Islamist Wave 2013 - Overview & Updates

10 posts

anunnaki

A Buddhist monk who incites violence and has a Facebook page.

Byssus
Byssus
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/w...a-shroud-of-silence-in-xinjiang.html?ref=asia
Angocachi
August and September 2013 have seen a number of lethal Islamist attacks around the world from China to Kenya. The consistent open conflict zones remain in and orbiting;
the Iraqi-Syrian-Lebanese Front (Al Mashriq)
the Afghani-Pakistani-Kashmiri Front
the Yemeni Front
the Southern Somalia Front
the Malay Southern Thailand Front(Greater Pattani)
the Moro Southern Philippines Front (Bangsamoro)
the Chechen-Dagestani-Ingush Front (Kavkaz)
the Sinai and wider Egyptian Front
the Islamic Northern Nigerian Front

These places are fields of Sunni Islamist insurgency over these past two months and are dangerous.


American paid Egyptian mafia-military threatens Hamas regarding Sinai Jihad.

http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Egypt-warns-Hamas-over-Sinai-border-326974
Angocachi
When the Arab Spring broke out many commentators spun it as discrediting Al Qaeda's claim that only insurrectionist violence can bring down the unpopular regimes in the Muslim world. Despite the Arab Spring being very violent, on part of the revolts and the regimes, the line pushes was that demonstrations, diplomacy, and social media posting could oust entrenched dictators and nobody needed to take up explosives and firearms.

Some regimes were ousted and the people in those countries elected for Islamist parties. Having been decreed unacceptable democracies by the same types who said Al Qaeda was discredited, these Islamist governments are being deposed not by popular will... but by coup and treachery.
And so it seems at last that Zawahiri's line about "democracy" being a dead end and a game of dangling promises pulled out of reach is right. Now that the Muslim public is been taught the hard way that the ballot is null and void, they can begin to consider what Osama Bin Laden realized a quarter of a century ago.


Tunisia deal to bring end to Islamist rule


Political rivals agree on timetable for ruling coalition to quit and be replaced by government of independents.


Tunisia's political rivals have agreed on a timetable for the Islamist-led ruling coalition to quit and be replaced by a government of independents.

The Islamist Ennahda party and opposition groups in the country signed a roadmap aimed at creating a new government within three weeks.

Saturday's deal, signed in the presence of politicians and media, was brokered to end a simmering two-month crisis sparked by the assassination in July of opposition MP Mohamed Brahmi.

The document, drawn up by four mediators, foresees the nomination of an independent prime minister by the end of next week, who would then have two weeks to form a cabinet.

It says that after the first day of national dialogue, "the government will resign with a delay not exceeding three weeks".

Abdelhamid Jlassi, one of the leaders of Ennahda, , told AFP news agency the national dialogue is not expected to start on Monday, however.

"First there will be preparatory meetings, and the date of the government's resignation will not be determined until the start of the real national dialogue," he said.

"Ennahda's signature today is a major concession made in the interests of the country," he added.

By signing the roadmap, the Ennahda-led coalition, which has been rocked by the murder of two political opponents, economic woes and prolonged political disputes, has agreed to step down two years after winning a general election.

Its victory at the polls on October 23, 2011, was the first free vote in Tunisian history, and followed the overthrow of long-ruling strongman Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in the first revolt of the Arab Spring.

The roadmap also foresees, within the next four weeks and after a national dialogue across the political spectrum, the adoption of a constitution and a timetable for elections.

Mistrust

"I want to thank you for joining this dialogue because you are opening the door of hope for Tunisians," said Houcine Abassi, whose UGTT trade union confederation was the lead mediator behind the roadmap, at Saturday's ceremony.

Delegates at the Palais des Congres said the launch of the hard-won dialogue with a symbolic ceremony had earlier been jeopardised by a last-minute dispute.

The UGTT said Ennahda had initially refused to formally sign the text that underlines the timetable of the national dialogue.

The two sides are still divided over issues including the date of elections, the role of a special assembly finishing a draft of a new constitution and composition of an electoral body to oversee the vote.

aljazeera.com/english
Longface
In Egypt, a campaign to promote an ‘Egyptian Islam’



Angocachi
Angocachi

On Al Qaeda in Libya

The seizure and rendition of key al-Qaeda operative Abu Anas al-Libi in Tripoli on Oct. 5 is being hailed as a victory for American counterterrorism efforts. Given that Libi — or Nazih Abdul Hamed al-Raghie, as he is known in civilian life — has been a wanted man in the United States for more than a decade, a victory undoubtedly it is. Libi is under indictment in the United States for his alleged role in the 1998 African embassy bombings. On closer inspection, however, the rendition operation also exposes the contradictions of American Libya policy and, in particular, the boon for al-Qaeda-linked and al-Qaeda-inspired groups that the US-backed Feb. 17 revolution against Moammar Gadhafi has represented.

Indeed, the very fact that Libi could have been living openly in Tripoli is a direct result of the triumph of the anti-Gadhafi revolution. Albeit little known to most Americans, during the last years of Gadhafi’s rule, the “old” Libya had become a “critical ally in US counterterrorism efforts” — as one leaked State Department memo put it. Gadhafi was particularly eager to cooperate, given his interest in taming Libya’s own homegrown al-Qaeda affiliate, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) . The organization — of which Libi was a member — had long been dedicated to overturning Gadhafi's “apostate” rule and replacing it with Islamic governance.

It is surely no coincidence that, per the declarations of his son Abdullah , Libi returned to Tripoli in August 2011. It was at this very time that rebel forces seized control of the Libyan capital, their path to Tripoli having been paved by massive NATO bombing. If the “new” Libya that has emerged as a result was likewise an effective and reliable ally of the United States, then a simple extradition request ought to have sufficed for the United States to obtain custody of Libi. Special forces raids conducted in defiance of another country’s sovereignty are typically reserved for hostile or failed states.

That the triumph of the Libyan rebellion would, on the contrary, provide an exceptionally hospitable environment for al-Qaeda and kindred jihadist organizations was inevitable. As documented in my recent book The Jihadist Plot: The Untold Story of Al-Qaeda and the Libyan Rebellion , it was none other than the LIFG that provided the military backbone of the anti-Gadhafi rebellion. The history of close cooperation between the LIFG and al-Qaeda was so extensive that the Libyan group figured among the very first organizations to be designated as al-Qaeda affiliates by the UN Security Council in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, by the late 1990s — long before Ayman al-Zawahiri officially announced the “merger” of the two groups — the LIFG was already essentially operating as a full-fledged al-Qaeda chapter.

The leading role played by the LIFG in the anti-Gadhafi rebellion became glaringly obvious in August 2011, when Tripoli fell and Abdul-Hakim Belhadj, the historical commander of the organization, emerged as the city’s new military governor. Self-professed and celebrated veterans of jihad would likewise lead rebel forces on other key fronts of the Libyan war.

The role played by the LIFG appears to have been anything but accidental. As British court documents cited in The Jihadist Plot show, the LIFG had a longstanding plan for destabilizing the Gadhafi regime, consisting of many of the same tactics that would be put into practice at the outset of the rebellion in February 2011. Testimony suggests that the author of the LIFG plan was Abu al-Munthir, aka Sami al-Saadi, the chief ideologist of the organization.

Both Belhadj and Saadi — respectively, the military and the “spiritual” leader of the LIFG — had just as intimate ties with Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda core as Libi. Indeed, as the leaders of the LIFG, their ties were undoubtedly more intimate. According to former LIFG member Noman Benotman, Belhadj was present with bin Laden at Tora Bora in December 2001 as US and allied forces closed in on the al-Qaeda leader’s mountain refuge. Saadi enjoyed such prestige among the Arab jihadists that established their base of operations in Afghanistan in the 1990s that Taliban leader Mullah Omar is said to have dubbed him — and not bin Laden! — “the Sheikh of the Arabs in Afghanistan.”

Moreover, both men have been connected to major terror plots in the West. Phone records obtained by Spanish investigators show that only weeks before the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, Belhadj was in touch with Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, the leader of the cell that would go on to carry out the attacks.

Three weeks after the bombings, Fakhet and six accomplices blew themselves up as Spanish police laid siege to their hideout in a Madrid suburb. According to Spanish counterterrorism expert Fernando Reinares, only minutes before the explosives were detonated Fakhet contacted another leading LIFG member in London. At the time, numerous LIFG members were living in asylum in the United Kingdom, as had Libi before he became a suspect in the embassy bombings. The timing strongly suggests that Fakhet’s London contact was the “emir” of the Madrid terror cell.

A certain “Abu Munthir” has been identified by British investigators as the guru of the so-called “fertilizer plot.” The plotters, young British Muslims who had trained in al-Qaeda camps in Pakistan, were planning on setting off ammonium nitrate bombs at civilian targets back home in the United Kingdom. The plot was broken up in early 2004. Numerous clues suggest that the “Abu Munthir” in question is none other than Sami “Abu al-Munthir” al-Saadi. Indeed, Saadi would himself be detained and rendered to Libya at the very time that the “fertilizer plot” was being broken up. According to the testimony of one of plotters, the Abu Munthir of the “fertilizer plot” was also attempting to obtain a radioactive “dirty bomb” — namely, with the help of a certain “Abu Anas.”

In detaining Libi, US authorities undoubtedly believed they were going after low-hanging fruit. But the root of the problem in Libya is the vast and heavily armed network of jihadist militias whose ascendency America and its NATO allies themselves secured. It was to be expected that the militias would not take long to respond to the rendition of Abu Anas. With the temporary detention of Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, who has since been released, an indication of that response has come. By seizing Zeidan, the militias are letting the whole world know where the real power in today’s Libya lies.

John Rosenthal is a European-based journalist and political analyst who writes on transatlantic security issues. His new book is The Jihadist Plot: The Untold Story of Al-Qaeda and the Libyan Rebellion . His articles have appeared in such publications as World Affairs, Policy Review, The Wall Street Journal Europe, Les Temps Modernes and Die Weltwoche , as well as numerous online media. You can follow his work at www.trans-int.com or on Facebook .


Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/qaeda-libya-rise-zeidan-us.html#ixzz2hZZxrFy5

Longface
Unrest rises in Tunisia after Islamists kill police officers
[​IMG]
Tensions are rising in Tunisia , where the ruling moderate Islamist Ennahda party and opposition have been trying to start talks to end a paralyzing deadlock since the assassination of two secular opposition leaders earlier this year.

Wednesday's killings delayed the long-awaited negotiations to save a transition to democracy, once seen as a model for the region, nearly three years after the first Arab Spring uprising toppled Tunisian autocrat Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.
Clashes erupted at a government building in Kef in northern Tunisia after funerals for the officers, with enraged residents accusing Ennahda of being too lenient with hardline Islamists. ‮‮‮‮‮‮‮ ‬‬‬‬‬‬‬Protesters attacked two local party offices of Ennahda in Kef and Beja, ransacking one and burning furniture in the street. Demonstrators took to the streets in four other cities to demand the Ennahda government resign, residents said.
"Ennahda killed my son, I will not accept consolation only after the departure of Ennahda...They are destroying our country and kill our children and want to turn Tunisia into a new Sudan," said the mother of Socrate Charni, one of the seven slain policemen.
Divisions between Islamists and their secular opponents have widened in one of the Muslim world's most secular countries.
Prime Minister Ali Larayedh says Ennahda is ready to resign, but insists on the completion of the country's new constitution, the establishment of an electoral commission and a clear election date before handing over power.
Talks are scheduled over the next three weeks to decide on a caretaker government and set a date for elections. But opposition leaders want Ennahda to be clearer about its intention to resign.
The government two months ago declared a local hardline Islamist movement, Ansar al-Sharia, to be a terrorist organization and began a crackdown that authorities say has led to more than 300 arrests.

Islamist violence is less common in Tunisia than in some other North African countries, where al Qaeda-associated groups have a stronger presence. But militants have grown in influence since the Arab Spring felled relatively secular authoritarian leaders who had suppressed Islamists for decades.

Tunisia: Uncovering Ansar al-Sharia

The public rise of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) – the radical Islamist group recently listed as a terrorist organisation by the Tunisian government – first began two and a half years ago, and online.
On 27 April, 2011, a blog titled the al-Qayrawan Media Foundation (QMF) was created, and two days later a corresponding Facebook page was established. Then, on 15 May, another Facebook page under the name Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia was launched, coinciding with the announcement that a conference would be convened in Tunis on 21 May.
This is the public story of AST’s emergence, and since 2011, the group’s visibility has grown significantly; the group has courted controversy through its protests against blasphemy, been accused of involvement in political violence, and been banned by the state. Yet the organisation remains poorly understood, not least with regards to its real origins, the story of which stretches several years further back than 2011, runs much deeper into Tunisian politics than has otherwise been disclosed, and has up to now stayed largely concealed.
Prison plans
In late August 2013 and early September 2013, I had the opportunity to meet one of the individuals (who will remain anonymous) present at the actual founding of AST. The event took place in 2006 in a Tunisian prison.
According to the source, when Hamadi Jebali – a senior member of the Islamist organisation al-Nahda who went on to become Prime Minister (2011-2013) – was released from jail in February 2006, some more radical Islamists believed they too could be leaving prison soon. They began planning for their mission once on the outside, and though the group did not have a name for it at the time, 20 Islamists, including AST’s future leader, Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi, agreed to create a new organisation.
The group’s release in fact took longer than expected, and it was only in March 2011, following the overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, that they were pardoned and set free. Once outside, the group organised, gathering in Abu Iyadh’s house, and began implementing the plans they had been working on for the previous five years. AST started outreach efforts in Tunis, Sousse, Sidi Bouzid, al-Qayrawan, and Bizerte as well as making contact with the Salafi cleric Shaykh al-Khatib al-Idrissi .
Although there is more public distance between al-Idrissi and AST currently, when AST first began, al-Idrissi promoted its existence and early activities via his official Facebook page and was loosely affiliated with AST’s original media outlet QMF. Al-Idrissi is one of, if not the most, influential Salafi clerics in Tunisia. In 1985, he went to Saudi Arabia and formally trained with some of the most important Salafi clerics of the modern era including ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd Allah bin Baz. AST’s early outreach to al-Idrissi highlights the fact it wanted strong backing from the ‘ulama – the class of Muslim legal scholars – to legitimise its cause.
Since spring 2012, al-Idrissi has been less public in his support for AST, and around a similar time, AST established a new media outlet named al-Bayyariq Media Foundation. It appears that al-Idrissi’s the current relationship with AST is more as an unaffiliated outside spiritual guide and that Abu Iyadh is the main link between AST and al-Idrissi.
Friends in high places
In addition to these early efforts, AST also had meetings and communications with al-Nahda, now Tunisia’s biggest political party, including with its leader Rachid Ghannouchi. According the founding member of AST I spoke with, relations between the Salafis and al-Nahda went back to the time that members of each group were in prison together. They reportedly passed letters to one another and were in close communication, though good relations may have been kept for cynical purposes. For example, a letter from Ali Larayedh, Tunisia’s current Prime Minister, to Nur al-Din Ganduz, another senior al-Nahda figure, allegedly explained that the Salafis were beneficial to al-Nahda because they make them look better and more moderate in comparison.
Following the overthrow of Ben Ali and the release of the prisoners, dialogue between factions within al-Nahda and AST continued. The individual I spoke with said that in 2011 he personally attended two meetings at Ghannouchi’s home in el-Menzah, just north of Tunis. In these meetings, Ghannouchi allegedly told Abu Iyadh to encourage the youth of AST to join the national army to infiltrate it, and to get another group of youth do the same with the National Guard.
This claim is less surprising when one bears in mind the leaked video that surfaced in October 2012 in which Ghannouchi provides strategic advice to the Salafis. In one part of the video, the al-Nahda leader warns, “the Army is in their [the secularists] hands. We cannot guarantee the police and the army.” It is possible Ghannouchi did not want to risk his own cadres, but saw a back door to controlling elements within the security apparatus by using the Salafis and the zeal of their youth members.
This relationship between al-Nahda and AST has since soured, and the al-Nahda-led government designated AST as a terrorist organisation on 27 August, 2013.
Brothers and arms
In the two and a half years since AST emerged in Tunisian politics, the organisation has been involved in a serious campaign for hearts and minds publicly. Yet it is also believed to have been involved in more nefarious and concealed activities, though these have been difficult to confirm. The founding member of AST, however, provided some insights these shadier aspects of the group and suggested he quit the group in AST because of “what was behind the curtain.”
He confirmed that AST has a military wing, thus contradicting one of Abu Iyadh’s famous statements that Tunisia is a land of da’wah (meaning preaching or invitation) and not jihad, and his claim that AST does not have or obtain weapons. The individual also noted that the relationship of AST with Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) and Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (ASE) is like a “spider web,” explaining that they all know one another – presumably referring to the groups’ respective leaders. Further, the source said certain members of AST, ASL, and ASE travelled together to Gaza and northern Sinai in 2012. He did not say that they went for military training – though it should not necessarily be ruled out considering Tunisians have reportedly trained in Libya with ASL – but rather to meet Palestinian Salafis who advised them on issues related to administration, organisation, and management.
When analysing semi-clandestine Salafi organisations, one needs to bear in mind what one knows for sure and what one doesn’t, especially as the latter category often overshadows the former. And there are still many questions to answer regarding AST, such as its relationship with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its role in recent violence in Tunisia. However, as AST continues to be important in Tunisia despite its official ban, hopefully filling in some previously concealed gaps regarding its history, its relations and its strategies will help us understand the mysterious group a little better.
Schmeisser