated us all.”

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/23/unravelling

Angocachi
From Zarqawi in a Jordani prison to Baghdadi in an American run Iraqi prison, they were behind bars for anti-government activity. This is typical for Al Qaeda and ISIS, Zawahiri himself was in prison for opposing the Egyptian government. ISIS is largely built on and run by guys who did time for their roles in the Iraqi insurgency and sectarian war. The author calls them criminals. Of course, they're insurgents. But what he means to say is that they're the Arab equivalent of MS-13, Mexican Drug Cartels, or the Italian Mafia... which is bogus and rather ironic given their role in shutting down prostitution, drugs, alcohol, smuggling, gambling, impossible loans, and all of the other Shariah prohibited businesses the Iraqi mafia actually went to the US military to become the Sahwa so that they could protect their proceeds.

That's right, but the author tries to present the Muslim public as moderates and secularists who yearn for liberal democracy, like himself. He even tries to explain away repeated Islamist election victories as votes against the corruption or despotism of the incumbent regimes rather than the genuine popularity of Islamism. It's deceptive on his part. While there are secular and even anti-Islamist minorities in Muslim countries, particularly the northern half of Tunisia, parts of the Nile Delta, old Baathists and Nationalists, and so on... he's ridiculous to present the Muslim world as Thomas Jefferson admiring pacifists who think religion is private.

Outside of those previously mentioned secularist strongholds, Istanbul, non-Shia & non-Palestinian Lebanon, the Islamic Balkans and the Islamic Former Soviet Union, the most popular political position is Democratic Islamism. That is, the majority want a shariah government but they don't want the peace disturbed to get it. They love the idea that they can have a government in line with their religion simply by voting, no disruption to their lives or sacrifice on their part but a drive to the polls. This has been Zawahiri's biggest point and one of the primary reasons he opposes ISIS; the Muslim masses don't realize the necessity for violent revolt yet. The fate of democratic Islamists in Egypt, Algeria, and so on haven't dissuaded many Islamists that the peaceful route is entirely closed. Ikhwan holds great power in some governments. Hezbollah is a king in Lebanon. Erdogan, despite being tied up by Kemalists in the public and in the military, is an Islamist in name and holds the throne. This is some evidence to the pro-voting crowd that violence is counter-productive. Zawahiri's theory is that in time the Democratic Islamists will prove themselves, universally, to be failures. None of them have established Shariah states. When their impotence and fruitlessness is realized by the Islamic public, they will be far more desiring a violent solution... and as Zawahiri would have it... Al Qaeda already set up in all of their countries, can raise its sail and ride the popular wind. ISIS doesn't care for any of that and is following the historically proven methods; fight now, make a bold example, and those worth having will join in.
Longface

I think most of them are of the petty criminal types. The 3500 Tunisian fighters are probably the same type that goes illegally to France and sells drugs or commit burglaries.

Yes Arabs are not liberals but they are not islamists either. they are more interested in American movies, music and porn than in the Quran.

Angocachi
Counter-terrorism profilers used to myth bust popular images of Al Qaeda recruits. They found that Al Qaeda members were generally people without criminal backgrounds, often educated, well employed, and sociable. After all, Al Qaeda couldn't work with bums, idiots, and guys who raise red flags with police.
ISIS is a splinter faction of Al Qaeda and it holds the same standards. They demand strict religious observance and the willingness to die in battle. To assume they're recruiting subway pickpockets or street corner drug dealers is silly. Quite the opposite, those are the types they subject to Shariah punishments.

Polls show that they are Islamists, as do elections.
Longface
AlQaeda recruits young Arabs who have miserable lives. Their recruitment method is based on making young men feel resentful towards people who have better lives and westerners. ISIS recruits people who are capable of executing missions and are able to follow the shariah even if they were criminals before and pays them good money. What I mean here is that the motivation to fight is not faith.

Who cares about polls? Shariah could mean many different things for muslims. Go visit Arab countries and see for yourself.
Angocachi
According to profiling of Al Qaeda recruits, that's not true.

They vote for Islamist parties and majorities say that they want Islamic law. They're Islamists. What more proof is needed that a majority of them are Islamists?
Longface
For starters, Islamism is different in different Arab countries. When a Tunisian says that he supports the rule of Islam he means a completely different thing from Salafism or Wahabism. So saying that the majority is islamist is quite meaningless, especially in a country where alcohol is produced and drunk with no repercussions whatsoever even when an islamist party was ruling.
Angocachi
Yes you're right, there are Ikhwani, Deobandi, Shia, Salafi, democratic and anti-democratic, caliphate and anti-caliphate Islamism. Currently Salafism is not the most popular, but it has been growing rapidly. ISIS is not widely popular either (they're not trying to be nor do they need to be). However, all Islamism is not secular or moderate. What Juan Cole wants is to paint a picture of a Muslim public that is anti-Jihadist, occidentophile, liberal, and secular because he is a Muslim apologist who wants to combat Western Islamophobia. It's dishonest. When clear majorities of Muslims answer the question "Should Shariah be the law of the land?" with a "Yes." then Juan Cole is peddling a fantasy. The common Muslim is neither cheering for or apologizing for Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Hezbollah, Hamas, or ISIS. But large numbers of them are joining and supporting such groups, and much larger numbers are looking for a political party that will legislate by Quran and Hadith.

Democratic Islamist parties are akin to the Republican party in the United States. Just as the Republican party holds out the false promises of lower taxes, smaller government, and Christian-leaning legislation (abortion, homosexuality, etc)... the Islamist Democrats like Erdogan and Ikhwan do the same to the Islamist masses with the promise of Shariah. It doesn't mean those voters are insincere in their desire for Shariah, just that the politicians who promise it are insincere or impotent in delivery.


In other news,

Israeli Jew in DC Rings the Alarm Bells Over ISIS in Afghanistan & Pakistan

The Islamic State (IS) has received dozens of official pledges from in Yemen, Libya, Egypt, Indonesia, and several other countries. Perhaps the most interesting—not to mention alarming—of its pledges has been from former Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and tribal leaders in the “Khorasan,” an old name for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

The Khorasan region is a powerful symbol of the jihadist movement: the grounds where Usamah bin Laden fought against the Soviets, a site of U.S. “Crusader” boots on the ground, and other events woven into the fabric of jihadi history. However, with the rise and outward expansion of IS this past year, the jihadist movement has never been further from unity. And as the group pushes its way into Khorasan, this prized region may be the stage for an infighting show-down between IS and those not willing to give up their stances.

The TTP has undergone power struggles with its smaller sub-groups trying to gain more footing in the past. The main separation took place with the August 2014 announcement of “Jamat-ul-Ahrar,” a group formed after separating from TTP due to strategic differences. However, these groups had strong foundations in their own areas, and infighting wasn’t a common phenomenon within these groups as they largely weren’t threatened by each other. This would begin to change upon IS’s arrival in the region, though.

On October 13, 2014, just three months after its creation, a message attributed to TTP spokesman Shahidullah Shahid (AKA Abu Omar Maqb ul) announced his allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The message also claimed that five other prominent TTP leaders from Hangu, Khyber, Orakzai, and Peshawar had also pledged to IS. On January 9, 2015, IS released a video wherein these TTP leaders (and others) reiterated their pledges to IS’s Caliphate. Two weeks later, IS’s “Khorasan Province” was made official in an audio message by IS spokesman Abu Muhammed al-Adnani.
Pledges to IS made before those of the aforementioned TTP leaders were made by small local groups—none of which well-established or with a noteworthy record of activity. However, the pledges in Khorasan were by some of the most prominent and battle-hardened leaders in jihad, with connections to both the Afghan Taliban and TTP.

Until the rise of IS, TTP was considered among the most dangerous of terrorist groups. The group was responsible for some of the most high profile and brutal attacks throughout Pakistan, and even the May 2010 attempt to detonate a car bomb in Times Square in New York. Unlike most of the other pledges to IS around the world, the Khorasan Province is IS’s only one with such experience and known leadership of local populations.

Why then did this former TTP/Taliban leadership abandon their well-known group and pledge to IS—a group based over a thousand miles away—to a self-claimed “Caliph”? Some jihadist figures would claim that these leaders were bought off by IS “under the pretext of support.” Regardless of whether or not this is true, it is a remarkable and dangerous feat that IS had managed to recruit these well-experienced terrorists leaders and, with them, their networks and experience.

Among these leaders is former TTP chief for Orakzai, Hafiz Saeed Khan , who was named by IS to be the head of its Khorasan Province. Khan, a veteran of jihad, is believed to have been fighting in Khorasan with the Taliban since the beginning of the West’s presence in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. His ties to the other tribes, military experience, and support among fighters might bring more pledges to IS.

Furthermore, it is very important that former TTP spokesman Shahidullah Shahid, an international figure who managed TTP media for many years, and holds contacts to international and local media sources, is part of the new province. None of the other IS provinces contain leaders with these credentials.
Of course, it’s still early in the game, and so far nothing of significance has been reported about IS new province. However, judging by the experience of IS’s progress in other external provinces—such as those of Libya and Sinai—it is most likely that we’ll be hearing a lot from the Khorasan province. Reports indicate that many in the region have been attracted to IS,with roughly 10,000 fighters purported to have joined the group’s new training camps.

TTP and/or Taliban Merge with IS Highly Unlikely

IS succeeded not only to recruit important players to its Khorasan Province, but also to import its strategy of creating infighting between the groups. IS’s strategy in Syria and Iraq has proven that the group doesn’t cooperate with anyone unless they are under IS leadership. Simply put, there are no allies for IS that don’t bear its name.

Furthermore, the Taliban/TTP and IS are competing to gain the support of the same people. Therefore, IS’s training of fighters in the region will likely result in intensified violence between these two sides. Indeed, though the Afghan Taliban has not made any official statement regarding violence between itself and IS, reports have surfaced of IS fighters attacking and killing a Taliban commander in Afghanistan’s Logar Province.

Yet, there is another important factor that will contribute to the infighting between the groups: the stature of these groups’ leaders.

Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar.The Afghan Taliban’s chief, Mullah Muhammad Omar, is one of the most prominent and revered figures among jihadists worldwide, and is still believed to be alive. Figures pledged to Omar include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) leader Abu Baseer al-Wuhayshi, Core AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, and even the late bin Laden himself. Simply put, if AQ or any of the groups aligned with it were to establish its own Caliphate, Omar would most likely be named the Caliph.

Baghdadi, on the other hand, has surely captured the world’s attention as a figure of authority with his self-proclaimed title of Caliph and increasingly dangerous fighting force.

Considering Mullah Omar’s prominent role in the global jihadist movement, it appears that Baghdadi and IS have taken their defiance beyond AQ to the highest peak with the Taliban. That being said, it is unlikely that IS and AQ, nor the Khorasan’s main groups, the Taliban and TTP, will ever unite. There can only be one Caliph, and neither Omar nor Baghdadi seem poised to bow to the other.

There will be those who insist that letting these groups fight each other is beneficial—keeping them focused on fighting each other rather than outside targets. However, this competition will more likely inspire each side to out-do the other with more notable attacks at all kinds of targets—be they each other or other entities all together.

The events in Khorasan area have, with no doubt, changed the dynamic of the war on terror, and call for a reassessment of the US and NATO’s strategy toward Afghanistan.

https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blo...or-khorasan-is-gearing-up-against-the-taliban


Rita Katz has huge clout in Washington DC. Both she and her father are blatant Mossad agents. She's done work for the Bush Jr and Obama administration which amounts to giving them Israel's orders regarding Jihadists. That she's giving her attention to the Taliban-to-IS defections is a cue that Israel is concerned and the Pentagon is currently taking steps on the matter.